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Abstract 
This thesis examines the origins and emergence of operational art. It does so by studying the 
changes in the conduct of warfare that caused operational art to emerge. It further investigates 
how armies perceived and responded to the changes. The thesis emphasises how armies 
adapted at the higher levels of command and especially the strategic-operational interactions. 
Operational art in western armed forces is often defined in broad terms and may span the 
entire spectre from strategy to tactics. It has been criticised for that reason and for being a 
relic from the Cold War. This thesis argues that operational art emerged piece-meal from the 
mid-nineteenth century. The reason for its emergence was the increased complexity of 
warfare caused by the effects of new technology, the industrial revolution, and mass armies. 
The parts first came together in the Allied 1918 offensive that won the First World War. 
When operational art was defined conceptually in the Soviet Union’s Red Army in the 1920s, 
the Allied offensive was at the core of the definition. There were previous examples of 
successful operational art, such as the Russian 1916 Brusilov offensive and the German 1918 
spring offensives. Still, all suffered from dysfunctional strategic direction and failed 
strategically despite positive tactical and operational results. 
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 Introduction 
 
By my faith! For more than forty years I have been speaking prose without knowing 
anything about it, and I am much obliged to you for having taught me that. 
“Monsieur Jourdain”1 
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein2 
 
When I first was introduced to operational art as a Staff College student, it was, together with 
“maneuvre warfare”, the philosopher’s stone to success in war. When I came back as an 
instructor a few years later, returning from a deployment to Afghanistan, a clear 
understanding of operational art was not that easy to get around. Was it a level of war or 
perhaps a more skilful and artistic approach to warfare? Historical examples revolved around 
“operational warfare” and “operational maneuvre”, where common traits among the stunning 
historical examples were the size and curvature of the arrows on the maps. When I got 
involved in doctrinal processes, my confusion reached new levels, since there were numerous 
and different doctrinal definitions of operational art. Frustration grew, even more, when new 
concepts were introduced that promised both to change the nature of war and make 
operational art superfluous. When I then back-tracked to translations of Soviet definitions and 
discussions from the 1920s, much of the mystique went away, but was what was left really 
worth all the fuss? There was no other option left but to find out myself. 
 
This is a study of the emergence of operational art. Operational art is the planning and 
conduct of military operations to achieve strategic objectives by directing the effort of tactical 
forces.3 Operational elements, separate pieces of operational art, became parts of warfare 
when modern operations began to take shape in the last half of the nineteenth century. These 
elements became more prevalent in numerous wars before 1914 and in operations in the last 
 
1
 J. B. Poquelin de Molière, Le bourgeois gentilhomme (New York: W. R. Jenkins, 1889), 31. “Par ma foi , il y 
a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose , sans que j’en susse rien ; et je vous suis le plus obligé du monde , 
de m’avoir appris cela.” Translated by Philip Dwight Jones: "The Middle Class Gentleman,"  
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2992/2992-h/2992-h.htm. 
2
 “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.” Translation by Pears/McGuinness at 
http://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Logisch-
philosophische Abhandlung (London: Kegan Paul, 1922), 109.  
3
 Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis, MN.: Eastview, 1927; repr., 2004), 68-69, 269-271. 
  8  
part of the First World War. All of these elements were first brought together when 
operational art materialised during the Allied offensives in 1918. 
 
The research question is 
 
How, why, and for what purpose did operational art emerge? 
 
Operational art as a concept was not identified by the armies that conducted it in the First 
World War. Both the Allied and the German post-war analyses interpreted developments in 
1918 as pragmatic adaptations of tactics and strategy. They had been “speaking prose without 
knowing anything about it”. Operational art was first defined by the Soviet General Alexandr 
Andreevich Svechin in the 1920s as the third military discipline that bridged strategy and 
tactics.4 A military discipline in this context is a major field of military science, alongside 
strategy and tactics.5 Operational art was confined to the Soviet sphere of influence until the 
1980s when it entered the American military reform debate and US Army doctrine.6 
 
Since its introduction in the western militaries during the 1980s, operational art has been 
debated, criticised, questioned, and rejected outright. The critique spans claims that 
operational art is an artificial construct that only serves to confuse strategy and tactics to its 
lack of utility in the counter-insurgencies of the twenty-first century. Operational art as a 
concept also met with scepticism long before it was formally introduced in US Army 
doctrine: “The purpose of such an innovation [operational art] is unclear ... in western military 
science operational art as a theoretical concept is completely rejected. ... The West should not 
add this concept to its armoury.”7 This fragmented quote by Walter D. Jacobs is somewhat 
misleading since Jacobs wrote in the Cold War environment and argued that operational art 
was a unique Soviet construction to structure warfare formally “because of the limits placed 
 
4
 Ibid., 67-68. 
5
 S. N. Kozlov et al., "Soviet Military Science," (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defence Technical Information Center, 
1967), 67-77. 
6
 Jacob W. Kipp, "Operational Art and the Curoius Narrative on the Russian Contribution: Presence and 
Absence Over the Last 2 Deacades," in The Russian military today and tomorrow : essays in memory of Mary 
Fitzgerald, ed. Stephen Blank and Richard Weitz (Carlisle, PA: Stategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2010), 194-203; Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U. S. Army," in The 
operational art : developments in the theories of war, ed. B. J. C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996); "FM 100-5 Operations," ed. Department of the Army (Washington DC, 
1982); "FM 100-5 Operations," ed. Department of the Army (Washington DC, 1986). 
7
 Walter Jacobs, Army Magazine, November 1961, quoted in Justin Kelly and Michael J. Brennan, Alien: How 
Operational Art Devoured Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 1. 
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in the USSR on original thinking and imagination.”8 Such a formal construct would allow 
Soviet commanders more freedom in their operations than the established strategy-tactics 
understanding. On the other hand, Western commanders already had the necessary freedom of 
action and did not need another level of command.9 
 
Much of the critique of operational art is based on a superficial understanding of it as large 
scale campaigns and operations, an understanding that is also reflected in early doctrinal 
definitions and historical case studies. What is lacking is an explicit conceptual understanding 
of operational art beyond formal doctrine and the popular images of le bataillon carré, 
Blitzkrieg, and glubokaya operatsiya (deep operations). To understand and criticise 
operational art, an in-depth study of its essence is needed. 
 
This thesis explores the nature and character of operational art by studying its origins, 
emergence, and finally its materialisation in 1918, in light of the early and original 
descriptions and theoretical expressions. It bases itself on other studies that have identified the 
First World War’s role in the emergence of operational art but will study the campaigns and 
operations in light of the initial Soviet definition of operational art in the 1920s.10 The thesis 
aims to reconsider the operations in 1918 to determine whether they illustrated operational art 
avant la lettre. The aim is not to write new interpretations of military history, but a critical 
analysis of the planning and conduct of operations to clarify the emergence of operational art. 
 
One essential question in this study is whether operational art can exist without explicit 
terminology. “The surest sign that a society has entered into the secure possession of a new 
concept is that a new vocabulary will be developed, in terms of which the concept can be 
publicly articulated and discussed.”11 This insight by Quentin Skinner implies that a 
phenomenon can exist as a concept, although it is not yet explicitly recognised and defined. It 
will, on the other hand, be difficult to “articulate and discuss” the phenomenon when it is 
 
8
 Walter Darnell Jacobs, "The Art of Operations," Army Magazine, November (1961), 64. 
9
 Ibid., passim. 
10
 Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940 (Lawrence, Kan.: University 
Press of Kansas, 2001), 62-71; Nick Lloyd, "Allied Operational Art in the Hundred Days, 1918," The British 
Army Review no. 156 (2012); William James Philpott, War of Attrition: fighting the First World War (London: 
Little, Brown, 2014), 306-339; David T. Zabecki, The German 1918 offensives : a case study in the operational 
level of war (London: Routledge 2006). 
11
 Quentin Skinner, The foundations of modern political thought, 2 vols. Vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), 352. 
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merely a form of practice. Is it possible for a practice to be consciously developed as a distinct 
concept without its own phraseology? The Prussian philosopher General Carl von Clausewitz 
also raised a similar concern: “Not until terms and concepts have been defined can one hope 
to make any progress in examining the question clearly and simply and expect the reader to 
share one’s views.”12 This thesis will explore whether a new and unrecognised practice can 
exist and be further developed in the absence of a new vocabulary, at least until it is 
reconciled with existing terminology.  
 
To answer the research question, the sources must be studied to identify operational elements 
that were not necessarily identified and recognised as such by the historical actors. At the 
same time, care must be taken to understand the historical meaning and content of the sources 
and avoid to interpret them in light of modern operational terminology. Historical actions and 
expressions that appear to represent operational elements viewed in hindsight were not 
necessarily that. On the other hand, nineteen-century operational elements may not look like 
those in modern doctrines, keeping in mind how operational art is perceived in the twenty-
first century. These methodical concerns lead to a supporting research question:  
 
What is the nature and character of operational art? 
 
This research question will serve as a framework for analysis to identify operational elements 
in warfare and writings before operational art was acknowledged and defined. 
 
The term nature is used as in the English translation of the German term Natur in Clausewitz’ 
book On War (Vom Kriege). Nature is the essence, the enduring characteristics of a 
phenomenon. Character, German Charakter, is, on the other hand, the expressions of a 
phenomenon that will vary according to circumstances.13 The character of operational art is 
reflected in the evolving and changing character of both warfare and military operations. The 
understanding of the character will illustrate how these operations were understood and 




 Carl von Clausewitz, On War: Indexed Edition (Princeton N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1989), 132.  
13
 Ibid., 61, 87-89, 220, 593-594; Svechin, Strategy, 67-70, 269271; Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Berlin: 
Ullstein, 1999), 23, 44-47, 206-207, 669-670. 
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This thesis will trace operational art’s historical and theoretical origins and study the way 
operational elements, these single pieces of the puzzle that make up operational art, became 
part of warfare when modern operations began to emerge. The emphasis will be on the 
planning and conduct of operations in the last part of the First World War. Finally, the thesis 
will consider the way the strategic and operational experiences of the war were understood 
and expressed in theory and doctrine during the interwar years. 
 
The relevance of this thesis is reflected in the academic and military debate of the past few 
decades, where operational art has been criticised for no longer being a useful concept after 
the prospects of large-scale conventional war declined: 
 
Does the nature of strategy accommodate intervening concepts? Operational art, for all 
the good it did early on in enabling a reemphasis on the actual and skilful conduct of 
war, has perhaps run its course and should be folded back into those concepts which 
existed prior to its development.14 
 
Thus, operational art is regarded by many no longer relevant or necessary as a military 
discipline alongside strategy and tactics. Several military practitioners and academics argue 
that the concept should be taken out of military nomenclature and relegated to history’s 
junkyard. The critique is broad and ranges from the information technology optimism of the 
1990s to contemporary counter-insurgencies and small wars advocates. Operational art is 
challenged from a technological basis by the claim that information technology and 
networking will make the operational level of command unnecessary. Some small wars 
proponents claim that operational art is ill-suited to small wars and counter-insurgencies. The 
critique is not uniform, but operational art also has its advocates. But what was regarded as an 
established element of military art a few decades ago is now receiving differentiated critique 
from several quarters.15 
 
The above-mentioned critique of operational art in western militaries began before it was 
introduced as a doctrinal concept. There were critical voices from the outset. US Army Major 
Stephen T. Jordan recollects the professional debate in his US Army Command and General 
 
14
 Lukas Milevski, "Strategy and the Intervening Concept of Operational Art," Infinity Journal 4, no. 3 (Spring 
2015), 22. 
15
 Yacov Bengo and Shay Shabtai, "The Post Operational Level Age: How to Properly Maintain the Interface 
between Policy, Strategy, and Tactics in Current Military Challenges," ibid.; Erik J. Dahl, "Network centric 
warfare and the death of operational art," Defence Studies, 2, no. 1 (2002); Kelly and Brennan, Alien: How 
Operational Art Devoured Strategy; Hew Strachan, "The lost meaning of strategy," Survival 47, no. 3 (2005).  
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Staff College monograph from 1991, Operational Art: Modern Utility or Defunct Doctrinal 
Concept: 
 
Contemporary discussion on the subject relates operational art to levels of war, levels of 
command, levels of planning, sizes of forces involved, and even to geographical 
characteristics of the battlefield. This broadening of the doctrinal concept clouds the 
issue of its practical utility to warfighting. While certain characteristics similar to those 
above emerge in the practice of operational art on the modern battlefield, its utility as a 
concept must be derived from what it “is”, not what it “looks like.”16 
 
Jordan highlights how vaguely operational art was understood and how imprecisely it has 
been applied in doctrine and operations, but he concludes that operational art still has a utility 
as a doctrinal concept. His monograph is a historical case study of two Second World War 
operations and Operation Desert Storm in 1991. It is also an example of the challenges 
involved in trying to bring clarity to an abstract concept to be used in a dynamic activity such 
as war. These challenges include how to interpret specific historical elements, such as force 
ratios, lack of operational doctrine, and planning processes in light of contemporary 
operational doctrine.17 
 
He then underlines two distinct elements in the debate when he highlights the difference 
between what operational art “is” as opposed to what it “looks like”. Military operations may 
share many similarities, although they were conducted in different centuries, planned and 
executed for different purposes, and based on different doctrinal approaches. To find out what 
it “is”, operational art must be studied critically in its historical context. Facets that must be 
studied include the way it was expressed in doctrine, education, and in the planning and 
conduct of operations. The “is” question concerns the nature of operational art, its enduring 
characteristics that are independent of context. The “looks like” or “looked like” are, on the 
other hand, the context-determined practices: the character of operational art. An illustration 
is whether American operational art in the Second World War was “real” operational art, as 
Michael R. Matheny claims, or did it just “look like it”? Some historians have questioned 
whether operations by the Western Allies might even have succeeded better and with fewer 
casualties, had they known the theoretical foundations of operational art.18 
 
16
 Stephen T. Jordan, Operational Art: Modern Utility or Defunct Doctrinal Concept (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, 1991), 1. 
17
 Ibid., 33-38. 
18
 Russel H. S. Stolfi, "A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised and Contrasted," The Journal of 
Military History 68, no. 2 (2004); Russell F. Weigley, "Normandy to Falaise A Critique of Allied Operational 
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The two military disciplines of strategy and tactics have been the framework for 
conceptualising war since the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Strategy provided the 
objectives to decide the war, while tactics determined how military engagements were 
conducted to achieve these objectives: “According to our classification, then, tactics teaches 
the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of 
the war.”19 This strategic-tactical dualism was challenged in the last part of the nineteenth 
century. Universal conscription, technology, and the industrial revolution increased the size 
and sustainability of armies to the point that victories in battles were often insufficient to 
decide wars. Battles became protracted in time and space, they often lasted for weeks and 
spanned hundreds of kilometres. The outcomes were no longer decisive in the sense that a 
definite outcome could be used by strategy for the object of the war. A widening gap 
developed between the strategic objectives of winning the war and the outcomes of 
engagements and battles. 
 
This tectonic drift of the two military disciplines of strategy and tactics made it increasingly 
more difficult to decide wars by tactical victories. The idealised Napoleonic decisive battle 
would no longer lead to strategic decision and victory in war. Simultaneously, strategic 
leadership lacked the ability to manage the new complexity and sustain the enormous increase 
in forces and the subsequent enormous logistical demands in the field. General staffs and 
military science struggled to span the gap during the industrialised people’s wars from the 
1860s onwards. There were several perceptions of war and different approaches to the 
conduct of modern war in the decades before the First World War.20 This study will examine 
when and how operational art emerged as an approach to bridge this gap. 
 
Operational art emerged as a practical response to the increased military complexity to bridge 
the strategic-tactical gap.21 The bridge consisted of consecutive operations planned and 
conducted by a dedicated operational command. The high command initially directed 
operations, such as the Prussian “mobile General Staff” in 1866. When complexity increased, 
 
Planning in 1944," in Historical perspectives of the operational art, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips 
(Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2005), 409-410. 
19
 Clausewitz, On War: Indexed Edition, 128. Italics in original. 
20
 Antulio J. Echevarria, After Clausewitz: German military thinkers before the Great War (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 2000); Azar Gat, A history of military thought : from the Enlightenment to the Cold 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 269-516. 
21
 Bruce W. Menning, "Operational Art’s Origins," in Historical perspectives of the operational art, ed. Michael 
D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips (Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2005), 4-10. 
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separate commands, army groups, were formed to plan and conduct operations. The high 
command was to provide strategic direction of the operations towards the object of the war.22 
 
In principle, strategic aims and objectives would be developed in an “unequal dialogue”23 
between the political leadership and the military high command, which represents the 
strategic level of command. These aims and objectives were political in their nature and were 
to direct the armed forces to ensure the political dimension in the planning and execution of 
military campaigns. Modern operations consume enormous amounts of ammunition, fuel, and 
other supplies. Industrial production and prioritising civilian resources to sustain the war 
effort demanded close political-military cooperation. The strategic aims in the modern 
industrialised war came to depend on the societies’ ability to support the operations to reach 
those aims, which added a substantial domestic element to the “unequal dialogue”. 
 
The operational commanders, subordinated to the high command, would plan and conduct 
military operations within the framework of the campaign to reach the given aims and 
objectives. Operational art was directly related to strategy and had to be fully aware of both 
the military aims of policy as well as the comprehensive political context. In a similar way, 
policy should be aware of the possibilities and limitations of strategy and the operations that 
strategy uses to reach its aims.24 The operational commander would then direct and sustain the 
tactical forces throughout the operation, while the tactical commanders conduct the fighting. 
Any element of war, such as operational art, must, therefore, also be studied within war as a 





 Arden Bucholz, Moltke and the German wars, 1864-1871, European history in perspective (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), 119-121; Nikolai N. Movchin, Posledovatel'nye operatsii po opytu Marny i Visly [Consecutive 
Operations According to the Experience of the Marne and the Vistula] (Moscow, Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe 
Izdatel'stvo, 1928), 119-121; Svechin, Strategy, 68-70, 259-262. 
23
 Elliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York NY: The 
Free Press, 2002), 12. 
24
 “a politician who sets a political goal for military operations must have an idea of what is feasible for strategy 
given the resources available and how politics may affect the situation for better or for worse.” Svechin, 
Strategy, 74; Clausewitz, On War: Indexed Edition, 605-610. 
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Sources and methodology 
 
The primary sources are published texts, plans, orders, and other sources that provide insights 
into how operational art originated and emerged. The chief sources are books, articles, and 
archival material that are grouped into three categories. The first category is military 
theoretical works that describe and discuss how military thinking and theory developed and 
how operational elements emerged explicitly or indirectly up to 1914. The next are texts and 
archival material that describe the planning and conduct of campaigns and operations. The 
third category is military theoretical works that analysed the First World War and discussed 
how to plan and prepare for the next war. The third category of sources is, on the one hand, 
comprised of Soviet post-1918 writings that identified a new military discipline focused on 
operational elements and operational art. On the other hand, texts and doctrines from western 
armies, some that developed operational art and others that maintained the pre-war strategic-
tactical patterns. 
 
Note on sources 
 
The references contain both official histories and archived primary sources. The official 
histories serve both as secondary sources when their narrative is cited, but also as primary 
sources to understand how central military terms were perceived, especially those related to 
operational elements and operational art. The French army’s official history is a particularly 
rich primary source.  
 
Les armées françaises dans la Grande guerre (AFGG), the French official history of the 
First World War, was published in 11 tomes (main volumes). Each tome contains between 
one and four volumes, while each volume contains up to five books of annexes and maps. The 
annexes consists of primary sources, such as orders, protocols of conferences, and directives.  
 
Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, the official German history of World War One, was published 
in 14 volumes from 1925 to 1944. Contrary to the AFGG, the Weltkrieg is a historical 
narrative without primary sources attached. However, there are some primary source 
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references and quotations by key commanders and other actors in the text. Der Weltkrieg is 
deliberately biased support the German army’s narrative regarding its role in the war.25  
 
The British Official History of the Great War was published in 29 volumes between 1922 
and 1948.26 There are selected primary sources printed as appendices in each volume, while 
selected French and German sources are quoted in the chapters. In addition, some volumes 
have added books of annexes and maps. Volumes of the OGHW received criticism from 
various commentators and historians, but Andrew Green says of the OHGW that “one must 




A major concern is operational elements have to be extracted indirectly in texts that originated 
before the Soviets defined operational art in the 1920s. Another issue is that since operational 
art did not enter western military terminology until the 1980s, operational elements outside 
the Soviet sphere of influence will also have to be derived circuitously. These concerns are 
addressed by examining historical texts in search of descriptions, phrases, and terms, that may 
reveal operational elements. A strict methodology is observed that aims to understand the 
texts within their historical context and avoid interpreting historical content and meaning in 
light of twenty-first-century operational doctrine and terminology. 
 
The study of warfare is primarily based on published historical studies of campaigns and 
operations and supplemented with official histories and primary sources for detailed studies of 
operational elements. This thesis does not aim to offer any alternative narratives, but will 
rather expand the knowledge of the planning and conduct of operations to identify operational 
elements and the emergence of operational art. Operational elements will contribute to 
 
25
 Der Weltkrieg 13, unnumbered page 3-10 after hardcover; Der Weltkrieg 14,1, unnumbered pages 3-7 after 
hardcover, unnumbered page 5 after hardcover, note 6; "The German Official History of the War Vol. 5," 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 74, no. 2 (1929); Gustav Roloff, "Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. 
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understanding how operational art emerged as practice before it was explicitly recognised and 
defined. The hypothesis is that operational art emerged as unconnected pieces of a puzzle that 
did not present those who were to solve it with any guide or template. On the contrary, the 
historical actors were not aware that there was a puzzle. The puzzle was only partly 
assembled at any time and all elements were not brought together until the Allied offensive 
from July to November 1918. Even then, few recognised the picture that the puzzle 
represented.  
 
When studying operational art, one methodical challenge is that it emerged as practice before 
its specific terminology was developed. Military historical studies tend to assume that 
operational art has been present since, or even before, the Napoleonic Wars.28 Warfare is a 
practical matter and military commanders may, therefore, as Monsieur Jourdain, “have been 
speaking prose without knowing anything about it”. The opposite approach is that a 
phenomenon cannot exist without a terminology. According to Ludwig Wittgenstein, “what 
we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”. If there was no operational terminology 
at a given time, did operational art exist? Did military activities just share some visible 
similarities with a twenty-century’s perception of operational art, such as envelopments and 
deep manoeuvres? Is operational art dependent on the ability to articulate it in specific 
operational terms, or is it to a great extent just a matter of practice? The methodological 
approach to these questions will be discussed and established in the next chapter. 
 
The thesis will follow three parallel paths in the study both of the conduct of war and of 
writings about warfare. The first is to discern when operational elements emerged in practice 
and military writings. The second path is a close examination of initial definitions and the 
discussions that lead to the original descriptions of operational art and the early conceptual 
explorations by Soviet theorists. Finally, the Soviet explicit expressions of operational art in 
the interwar period will be compared with French, German, and American understandings of 
contemporary war and military operations. This part will study whether operational art could 
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Along these paths, operational art will be studied in different phases; its origins, its emergence 
and materialisation, and finally its definition and initial theoretical developments. These 
phases are partly overlapping, partly parallel, and to a large extent influenced by the different 
countries’ military organisations and institutional characteristics. The methodological 





The first chapter will present the research status and provide an overview of the literature on 
operational art. It will cover literature about operational art, but also literature where 
operational art is a secondary subject or is just implicitly revealed as fragmented operational 
elements in a historical narrative. The chapter will also introduce and discuss theory and 
methodology that will be used in the study of warfare and texts. 
 
Chapters two and three explore the origins of operational art by questioning the meta-
narrative of the continuity of operational art from pre-industrial to present times. The chapter 
will follow two tracks. The first is the changes in land warfare from the Napoleonic wars to 
the First World War, emphasising campaigns and operations that have been used as examples 
of early operational art. The second track is the emergence and development of military 
thought and terminology that may have reflected operational art or operational elements. 
 
The fourth chapter will study two modern operations in the First World War. Both the 
Russian Brusilov offensive in 1916 and the German Michael offensive in the spring of 1918 
were spectacular operational successes by First World War standards. Still, they did not 
contribute to any positive strategic outcome. The conduct of these operations has since 
influenced tactical developments, operational art, and military doctrine. 
 
The Allied offensive on the Western Front that led to the armistice in November 1918 is the 
object of study in the fifth chapter. This offensive was conducted as strategically directed 
successive operations that led to the Allied victory. The hypothesis is that the Allies won 
because they mastered operational art as a military discipline, although it was not recognised 
at the time. They were able to establish and maintain functional interactions between strategy, 
operational art, and tactics.  
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The purpose of these chapters is to deduce why, how, and for what purpose operational art 
emerged as a practical solution of how to manage the complexities in modern war. 
 
The sixth chapter will study the definition and theoretical development of operational art in 
the Soviet Union in the 1920s and how operational art was outlined as a discrete part of war 
as a totality. The chapter is limited to the conceptual understanding of operational art and will 
not study in detail how operational art was later developed into doctrine. The Soviet case will 
be compared to French, German, and American understandings of modern war, to 
comprehend further operational art’s emergence, nature, and character. 
 
Level of analysis  
 
The thesis will emphasise the theoretical and conceptual content and development of 
operational art. However, it will not study how it was developed into specific operational 
concepts, doctrines, and force structures, which has already been thoroughly examined in the 
past decades.29 There are also numerous studies of military operations, with or without an 
operational framework, which span from descriptive narrative to critical analysis.30 These 
works tend to base their analysis on an established doctrinal definition of operational art, 
which is usually derived from the 1986 US Army definition in FM 100-5 Operations. There 
are also theoretical studies that analyse operational processes and interactions. These are rare 
and often confined to War and Staff Colleges that teach and train students to manage 
processes and procedures in operational headquarters. Shimon Naveh’s study is an atypical 
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exception, where he aims to explain operational art and its development from the perspective 
of systems theory.31 
 
There are some interactions between this thesis and studies of military innovation, such as 
studies of the British army’s “learning curve”, inventing modern warfare, or German 
stormtroop tactics.32 This thesis will study how the tactical results of these innovations were 
managed to reach objectives beyond the immediate outcome of the combination of tactical, 
organisational, and technological innovations, to explore operational art’s emergence in light 
of its initial definition and purpose. Pitfalls to be avoided are those of teleology and projecting 
contemporary operational concepts and doctrine into the past. These theoretical and 
methodological issues will be further elaborated on in the theory and methodology chapter. 
 
Operational art had a fragmented and piece-meal emergence. Operational elements, disparate 
pieces of an unknown puzzle, appeared and were lost again until a complete picture emerged 
in the final years of the First World War. The emergence was pragmatic responses to the 
changing character of land warfare that was caused by the increased range, volume, and 
precision of firepower, industrialised logistics, and armies of millions. Operational art as an 
integral part of military strategy that was harnessing tactics towards the strategic objective 
materialised itself for the first time in the 1918 Allied fall offensive operations. The Allied 
conduct of operations was in the 1920s defined as a new military discipline named operational 
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Chapter 1. Theory and methodology 
 
Many readers no doubt will consider it superfluous to make such a careful distinction 
between two things so closely related as tactics and strategy, because they do not 
directly affect the conduct of operations. Admittedly, only the rankest pedant would 
expect theoretical distinctions to show direct results on the battlefield. 
The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as 
it were, confused and entangled. Not until terms and concepts have been defined can 
one hope to make any progress in examining the question clearly and simply and expect 
the reader to share one’s views. 
Carl von Clausewitz.33 
 
This chapter will initially present and discuss the literature on operational art. It will then 
clarify the theoretical and methodical framework for the study. The purpose is to establish a 
comprehensive structure to identify and understand the emergence of operational art in its 
three phases; its origin, its early and partly unrecognised emergence and materialisation, and 
when operational art was defined as a unique military discipline. 
 
A central question is if operational art as a phenomenon can exist without a new vocabulary 
or clearly defined terms and concepts? Both the pragmatic and the theoretical-doctrinal lines 
in the development of operational art will be explored in parallel. The sources will be studied 
in light of what operational art “is”, as opposed to what it “looks like”. The purpose is to 
investigate whether operational art could exist without new and explicit terms, concepts, and 
vocabulary. Or, on the other hand, if operations that “looked like” operational art, but did not 
have the theoretical and doctrinal foundations, also were operational art. 
 
The literature review will emphasise texts that have shaped contemporary western 
understandings of operational art. It will present the research status and the main lines of 
argument in the professional and academic debate over the past two decades. The literature 
will be presented thematically and also chronologically within each of the themes. 
 
Operational art is not regarded as a military discipline or term in The Oxford Companion to 
Military History from 2004, but briefly noted en passant under “art, the military” and 
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“operational level of war”.34 Operational art is only mentioned as a Soviet term under 
“operations” in the 1986 Dictionary of Military Terms, although operational art had been an 
element in the professional and public military debate for several years.35 On the other hand, 
operational art is exhaustively recounted in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia of the 1970s, as 
well in the new online Great Russian Encyclopaedia.36 These examples reflect both that 
operational art is an established element in the Russian military nomenclature, while its 
position in western academia and military is less prominent. 
 
Soviet elaboration of operational art as a concept 
 
The literature consists of books, academic studies and professional compilations, reports by 
academics, think-tanks, and professionals, journal articles and web pages. Several books and 
articles are in addition, indirectly concerned with operational art and operational elements. 
These are historical studies of military campaigns and operations and military institutions 
when operational art was emerging as a phenomenon. Memoirs and biographies of 
commanders and other central historical actors will contribute to enlightening the emergence 
of operational art and modern operations.37 Studies of military innovation, technology, 
military education, doctrine, and command organisations will often if indirectly, provide 
valuable insights into operational elements.38Professional journals are excellent sources. 
Western journals first began to explicitly discuss operational art in the wake of the US Army 
doctrinal reform in the 1970s. Operational elements have been discussed indirectly and with 
different terminology back to the interwar years. Soviet military journals have been an arena 
for explicit operational discussions since the 1920s. 
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In addition to the interwar years’ Soviet writers, there are several scholarly studies on the 
development of Russian and Soviet military thought that provide essential contextual 
understanding for the study of operational art. Carl Van Dyke studied the development of 
Russian higher military education from the wake of the Napoleonic wars to the First World 
War in his Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914.39 The book is 
about the institutionalisation of education and the failed attempts to create a unified military 
doctrine.  
 
Dyke’s book parallels Bruce W. Menning’s Bayonets Before Bullets : The Imperial Russian 
Army, 1861–1914,40 where Menning presents the development of Russian warfare and 
strategic thinking. This process illustrates how some of their thinkers grasped the essence of 
what later was defined as operational art. Menning’s book provides a good description of the 
interplay between war experience, foreign influence, and Russian indigenous thinking that 
laid some of the intellectual foundations for the Red Army’s military theoretical 
developments in the 1920s. Both books are examples of historical studies that indirectly 
contribute to the study of operational art. Menning also wrote a short and concise article in 
Military Review on the development of operational art, especially the early Soviet theorists’ 
role. This article was printed as an introductory chapter in the 2005 anthology Historical 
perspectives of the operational art, edited by Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips.41 
 
Several influential Soviet military theorists were translated into English by the US Armed 
Forces and later published with scholars’ introductions and commentaries. Although the 
books were published after the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the texts were available to the US Army 
doctrine developers in the late 1970s and 1980s and arguably influenced the US Army’s 1982 
and 1986 FM 100-5 editions (the AirLand Battle doctrines).42 
 
Aleksandr Svechin is regarded as the first to define operational art and described it in a 
military theoretical text. His book, first published in Moscow in 1926, was followed by a 
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revised second edition in 1927 that was first published in English in 1991. Svechin was 
educated within a classic general staff tradition and was well versed in the teachings of Carl 
von Clausewitz. He also translated Clausewitz’s On War into Russian and wrote a short 
biography of the Prussian philosopher general.43 Svechin is of particular interest since he 
extracted the concept of operational art from classic military theory and the lessons of 
contemporary wars and military operations where the elements of operational art emerged. 
 
The Cass/Routledge Series Soviet Study of War published several Soviet historical texts and 
sources on the development of operational art. In 1994 Cass published Vladimir Kiriakovitch 
Triandafillov’s The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies, first printed in the Soviet 
Union in 1929. The edition has a foreword by Jacob W. Kipp and an introduction by James J. 
Schneider. The book has two parts. The first, “The State of Modern Armies”, was about land 
forces at the time of writing. It was about how armies have developed since the Great War 
and their current status in armaments, size, and organisation. The second part is the most 
interesting concerning operational art. Triandafillov developed an operational concept for 
conducting operational art in a modern environment.44 
 
The 1995 two-volume publication The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927-1991 The 
Documentary Basis, is a collection of selected Soviet texts on operational art. The first 
volume covers 1927 till 1965 and opens with some sections from Svechin’s Strategy. 
Varfolomeyev’s 1928 article on military theory development and two texts by Georgii 
Isserson are the next parts. The first is Isserson’s 1932 article in the periodical Voina i 
revolyusia (War and revolution), where he outlined the development of operational art. The 
next chapters cover Soviet analysis of operational experiences during the Second World War 
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The second volume of The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927-1991 The Documentary 
Basis, covers 1965 to 1991. Its first two chapters contain texts on the theoretical development 
in the interwar years as operational art was established and how it was intended to be 
conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. The final chapter reflects the debate on the changed 
strategic direction in the Gorbachev years up to 1991.46 
 
Georgii Isserson’s chapters in volume 2 of The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927-
1991 and other texts were issued in a revised edition of his book The Evolution of Operational 
Art in 1936 and published in a new translation by the US Army in 2013.47 Much of Isserson’s 
thinking is also available in Richard Harrison’s biography from 2010 and translation of six of 
Isserson’s military theoretical texts in 2016.48 Stephen J. Main explored Isserson’s views in 
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies in February 2016.49 Isserson’s writings include 
historical analysis, discussion of operational art in light of historical experiences, and 
operating concepts and doctrinal texts. He is credited with having had a significant influence 
on the development of Soviet operational art before he was demoted after his performance in 
the Winter War against Finland. 
 
The US National Defense University published the three volumes series The Voroshilov 
Lectures between 1989 and 1992. These were the teaching in the years 1973-1975 at the 
Military Academy of the General staff of the Soviet Armed Forces Marshal K. Е. Voroshilov, 
compiled by the Afghan colonel Ghulam Dastagir Wardak. The notes were translated and 
edited by American Russian language specialists. They are a valuable source on Soviet 
strategic and operational thinking and doctrine in the 1970s when the Soviet army 
reinvigorated operational art after emphasising nuclear war in the 1960s. The third volume is 
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about “Issues of Operational Art” and provides both an overview of and insights into Soviet 
operational thinking.50 
 
Use of the concept by military historians: problems 
 
The terms “operational art” and “the operational level of war” entered western military 
terminology in the debate after the 1976 edition of the US Army’s Field Manual 100-5 
Operations (Active Defense).51 These concepts were but small elements in the American 
debate, which was dominated by civilian reformers and the army establishment on the one 
hand and the “maneuver warfare” versus attrition debate on the other.52 The operational 
dimension was only partly linked to the assumed role of “maneuver warfare”, mostly as an 
argument favouring the latter.53 This connection created the initial perception of mutual 
relation between operational art and “maneuvrism”, which is reflected in recent critique of the 
operational level of war.54 
 
In his seminal critique of the 1976 FM 100-5 Operations, William S. Lind used “operational” 
as part of his argument and referred to the “operational level” without defining the term or 
specifying if he meant the operational level of war or command.55 Edward Luttwak’s article 
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“The Operational Level of War” is an early text that was also part of the US doctrinal debate 
after the Vietnam War.56 The US Army’s concepts and doctrines in the 1980s describe the 
operational dimensions conceptually and doctrinally how the US Army understood them at 
the time.57 The professional debate in the US Army’s professional journals Military Review 
and Parameters illustrates how the new concepts were understood primarily as campaigns and 
large scale operations, but several authors also criticised operational art. There were both 
whole issues dedicated to the new doctrine and articles on operational art and the operational 
level of war in numerous other matters.58 
 
In his chapter on the Battle of Jena in Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips’ anthology 
Historical perspectives of the operational art, David G. Chandler presented an abbreviated 
description of Napoleon’s method of waging war. 59 In this chapter, Napoleon was credited 
with conducting operational art and operational level warfare. This interpretation is 
significantly at variance with the chapter of the Jena campaign in Chandler classic book The 
campaigns of Napoleon, first published 1966.60 The difference between the two is the use of 
late-twentieth-century operational terminology in the 2005 chapter to analyse and explain the 
campaign, its battles, and pursuit. 
 
The main argument in Claus Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art, 1740-1813 From 
Frederick the Great to Napoleon, is that operational art evolved due to a transformation of 
warfare from the Wars of Frederick the Great to the Napoleonic wars. The drivers were 
 
“the interplay between military and non-military factors such as social, economic and 
political developments. The second is the interplay between military theory and 
practice. The third is the interplay between developments in military theory and practice 
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Telp argues that the campaigns that involved France and Prussia in 1806 (Jena-Auerstedt) and 
1813 (Befreiungskriege), illustrate how the conduct of battles was changing. These 
developments blurred the division between strategy and tactics. They created “a strategic-
tactical continuum which suggests the introduction of the operational level in the analysis of 
warfare of this period.”62 Telp defines operational art as “the art of war at the operational 
level, concerned with the conduct of campaigns with the means provided by strategy,”63 and 
argues that  
 
though the terms ‘operational art’ and ‘operational level’ were used in neither the 
Frederician nor the Napoleonic period, they may be applied nonetheless since the 
concept of the third level of warfare was emerging in this time, particularly in the works 
of Guibert.64 
 
The American retired army officer and historian David T. Zabecki wrote a study in 2006 that 
“will likely prove to be the definitive account of the German 1918 ‘Peace Offensives’.”65 
Zabecki’s account is thorough and based on a vast number of primary sources, but is more an 
analysis of the German 1918 offensives than a study of operational art. His research draws on 
the US Army’s doctrinal understanding of operational art and a balance of military and 
academic source-based analysis. The British historian Nick Lloyd studied the Allied offensive 
in 1918 in light of operational art and argued that the Allied victory was more than pure 
attrition.66 Lloyd and Zabecki base their analysis on US and British definitions of operational 
art, both of which include the strategic dimension of the campaign in their understandings of 
operational art. Thus the strategic and operational dimensions tend to become intermingled. 
 
In Carrying the War to the Enemy : American Operational Art to 1945, Michael R. Matheny 
aims to rectify the common opinion that operational art was developed by the Germans and 
Soviets. He argues for a uniquely American approach, based on studying the US Army’s First 
World War experiences and developing campaign and operations planning in the military 
school system. These efforts led to the successful joint and combined campaigns and 
operations that won the Second World War. Matheny argues that despite the US military not 
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studied and developed jointly by the US and Army and Navy. It was the conceptual 
framework in the warfare against Nazi Germany and Japan.67 Matheny’s book presents an 
essential perspective on what operational art is and how it emerged and was expressed 
without any terminology of its own. 
 
Many non-German authors have given German operations an essential role in the 
understanding of operational art. German studies of their operations and operational thinking 
are therefore often a necessary corrective. The Germans tend to bypass the term operational 
art because it is not a part of traditional German military terminology and concepts. 
 
Karl-Heinz Frieser’s study of the German campaign in France in 1940, Blitzkrieg-Legende: 
der Westfeldzug 1940, is very illustrative of the “German way of war” interpreted as a matter 
of expedients, where German excellence in combat leadership would gain the upper hand 
against perceived stronger enemies. Although the modern use of the term operation has a 
German origin, they did not use the term operational art, but operational leadership (operative 
Führungskunst, literally the art of operational leadership).68 
 
If Blitzkrieg-Legende is a case study of one operation, Mythos und Wirklichkeit : Geschichte 
des operativen Denkens im deutschen Heer von Moltke d.Ä. bis Heusinger by Gerhard P. 
Groß, is a thorough study of German operational thought and practice over a century.69 In the 
Concluding Remarks Groß highlights how the  
 
military leadership repeatedly attempted to address Germany’s strategic dilemma with 
operational solutions, which would compensate for the vulnerability of the country’s 
central geographic position and its relative inferiority in manpower and resources.70 
 
This observation underlines the German General Staff’s credo that “strategy is a matter of 
expedients” and a counter case to any understanding of operational art and the primacy of 
strategy over operations. Another interesting observation is that the Bundeswehr first wrote an 
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authoritative definition of operation in 1977 (!). Groß thus points to the obvious that 
operational thinking is barely possible without a working definition. As a result, German 
operational thought “oscillates between tactics and strategy”.71 
 
In his article “The Lost Meaning of Strategy” from 2005, Professor Hew Strachan argues that 
the operational level of war is what was known as strategy in the First World War and that 
“the operational level of war is a covert way of reintroducing the split between policy and 
strategy.”72 Strachan’s article is on strategy, but he assigns the operational level of war the 
inglorious role of undermining strategy. The argument is repeated and elaborated in 2006 and 
so is the argument about the operational level’s close relation to the notion of “manoeuvre”.73 
Strachan’s arguments are not so much about operational art as the operational level. But both 
are interconnected in doctrine and other texts. The operational level is part of operational art, 
so Strachan’s critique is just as much of operational art. 
 
In this context, the third text by Hew Strachan is his 2010 article “Strategy or Alibi? Obama, 
McChrystal and the Operational Level of War”.74 In this article, he develops his argument on 
the lost meaning of strategy into an argument of a lack of strategy. In this article, the 
operational level represented by the ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal fills the 
strategic void, but without the formal or de facto strategic functions of a Chief of Defence or a 
Joint Chief of Staff. Strachan puts forward an example in the British public debate where 
“[the Army] was trumping the government and setting strategy.”75 Strachan’s recent 
contribution is the Journal of Strategic Studies’ article “Strategy in theory; strategy in 
practice”, where he suggests that  
 
Solutions to these challenges are not straightforward, but they need to begin with an 
awareness of the distinctions between operations and strategy, and between ‘military’ 
strategy and ‘grand’ strategy, however, confused those differences become in practice 
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These texts by Strachan illustrates the fundamental problem with the western understanding 
of operational art because it is understood and defined as campaigns and large-scale 
operations in a conventional war. Some definitions even include battles.77 Instead of being the 
much-needed bridge between strategy and tactics, operational art has “devoured strategy” and 
encompasses all of warfare.78 
 
A new conceptual and methodological framework 
 
The purpose of this section is to clarify and develop the theoretical basis for the methodical 
approach to the study of military thought and warfare and explain military terminology central 
to the research questions. The first part is a history of ideas approach to describe how 
historical texts will be studied to understand their meaning and content. This part will also 
explain the role of military theory in the thesis. The second part concerns itself with how to 
study warfare and the conduct of war. It will emphasise topical criticism to supplement 
philological criticism, to find and understand issues of military thought and practice that were 
not explicitly stated in the sources or narratives.  
 
Ideas and concepts 
 
In his influential 1969 article “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, Quentin 
Skinner challenges the two “orthodox (though conflicting)” approaches to the study of past 
ideas.79 He describes the first approach as “the context ‘of religious, political and economic 
factors’ which determines the meaning of any given text”. The second dismisses the 
contextual approach and “insists on the autonomy of the text itself as the sole necessary key to 
its own meaning”.80 Several decades later, Skinner’s article and his form of criticism of the 
“orthodox thought approaches” to the history of ideas is still debated.81 One theme is the 
“view that it is not possible to write the history of any idea or concept has often been 
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attributed to Skinner by his critics.”82 Anthony Burns discusses both the critique and 
Skinner’s different responses through the decades. He concludes that “even today Skinner 
continues to view the idea of writing the history of any concept with a considerable degree of 
scepticism.”83 Given operational art’s ambiguous emergence and often vague and 
approximate understanding, a critical approach is crucial. This study will use Skinner’s 
approach to the study of past ideas and concepts. It will adapt his critique and methodology to 
operational thinking and study operational art as an idea or concept. 
 
Skinner elaborates his criticism of the two above-mentioned approaches in the first two 
sections of the article. He begins with the ‘text itself’ approach and presents some dilemmas 
regarding “the observer’s mental set.” These dilemmas imply that our ways of managing our 
thoughts and perceptions tend to determine how we read a text and the way we perceive it, 
which will influence our interpretation. Skinner attempts to exploit the use of paradigms in the 
history of ideas to “uncover the extent to which the current historical study of ethical, 
political, religious, and other such ideas is contaminated by the unconscious application of 
paradigms whose familiarity to the historian disguises an essential inapplicability to the past.” 
He continues by insisting on the danger of “lapsing into various kinds of historical absurdity” 
in reading classical texts and discusses the outcomes of these ‘absurdities’ in the form of 
mythologies.84  
 
There is also “the danger of converting some scattered or quite incidental remarks by a classic 
theorist into his ‘doctrine’ on one of the mandatory themes.” A relevant topic for this study is 
that there might be “some chance similarity on terminology, on some subject to which he 
cannot in principle have meant to contribute.” In this sense, there will always be the danger of 
inflating “incidental remarks” in a text that support a contemporary subject.85 This danger is 
present in the search for operational art’s origins since some of contemporary operational 
terminology was also used by eighteenth-and nineteenth centuries’ military writers. The 
writers used such terminology in a very different context and intellectual paradigm. The terms 
were usually used widely and with both a different meaning and another usage than today. 
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Furthermore, military historians have repeatedly cautioned about interpreting historical events 
based on contemporary doctrine or strategic preferences.86 
 
Skinner also elaborates on “two kinds of historical absurdity”. In the first, the historical writer 
is credited with a form of clairvoyance in his ability to anticipate future developments.87 The 
other absurdity is “about whether a given idea may be said to have ‘really emerged’ at a given 
time, and whether it is ‘really there’ in the work of some given writer.” An “unargued 
assumption” is also that the historical writers were attempting to develop the doctrine 
contemporary scholars are trying to detect.88 Both of these ‘historical absurdities’ must be 
considered in this study’s search for the emergence of operational art. One specific challenge 
is to read Clausewitz in search of operational art, which is easily done if the reader uses the 
standard Howard and Paret translation into English.89 
 
The second type of fallacy is that historians “will be unavoidably set in approaching the ideas 
of the past.” This implies that “it will become dangerously easy for the historian to conceive it 
as his task to supply or find in each of these texts the coherence which they may appear to 
lack”, a danger reinforced by the possibility that a classical writer is not consistent or does not 
provide “any systematic account of his beliefs.” Skinner contends that his danger is evident in 
the search for a “message” and constructing a “mythology of coherence.”90 He is critical of 
any attempt to create coherence or explain away inconsistencies to claim coherence and 
resolve apparent contradictions to maintain the intended doctrine.91 
 
In the second part of the article, Skinner develops his arguments and discusses specific 
problematic issues when studying past ideas. One such issue is also a critique of the 
“applicatory approach to military history”92 and concerns itself with “when the historian is 
 
86
 Michael Howard, "The use and abuse of military history," The RUSI Journal 138, no. 1 (1993); Daniel J. 
Hughes, "Abuses of German Military History," Military Review LXVI, no. 12 (1986). Richard M. Swain, 
„Foreword“ in Alfred von Schlieffen, Cannae (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute, 
1931), ii. 
87
 Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," 11. 
88
 Ibid., 12. 
89
 Hew Strachan, The direction of war : contemporary strategy in historical perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 213. 
90
 Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," 16. 
91
 Ibid., 19-22. 
92
 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military misfortunes: the anatomy of failure in war (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2006), 36-40; Robert H. Larson, "Max Jähns and the Writing of Military History in Imperial Germany," 
  34  
more interested - as he may legitimately be - in the retrospective significance of a given 
historical work or action than in its meaning for the agent himself.”93 This cautioning is not 
only about past ideas, but also events where the historian might deduce a greater significance 
of an action “and the meaning of that action itself.” Military theorists are often accused of 
cherry-picking operations and battles to reinforce their arguments and theories.94 A related 
theme is what Skinner describes as “‘seeing’ far too readily the ‘modern’ elements which the 
commentator has thus programmed himself to find;” and implies a certain teleological 
element in the interpretation of past ideas, concepts or events.95 In studies of operational art, 
there is a tendency to read modern operational concepts and understandings into historical 
events. However, early nineteenth-century actors did not have any late-twentieth-century 
military terms, knowledge, and professionalised military organisations and technology that a 
modern operational concept needs to function. 
 
Skinner also cautions against “a mythology of parochialism” as a danger inherent in “any kind 
of attempt to understand an alien culture or an unfamiliar conceptual scheme.” He provides 
two examples. The first is the possibility of the historian’s “misuse [of] his vantage-point in 
describing the apparent reference of some given statement in a classic text.” This problem is 
related to supposed relations or intentions of a writer’s meaning in different texts at an early 
and late stage of his authorship, where “the historian may mistakenly come to suppose” any 
intended influence of earlier work upon later works.96 In this study, such a warning against 
parochialism should caution anyone reading texts by historical authors who wrote over 
several decades in periods of significant changes in military thinking or practice, such as the 
influential thinkers Clausewitz, Jomini, and Helmuth von Moltke the Elder. 
 
Skinner’s second example is that “the observer may unconsciously misuse his vantage-point 
in describing the sense of a given work.” In the study of military history and concepts, this 
example may be of particular relevance since it concerns “the danger that the very familiarity 
of the concepts the historian uses may mask some essential inapplicability to the historical 
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material.”97 This danger may be even more imminent when military theorists explore past 
texts, since contemporary operational concepts may bias their approach to historical texts and 
events. In this thesis, it is imperative to read the historical texts with an enhanced 
consciousness regarding searching for traces of operational thought. Operational terms in the 
modern sense of operational, usually had a different meaning in the past. 
 
In the third part, Skinner discusses further consequences for the history of ideas. A number of 
these elements will support this thesis’s theoretical consistency. One such element is “the 
obvious difficulty that the literal meanings of key terms sometimes change over time”.98 Both 
literal and implied meanings of key military terms have changed since military science 
emerged in the last part of the eighteenth-century. A related issue is when classical writers 
conveyed “their meaning with deliberate obliqueness.”99 The military writers may also have 
used a term that was oblique in their time and without further definition. Still, both the utility 
and the precision in its meaning could also vary between different military scientific 
traditions. A basic word count of ‘operation’ in the major works by the contemporary classical 
military writers Clausewitz and Jomini reveals that the word was used just a dozen times by 
Clausewitz and about 600 times by Jomini.100 This example indicates the need for a broad 
contextualisation of the classic sources, although Skinner raises some concerns with the utility 
of trying to understand the world of historical authors.101 
 
Skinner continues his criticism in the fourth part and concludes that “it must be a mistake 
even to try either to write intellectual biographies concentrating on the works of a given writer 
or to write histories of ideas tracing the morphology of a given concept over time.”102 He then 
points to an alternative methodology that  
 
presupposes the grasp both of what they were intended to mean, and how this meaning 
was intended to be taken. It follows from this that to understand a text must be to 
understand both the intention to be understood, and the intention that this intention 
should be understood, which the text itself as an intended act of communication must at 
least have embodied. The essential question which we therefore confront, in studying 
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any given text, is what the author, in writing at the time he did write for the audience he 
intended to address, could in practice have been intending to communicate by the 
utterance of this given utterance.103 
 
Regarding the role of the context, Skinner emphasises that “The ‘context’ […] needs instead 
to be treated as an ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognisable 
meanings, in a society of that kind, it might in principle have been possible for someone to 
have intended to communicate.”104 This approach implies a concern for the military 
communities the historical writers belonged to and similarly for their intended audiences. 
 
The challenges in transcending the intended audiences are exemplified in the example 
mentioned above of translating Clausewitz’ Vom Kriege of early nineteenth-century Prussia 
into the post-Vietnam War western societies. The final point to highlight from Skinner’s 
methodology is that “Any statement, […] is inescapably the embodiment of a particular 
intention, on a particular occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem, and thus 
specific to its situation in a way that it can only be naive to try to transcend.” This thesis is 
addressing the particular issue of operational art, which did transcend ‘its situation’ from the 
USSR to the western military sphere. Prussian and German military thinking and practice 
have crossed the Atlantic for two centuries and been interpreted by the US military. Usually, 
something has been lost in translation.105 Daniel Hughes’ critique from the US doctrinal 
debate in the 1980s is indicative: 
 
The first is a careless and superficial application of German terms and concepts to 
current practices. The second is a general failure to place individual German methods 
and experiences in their proper historical context. Hindered by superficial knowledge 
and dependent upon unreliable sources, too many writers have created false pictures of 
the German army’s doctrine and methods. Far too often, German military history has 
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Military theory and doctrine 
 
Military thinking is a term that encompasses all intellectual activity regarding the military, 
both within and outside military organisations. Jan Angstrom and Jerker Widén define 
military theory by initially distinguishing it from related fields. The first distinction is 
between military theory and military thought, that “while all theories constitute thought, not 
all thought amounts to theory. Theory is, therefore, a sub-set of thought. [...] A theory is more 
systematic than an idea and is consequently a more complex thought pattern that expresses 
links between different ideas.”107 The next distinction is between theory and doctrine. Where 
doctrine is institutionalised, normative, and prescriptive theory can be normative, but without 
the formal authority of doctrine. The third distinction is between military theory and military 
history. Theory “deals with the general rather than the specific, the abstract rather than the 
tangible, and the timeless rather than the contextual.” The final distinction is between military 
theory and all other research that concerns military matters. The core of military theory is thus 
what war is and how to achieve victory.108 
 
In his book Understanding Military Doctrine : A multidisciplinary approach, Harald Høiback 
embarks on his project by discussing military doctrine as “institutionalised beliefs about what 
works in war and military operations”.109 He also expounds how doctrine can vary between a 
“written and officially endorsed form” and being “unwritten and informal”.110 Its purpose is to 
provide authoritative guidance to military activities, primarily to combat.111 Høiback’s 
definition of doctrine resembles NATO’s: “authoritative documents military forces use to 
guide their actions containing fundamental principles that require judgement in 
application.”112 This thesis will study both formal and “unwritten and informal” doctrine and 
other expressions of the preferred way of conducting military operations and battles, such as 
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This section will present and discuss some central terms that will be part of the thesis. The 
basic military terms of strategy and tactics were relatively consistently understood in the 
military literature and armed forces since the terms were defined in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century until operational art were introduced in the 1920s.113 The term 
operation and its derivations were used in very general ways and are in itself not necessarily 
useful in a search for early indicators of operational art.  
 
The two most influential military theorists in the decade before World War One were Carl 
von Clausewitz and Antoine de Jomini. Both were based in late eighteenth-century scientific 
and military theory and developed their understandings based on the historical tradition and 
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars where both took part. Clausewitz’ On War and 
Jomini’s The Art of War are the classic military theory texts in the European and American 
tradition.114 Jomini was part of the scientific tradition of the enlightenment, while Clausewitz 
in addition was influenced by German romanticism and nationalism.115 Although both 
Clausewitz and Jomini confirmed or established the military terminology, the following 
enquiry into the central terms for this thesis will elucidate the need for reading each term in 




The word “art” in “operational art” has created an impression that there is something artistic 
about operational art, which is lacking in strategy and tactics.116 Tactics have its tacticians and 
strategy is conducted by strategists, but is operational art something done by operational 
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artists? Svechin’s initial choice of “the less elegant term ‘operational art’” instead of an earlier 
Russian term, operatika (English: operatics), may have contributed to creating an impression 
of operational art as a creative and artistic approach to warfare.117 This impression may well 
have been underpinned by the English translation of Svechin, which has at least on one 
occasion translated as “operational artist” where the original used “operator” as the one 
conducting operational art.118 On the two other occasions Svechin used “operator” in this way, 
it is translated as “operations specialist” and “operator”.119 
 
The Oxford Dictionary has four definitions of art. The first three are about the arts, while the 
fourth is related to a practical skill: “A skill at doing a specified thing, typically one acquired 
through practice.”120 Svechin’s use of the word art in relation to military terms was consistent 
with understanding art as a practical skill. On one occasion, he also referred to Clausewitz and 
Goethe in comparing war to trade or commerce.121 Art was also used about the practical 
conduct of war, such as the art of war. 
 
On the other hand, science was about the theoretical knowledge that underpins practice. 
Ekaterina Smirnova supports this understanding of art in a Russian context in her discussion 
on the development of Russian scientific terminology. The meaning of art (iskusstvo) changed 
from its eighteenth century’s use in scientific experiments to its modern content. 
 
The words iskus and iskushenie retain only the meaning of experience lived through and 
are completely removed from the scientific field, and iskusstvo (apart from the creative 
work)53 holds only the meaning of possession of certain skills and has lost its meaning 




Clausewitz acknowledged that the terms strategy and tactics were “almost universal, and 
everyone knows fairly well where each particular factor belongs without clearly 
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understanding why.” He then commented caustically on blind usage of categories before 
defining strategy as “the use of the engagement for the object of the war.”123 Jomini was not 
as precise as Clausewitz but considered strategy within the context of his six parts of war. 
Strategy was “the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense 
or for invasion” and “the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater 
of operations.”124 Jomini used strategy in many ways and was not as explicit as Clausewitz in 
defining the term precisely. He later described strategy as “the art of posting troops upon the 
battlefield according to the accidents of the ground,” and “the art of making good 
combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress”.125 This way of using 
strategy was more related to Jomini’s term Grand Tactics. Still, he was elsewhere consistent 
that “in the most important operations in war, strategy fixes the direction of movements, and 
[...] we depend upon tactics for their execution.”126 After the First World War, Clausewitz’ 
definition of strategy was redefined by the Americans and Soviets as “the use of the 




The campaign (German Feldzug, French: campagne) is the strategic conduct of war and the 
supreme commander’s orchestration of all military resources to achieve the war’s aims.128 
Neither Clausewitz nor Jomini gave any explicit definition of a campaign. Still, the context in 
which the term was used and its relations to battles and engagements, clearly indicate that the 
conduct of a campaign was the responsibility of the highest level of command. In 
contemporary military doctrine, the campaign is still the highest echelon of military activities, 
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Tactics 
 
Clausewitz defined tactics as “the use of armed forces in the engagement”.130 This definition 
was in the same sentence as his initial definition of strategy. Jomini was more general in his 
definition, but tactics were consistently divided into two concepts; grand tactics on one hand, 
and tactics, minor tactics (la tactique de detail), or “Tactics of the different arms“ (la tactique 
des armées) on the other. The English edition translates la tactique de detail and tactique into 
tactics, minor tactics or “tactics of the different arms”, apparently arbitrarily.131 Since tactics 
for both Clausewitz and Jomini were about how to use forces in the engagement or battle, any 




Jomini outlined the term grand tactics (la grande tactique [des bataillés et des combats]).133 
Grand tactics may be considered an operational element that will reflect an operational 
understanding in armies that taught Jomini at their academies and staff colleges. But that 
depends on how that institution understood grand tactics. The English translation omits the 
reference to battles and combat in the introduction to grand tactics. Still, the text's use of 
grand tactics clearly related it to tactics (battles, combat), although the translation is not 
always consistent.134 This is also a reminder that all terms must be studied in context and each 
interpretation of grand tactics and its role in the origins of operational art must be determined 




Operational art is closely related to and originates from the term operation. Operation and 
operational (operativ) was used in German military literature during the second part of the 
 
130
 Clausewitz, On War: Indexed Edition, 128. 
131
 See amongst other: Jomini, Précis de l'art de la guerre, 29-31, 98, 129; The art of war, 13-14, 42, 66. 
132
 The United States Department of Defense, The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Washington D.C.: The United States Department of Defense, 15 October 2016), 31; NATO, AJP-01(E)V1: 
Allied Joint Doctrine, LEX-3. 
133
 Jomini, Précis de l'art de la guerre, 30; The art of war, 13. 
134
 See for example: Précis de l'art de la guerre, 135-136; The art of war, 69-70. 
135
 Joseph G. Dawson, “Jomini Meant “Grand Tactics,” Not “Operational Art”” in Stephen Badsey, Donald J. 
Stoker, and Joseph G. Dawson. "Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War Revisited." The Journal of 
military history 73, no. 4 (2009), 1278-87. 
  42  
nineteenth century and was given a more prominent position after the German Wars of 
Unification. Simultaneously, the term was used generally and not given any precise definition. 
It was an element of strategy concerned with bringing the army to the battlefield and the best-
suited position for battle.136 This use resembles Jomini’s use of strategy in relation to battle.137 
The operation did not become a conscious and independent military discipline until after the 
First World War. Groß makes a point that operation was not given any official military 
definition in Germany until 1939 and the Bundeswehr did not define it until 1977.138 
Consequently, since the term operation does not have a universal definition, it needs to be 




Operational has two different meanings in a military context. Firstly, it is used generally as 
“in or ready for use”, with two subordinate understandings: “the routine functioning and 
activities of an organisation” and “active operations of the armed forces, police, or emergency 
services”139 Secondly, operational is related to operational art, the operational level, and other 
terms that relate to operational art as a military discipline. Topical criticism must be used to 
distinguish between operational art as a concept and the operational level of command, which 
inhibit a specific place in a military command hierarchy. This distinction is essential in 
studying when operational terminology entered western military thought, such as in the 1981 
US Army TRADOC Pam 525-5 Operational Concepts for the AirLand Battle and Corps 





The German military historian Hans Delbrück was among the first professional historians that 
studied military history and applied rigorous source analysis and other historical, scientific 
methods. His critique of the German Great General Staff’s applicatory historical approach, 
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where military history was used to validate contemporary doctrine, led him into the decades-
long strategy struggle (Strategiestreit) with the German army’s historians.141 The debate 
began as a discussion of the strategy of Frederick the Great, but a central theme was historical 
methodology. Delbruck’s historical methodology was up against the General Staff’s 
applicatory approach, where selected successful historical cases were used to prove 
contemporary doctrine.142 
 
Delbrück set up four requirements for a professional historian’s perspective on military 
history. The tension between ideas and experience formed the basis of his approach. Arden 
Bucholz has studied these requirements in light of the historical context Delbrück lived and 
worked in and how his method was reflected in his writing and the historical debates.143 
According to Delbrück, the military historian should firstly “acquire and utilise detailed 
knowledge of the practical realities of military life.” The military historian will need practical 
experience and technical knowledge of the topic, to be able “to describe the living 
phenomenon of the past”.144  
 
Secondly, Delbrück maintained that “historians had to adopt the comparative approach.” The 
comparison should be between “pure historical cross sections”, “single time periods”, and 
“chronological blocks.” The longitudinal comparison should be between objects, where also 
the art of war belongs. In these fields of comparison, Delbrück also lists some practical 
military elements to consider. Since many important issues were not directly handed down 
through history, missing links must be sought through analogies and combinations to 
supplement what is lost. Delbrück meant that a proper knowledge of relevant parts of practical 
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military life was essential to draw the right conclusions from fragmented and uncertain 
sources.145 
 
The third point was that the uniqueness of each military action should be given more 
attention. This element was where Delbrück criticised popular and prominent contemporary 
military authors for simplistic generalisations, errors, and misjudgements.146 On the other 
hand, he discussed the positive role of experience and a military writer's ability to present and 
elaborate on his war experiences. He uses the “strategic letters” by Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe 
as a good example of how a military practitioner could convey needed military knowledge 
and experience to other officers, military historians, and even laymen.147 Finally, Delbrück 
“took a conservative, materialistic view of war” and an unromantic image of war as 
“hemorrhaging and exhaustion, not heroism and valor.”148  
 
Delbrück’s second and third requirements are central tools for the historian. As for the fourth, 
war’s savage realities had already in his own time begun to challenge the militaristic war 
romanticism of “Pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war!”149 Delbrück’s first 
requirement, which implies that the historians need a practical understanding of the topic they 
are studying, will be emphasised in this thesis. For Delbruck, such understanding was 
necessary to complement the philological source criticism with criticism of the content in 
sources that are false traditions and involve physical impossibilities, such as inflated numbers 
of troops or casualties.150 Delbrück used the terms Sachkritik and Sach-Kritik, which literally 
means topical criticism.151 The English translation used several terms: “critical analysis based 
on objective considerations”, “objective approaches”, “objective-type analysis”, “objective-
type interpretation”, and “objective interpretation”.152 For the sake of coherence and 
simplicity, this thesis will use “topical criticism” because it also reflects the necessity to 
understand the practical elements of the topic in question to criticise it. Delbrück’s Sachkritik 
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also reflected Clausewitz’ brief chapter “On Physical Effort in War”, although Clausewitz did 
not regard that a lack of military or combat experience should prevent anyone from having 
reasoned opinions on war.153 
 
Delbrück developed topical criticism to sort out the historical realities from sources that were 
imprecise because they were traditional myths, legends, chronicles, or otherwise lacked 
reliable and detailed information of past events. Delbrück sought to circumvent inaccuracies 
in these sources by comparing the information they contained with professional knowledge of 
contemporary military realities, such as terrain, logistics, soldiers’ stamina or carrying 
capacity.154 Similarly, modern military historians that aim to legitimate contemporary doctrine 
by authoritative historical examples can be criticised by testing their conclusions against the 
physical military realities of their examples. Delbrück’s argument during his strategy struggle 
(Strategiestreit) with the Great General Staff regarding Frederick the Great's strategy is a 
representative case at the strategic level.155 Antulio Echevarria criticises Delbrück for 
confusing Clausewitz’ statements about limited war with the kind of strategy to apply. 
Echevarria’s critique is in itself an instructive example of topical criticism related to 
Delbrück’s strategic arguments.156 
 
Delbrück’s purpose with the double set of topical and philological criticism was to avoid a 
double pitfall. The historian could easily 
 
restate a false set of facts, since he is not capable of perceiving their objective 
impossibility; the other runs the danger of attributing to the past certain events taken 
from the reality of the present, without paying sufficient attention to the differences in 
circumstances.157 
 
 Both of these pitfalls must be avoided in the historical quest for the origins and emergence of 
operational art. The second pitfall also reflects Skinner’s concerns with historians interpreting 
the past with their bias set on the modern world.158 The way to avoid these pitfalls is to 
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For the examination to progress, the philological and topical criticism go hand in hand 
in every step and ceaselessly educate and control each other. There is no true topical 
criticism without the source based precise philological criticism, and there is no true 
philological criticism without topical criticism.159 
 
Books on military history should be treated with great mistrust (mit großem Mißtrauen zu 
betrachten) if they did not reflect the practical conditions of the field in the specific context, 
or lacked critical assessments.160 
 
Finally, Delbrück warned indirectly that topical knowledge is not sufficient if it is not aided 
by an understanding of the past. As part of his polemics against his military opponents, he 
strongly criticises them for thinking that their peacetime knowledge of military matters makes 
them masters of the history of war as they quickly and with great self-confidence explain past 
events.161 This critique is especially valid in studies of operational art, where modern 
definitions are frequently used with almost doctrinal authority to explain historical events as 
operational art or warfare at the operational level. 
 
The role of topical criticism in philological criticism is to discover emerging operational 
elements and their origins when the sources did not use operational terms. Operational 
elements must, therefore, on the one hand, be sought in the terms used by historical authors in 
light of their historical meaning and content. On the other hand, operational elements must be 
identified indirectly by studying the realities that faced commanders, their staffs and the 
troops involved in the planning and conduct of operations. These realities are both physical 
and cognitive. The physical ones relate to what tasks armies were capable of, given their 
organisation, equipment, and especially their logistics. The cognitive realities are the 
knowledge and staff capabilities that commanders and staff officers would have possessed, 
given their education, training, and experience. The historical meaning and content of 
terminology and of theoretical knowledge, are also elements in the cognitive part of topical 
criticism. This knowledge is also based on the military realities in the historical actors’ 
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Operational art is a new historical phenomenon, but since it evolved in different countries’ 
armies at unrelated times, there are some challenges in comparing these diverse conditions. 
One task is to identify what constituted operational art and how well developed it possibly 
could become at any time in history. This question requires an understanding of the nature 
and the character of operational art, as well as of topical criticism to understand what kind of 
tasks and activities it was possible for armies to conduct. Topical criticism is also necessary to 
understand the specific conceptual framework where military action was conceived and 
executed; especially what an operation consisted of and how the term was understood. 
 
Operational elements, the pieces of the puzzle that make up operational art, must be 
recognised and understood. These emerged and existed as discrete elements in warfare in the 
century before operational art was defined and described as a concept. Operational elements 
are indicators of a practice where operational art emerged as a new concept for the conduct of 
modern operations. This emergence was fragmented, as different elements appeared in 
different forms in separate wars. There were also continuities and discontinuities in whether 
the operational elements had any lasting influence on the understanding and conduct of war. 
This study’s operational elements are derived from Alexandr A. Svechin’s descriptions of 
operational art, its substance, and its interrelations to strategy and tactics.  
 
In his book, Russian and Soviet Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940, Richard W. 
Harrison introduces a number of “operational indices”, which are “quantitative indicators 
such as the number of forces engaged, the length of the front, the depth to which operations 
are conducted, and the duration of the particular operation.”162 Harrison uses these indicators 
to declare the fighting at the Sha-ho River in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War in 
October 1904, as “the first modern operation.” The forces involved were almost 400,000 
troops, the fighting lasted two weeks over a manned front of 90 km reaching a depth of 20 
km. Harrison’s view is also supported by early Soviet analysis.163 
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In regard to the research questions, quantitative indicators like these will have to be critically 
analysed in relation to terms and texts, to assess their role and interaction with strategy and 
tactics, to be able to determine if they are elements of operational art as it “is”, or large scale 
tactics that just “looks like” operational art. Quantitative indicators may be useful elements as 
part of the operational elements but have to be balanced against other operational elements so 
that relevant findings are not excluded on a solely quantitative basis, or others included purely 
based on sizes and numbers. 
 
Operational elements will be used to study the interactions between the strategic command, 
that is, between the supreme commander or the Chief of the General Staff and the tactical 
commanders on the battlefield. The tactical forces vary from armies (100,000+ troops) to 
divisions (approx. 10,000 troops). Warfare evolved and became more extensive in scope 
during the half-century before the First World War, ranging from a campaign decided by a 
single battle, to protracted campaigns consisting of several operations, each consisting of one 
or more battles or tactical engagements. Besides, there were increased logistical demands as 
armies grew in size. Furthermore, wars became more protracted, which implies that there 
were also logistically determined operational elements to search after. 
 
As a norm, this thesis will emphasise qualitative over quantitative elements, especially those 
that will assist in determining an operation’s relation to other military disciplines and 
elements of warfare, such as strategy and logistics. Therefore, the operational elements 
emphasised in this study are the modern operation, the strategic-operational relations, the 
operational-tactical relations, logistics, and command and control. 
 
The modern operation is both the framework and precondition for operational art. In the 
modern paradigm of operational art, an operation is an entity in itself that contains 
manoeuvre, logistics, and combat merged together in “a conglomerate of quite different 
actions”.164 The understanding and purpose of an operation have changed over the centuries 
and so have the elements of which an operation consists. Therefore, the thesis will outline the 
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Strategic-operational relations. The thesis will study the relations between strategy and 
operations to identify any operational elements that might indicate emerging operational art. 
 
Operational-tactical relations. This is related to the previous element, but concerns the role 
of battles and engagements as integrated elements in modern operations, in contrast to the pre-
industrial battle that had an independent action after an operation had brought the army to the 
battlefield. 
 
Logistics. Svechin wrote that “tactics and logistics are the material of operational art” and that 
the success of the development of an operation also depended on “the provision of all the 
material they need to conduct an operation without interruption.”165 Modern industrialised 
war is a war of resources. It is logistics that sustain military actions: “The great lesson of the 
operational art for Desert Storm [...] is in the extent to which logistics dominates the 
operational offensive.”166 With the exception of the US Civil War, campaigns and operations 
in the century before the First World War were decided before lack of supplies caused 
offensives to halt, they were still wars of a few battles. The German offensive against France 
in 1914, on the other hand, came close to a halt because of an overstretched supply system.167 
Logistics is an operational element when it contributes to sustain a modern operation beyond 
what the tactical units carry themselves or can obtain by requisition and plunder. 
 
Command and control in the form of leadership and staff work will include the command 
relations of the two first operational elements and will therefore be an indicator in itself.168 A 
modern operation is characterised by its complexity and the command structure as a well-
developed bureaucracy designed to manage military complexity. The modern general staff 
matured professionally in the same period as operational elements were beginning to make 
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headquarters were developed into specialised staff functions to manage large and resource-
intensive armies and to command the armies in combat. 
 
Operational elements are elements in warfare or military thought that indicate the emergence 
of operational art or are defining elements in the nature of operational art as a military 
discipline. These elements are often seen as unconnected pieces of a puzzle. The historical 
actors rarely had any idea of how what the complete puzzle would look like, or that the pieces 
were parts of a puzzle. Operational elements will be used in this thesis to identify stages in the 
emergence of operational art and to distinguish between elements that “are” elements of the 
nature of operational art from elements that just “look like” it. 
 
Yet practice did precede the development of the 
concept: Jourdain. 
 
Skinner discusses “the unconscious application of paradigms whose familiarity to the 
historian disguises an essential inapplicability to the past.”169 The doctrinal definitions of 
operational art and the operational level of war that came out of the reform process in the US 
Army in the 1970s and 80s are part of such a paradigm. Historical studies of operational art 
based on this paradigm for analysis run the risk of imposing a modern operational paradigm 
upon pre-modern historical conditions. They also create the kind of historical absurdities in 
reading classical texts and discussing the outcomes of these absurdities in the form of 
mythologies.170 Imposing theories of “maneuvre warfare” upon historical operations is just 
one such absurdity.171 
 
This thesis will emphasise the need to study historical texts in light of the historical context in 
which they were written to reduce the danger that today’s military theoretical paradigms will 
distort historical texts. The framework for the study of operational art is twofold. First, to 
study it in light of its nature; as it “is” and secondly its character; what operational art “looks 
like” or resembles. The purpose is to understand when operational elements were present; the 
“is”, or whether historical military actions just shared some superficial similarities to modern 
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operations; they only resembled modern operations. This appearance was usually in the form 
of distributed manoeuvres of large forces over a considerable distance, which resulted in 
successful combat with a decisive strategic outcome. Historical cases must therefore be 
studied in light of the historical strategic, doctrinal, and practical military realities. 
 
Operational elements were rarely deliberately expressed in writing, nor were they dominating 
features in how warfare was perceived by the historical actors. This thesis's emphasis is to 
critically study theory and practice to identify and interpret operational elements. Military 
theory and doctrine will be studied in light of Skinner’s critical approach to the meaning and 
content of historical terms. Delbrück’s topical criticism will accompany the historian’s 
philological source criticism to better understand past warfare and theory that are clouded by 
historical terms that in themselves do not disclose any origins or emergence of operational art. 
Operational art is understood the way it was originally defined by Svechin and is about 
operations, not strategy or tactics, although operational art is closely interrelated with both. 
Operational art, together with the other disciplines, is about warfare as a totality. The 
emphasis will be on understanding the difference between what operational art “is” and what 
it “looks like”. Its nature and character will be used as analytical tools to overcome 
paradigms, oblique sources, and teleology. 
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Chapter 2: Origins of operational art 
 
Among other books, I had dabbled in Jomini's volumes on the Art of War, and I 
remember on one occasion when I was with Grant on the Tennessee River, asking him 
what he thought of Jomini. “Doctor,” he said, “I have never read it carefully; the art of 
war is simple enough; find out where your enemy is, get at him as soon as you can, and 
strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on.”172 
 
This chapter will study how military terminology originated in the European Enlightenment 
and was defined in the decades after the Napoleonic Wars. It will analyse Napoleon’s 
celebrated Jena-Auerstedt campaign for evidence of operational art. Furthermore, it will study 
how the American Civil War changed its character to become the first industrialised people’s 
war. It began as a blueprint of Napoleonic warfare and ended with extensive trench systems 
and operational manoeuvre. Military operations are at the centre of this study, specifically 
their relations to the strategic conduct of war (campaigns) and to tactics (battles and 
engagements). Logistics and command elements will be studied in terms of their role in the 
planning and conduct of operations. The role of command, commanders, and the means by 
which command is exercised are all key elements for research as they constitute the brain and 




Five central military terms related to operational elements emerged in the eighteenth century: 
strategy, campaign, operation, tactics, and grand tactics. The terms strategy, tactics, and grand 
tactics appeared in late eighteenth-century France and had their origins in classical 
Antiquity.173 The military terms operation, operate, and campaign were used in the sixteenth 
and early seventeenth-century Italian and French military literature. Still, the meanings of 
these terms were different from contemporary use. The Italian term campaign (campagna, 
campagne) referred initially to the terrain (the field or countryside). However, it evolved to 
include the modern understanding of campaign as a “set of military operations planned and 
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conducted to achieve a strategic objective”.174 The word campagna was also used as a 
technical term to distinguish field artillery (artiglieria di campagna) from stationary artillery 
used in fortresses.175  
 
Operate (opere, operare) and operation (operazione) referred to activities in general from the 
sixteenth century onwards.176 By the early seventeenth century, the term was beginning to be 
applied in military texts. The term operate described military activities in general. At the same 
time, operation (operazione) to some extent resembled the modern use of the term operation 
and represented a range of military activities that served a purpose and were usually related to 
movements of troops.177 The term operation was not described as a specific military discipline 
in the French Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métier, 
which is the most notable documentation of the ideas and intellectual effort of the French 
Enlightenment.178 In the Encyclopédie, operation was related to logic, theology, medicine etc., 
and frequently used as a general term for various activities.179 Military use of the term 
operation in the chapter “War” (Guerre) described the major activities of a campaign, but it 
was not defined as a military term.180 
 
The military disciplines of strategy and tactics were developed during the French 
Enlightenment and the Napoleonic Wars. These terms were adapted from classical Greek 
texts by military writers. The meanings of the terms evolved in the last decades of the 
eighteenth century. The first term to emerge was tactics, which also was included in the 
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Encyclopédie.181 The term tactics has references to Antiquity. The brief section on tactique 
was followed by a lengthy elaboration of Roman tactics.182  
 
The French colonel and philosophe Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert published his 
Essai général de tactique in 1770. This publication was among the most influential of its kind 
in the eighteenth century.183 Guibert’s writings were in line with the Encyclopédie. He used 
the term tactics as the general framework for the science of war. Guibert developed and 
divided tactics into elementary tactics, tactics for arms and branches, and grand tactics 
(grande tactique), which was the highest level of war and had a meaning comparable to the 
later term strategy.184 Grand tactics was to become a recurring term in military theory until the 
Great War. 
 
The term strategy was not included in the Encyclopédie, nor was “strategic”. The Strategos 
(commander, general) in classical Greece was described in related terms from Antiquity, 
where stratagem and military ruse were associated with deception.185 Strategy as a military 
term was first adapted from classical Greek and defined by the French lieutenant colonel Paul 
Gideon Joly de Maizeroy in 1773. De Maizeroy initially used the established term tactique 
about war as a whole. But, a few years later, he re-named this highest level of war stratégie 
and redefined tactics as “but a branch of this vast science”.186 Maizeroy also used the terms 
campaign and operation regarding warfare and the manoeuvres of forces.187 The 1777 German 
translation of Maizeroy introduced Strategie for the German readers, an example of how 
military terminology was translated and adopted by different armies.188  
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The French general Pierre-Joseph Bourcet wrote a treatise on mountain warfare in 1775, 
Principes de la guerre de montagne, which was not published until 1888. The manuscript was 
presented to the king in 1776. In the 1870s it was discovered in the library of the Ministry of 
War and edited for publication. Bourcet used the term operation as an activity within a 
campaign. He only used the term tactics once. He did not use the term strategy or strategic but 
was consistent in his use of campaign as the strategic element of warfare.189 While writers 
such as Guibert and Mauvillon only wrote in general terms on distributed manoeuvre, Jean 
Colin credited Bourcet for devising specific rules of manoeuvre with dispersed forces and a 
practical approach concerning how to operate on different axes.190 For Bourcet, an operation 
was a practical activity about manoeuvring forces, an activity that could be regulated with 
rules and regulations. However, he was also adamant that the unique conditions in the field 
held authority over rules.191 Colin stated that Bourcet’s writings were representative of the 
opinions of other French generals and military authors at the time and that the divisional 
system was well known, a system that “divided the army into several corps on an extended 
front, [and] affirmed the necessity of concentrating it for the battle”. According to Colin, this 
approach was the essence of eighteenth-century grand tactics.192 
 
The Prussian officer and writer Dietrich Heinrich von Bülow is an interesting source for 
uncovering attempts to define and develop military terminology.193 Bülow wrote during the 
early Napoleonic wars and used the term operation concerning manoeuvres of armies or other 
large forces and the verb operate (operiren) when forces manoeuvre. Bülow distinguished 
between tactical operations, which had the enemy as the objective and strategic operations, 
where the enemy was the aim or purpose (Zweck) of the operation, but not its objective 
(Gegenstand).194 Strategy was “the science of movements and so on, where the enemy is the 
aim or purpose (Zweck) of the operation but not its objective.” and “consists of two key 
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elements, marching and bivouacs. Tactics consist of two key elements: development or 
deployment for battle, and combat (Gefecht) or attack and defence. All that together is 
war.”195 
 
After the Napoleonic wars, the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz defined the pair: “tactics 
teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the 
object of the war.”196 The original German text uses Zweck where the English translation uses 
object. Zweck is better translated as purpose or aim, since it is more abstract term than the 
concrete understanding of object.197 These nuances are essential to understand the 
characteristics of the two, where tactics covered the concrete and physical actions. At the 
same time, strategy was the use of these actions to fulfil the purpose of the war. The purpose 
of war was political. Therefore, strategy had to relate to both policy and combat. These terms 
and definitions did not have much impact outside small circles of military intellectuals before 
the terms were included in the curriculum of military institutions of higher education later in 
the nineteenth century. The evolution and changes in the meaning of these central military 
terms are a reminder of the necessity to understand the meaning and content of a term at a 
specific point in time and its context and the intended and defined use.198  
 
The Napoleonic heritage 
 
The pre-Napoleonic military writers developed and used the term operations increasingly 
frequently at the end of the eighteenth century as military thought matured. Both the 
terminology and the content and meanings of terms evolved unevenly in different countries 
until the strategic-tactical relation was established at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
The operation was not an independent element of war, but an element of strategy. It was an 
activity within the campaign and primarily concerned with strategic movement and 
manoeuvre of forces. Operation was not defined as a discipline in its own right, but the term 
was used uniformly, which indicates that both commanders, educated officers, writers, and 
readers understood its meaning and content. While the operation was an element of strategy 
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and related to movements and manoeuvre of troops, fighting was a part of the battle, which 
was governed by tactics. Some writers used the term tactical operations regarding the 
manoeuvring of troops on the battlefield. 
 
The Napoleonic wars were in general conducted by mounting a campaign to bring the army, 
or armies in coalitions, to the battlefield by strategic manoeuvres. Such a strategic manoeuvre 
was usually regarded as an operation. When the forces were concentrated, the campaign was 
to be decided through battle. A decisive battle did in some cases decide the campaign and 
occasionally the war. There was usually more than one battle in a campaign. The campaign 
might necessitate the pursuit of the remnants of the defeated enemy to bring the war to a final 
conclusion. The decisive 1805 campaign that culminated in the battle of Austerlitz is the ideal 
example, the indecisive and exhausting Peninsular War the antitype, and the remaining 




Napoleon Bonaparte was well-read and familiar with the leading military authors and their 
writings. He was also acquainted with the latest developments in warfare as well as recent 
developments in doctrine, organisation, and tactics.199 In the popular compilation of 
Napoleon’s maxims about war, the term operation was predominantly used regarding the 
movement of forces and thus consistent with the understanding of operations since the 
Enlightenment.200 Napoleon used the term grand tactics (la grande tactique) only on one 
occasion. It described a part of warfare that was different from tactics and had to be learned 
by experience and by studying the campaigns of great commanders.201 The English 1831 
edition of Napoleon’s maxims translated la grande tactique as strategy, which may indicate 
that the translator interpreted the term the way British officers understood strategy, or, rather, 
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Napoleon’s campaign in Germany during the autumn of 1806 has been used as an argument 
that Napoleon mastered operational art and conducted operational-level warfare.203 Dennis 
Showalter is initially less certain and credits Napoleon “with being if not the father, certainly 
the facilitator of operational war as it is generally understood”. Nevertheless, he concludes the 
chapter: “The Jena campaign stands as the first masterpiece of operational art.”204 The Jena 
campaign involved the main components of pre-industrialised conduct of war; the strategic 
approach march, the battle, and the pursuit. It is therefore illustrative of Napoleonic warfare. 
It also illustrates the Enlightenment’s military legacy that Napoleon brought with him and 
adapted to the various circumstances. This section will not delve into tactical details but 
emphasise the campaign perspective to critically study any similarity to modern operational 
art and twentieth-century operations. 
 
In his chapter on the Battle of Jena in Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips’ anthology 
Historical perspectives of the operational art, David G. Chandler presented an abbreviated 
description of Napoleon’s method of waging war. 205 In this chapter, Chandler credited 
Napoleon with conducting operational art and operational level warfare, an interpretation that 
is greatly at variance with the chapter of the Jena campaign in his classic book The campaigns 
of Napoleon from 1966.206 The difference is the use of late-twentieth-century operational 
terminology in the 2005 chapter to analyse and explain the campaign, its battles, and its 
pursuit. There is a methodological risk when twenty-first-century operational terms or 
analytical framework are used to explain early nineteenth-century warfare and to see “far too 
readily the ‘modern’ elements which the commentator has thus programmed himself to 
find”.207 
 
As the probability of hostilities between French and Prussia increased during 1806, Prussia 
had secretly decided in early August to go to war and Napoleon only became aware of the fact 
in September. France had six corps d’armée (army corps) totalling 160,000 troops spread out 
in southern Germany, in addition to 32,000 cavalry and additional artillery. Napoleon’s 
 
203
 Chandler, "Napoleon, operational art, and the Jena campaign."; Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art, 
1740-1813 : From Frederick the Great to Napoleon. 
204
 Dennis E. Showalter, "The Jena Campaign: Apogee and Perihelion," in Napoleon and the operational art of 
war : essays in honor of Donald D. Horward, ed. Michael V. Leggiere (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2016), 173, 197. 
205
 Krause and Phillips, Historical perspectives of the operational art, 28-35. 
206
 Chandler, The campaigns of Napoleon, 443-506. 
207
 Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," 24. 
  60  
Grande armée was the victor of the battles of Ulm and Austerlitz in 1805, it was experienced, 
seasoned, and in very good fighting condition, “probably the most integrated and best trained 
force that Napoleon ever commanded.”208 
 
The Prussian army had maintained the reputation of Frederick the Great, but it had more to do 
with appearance than reality. Its shortcomings were evident and ranged from ageing 
commanders to soldiers’ muskets of similar vintage as the generals. The army staff was 
rudimentary. There were three competing chiefs of staff and no functional chain of command. 
The army fielded 171,000 troops but did not have the corps headquarters system that made the 
Grande armée such a flexible force. In addition, the Prussians were lumbered with a 
cumbersome logistics system based on magazines. As a consequence, the Prussian army was 
not capable of operating and fighting effectively outside its parade ground. In late September, 
the Prussians were deployed with their three field armies from Gotha to Dresden, in addition 
to numerous garrisons dispersed all over Prussia. The Prussian army was, in reality, a mid-
eighteenth century museum’s piece, not at all ready to confront the most vigorous and 
victorious field force on the continent.209 
 
While the Prussians argued among themselves and finally decided on a compromise war plan 
that failed to satisfy any of the commanders, Napoleon tried to discover what the Prussians 
were planning. When it became apparent that they would deploy their main forces west of the 
River Elbe, Napoleon knew precisely which course of action to choose. Even before the 
Prussian army had made any of its initial dispositions, Napoleon was on the march, causing 
further confusion among the Prussian commanders. New orders called for the Prussian armies 
to concentrate their efforts west of the Saale River to meet and defeat the French forces by “an 
oblique and rapid movement” against the enemy’s course of advance.210 The “oblique and 
rapid movement” was a hallmark of Frederick the Great. But Der Alte Fritz was no longer in 
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Napoleon had considered three strategic options, all with the ultimate aim of crushing the 
Prussian army and seizing Berlin before an expected Russian intervention. Napoleon initiated 
strategic preparations that ranged from calling in recruits to secure the western parts of 
Germany and calling up the army’s corps that were stationed all over southern Germany. He 
decided to move his main force from the Bamberg area in a strategic outflanking manoeuvre 
north-east through the Thuringian Forest and place the army between the Prussian armies and 
their capital. The Grande Armée was ready and organised in early October. On 8 October it 
moved into the Thuringian Forest on three axes by Coburg, Kronach, and Bayreuth.212 
 
Sketch 2.1. The Jena Campaign. Operations (marches) late September to 12 October.213 
 
The Grande Armée assembled for the campaign consisted of six army corps, Murat’s cavalry 
corps, and the Guard Division. The army marched in the formation of a wedge-shaped 
bataillon carré, cavalry detachments in front followed by two corps on each of the three axes. 
Each corps was capable of fighting a larger enemy until reinforcements arrived. The 
formation was a refinement of the Grande Armée’s strategic march from the Rhine to the 
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Danube the previous year, where the allied armies were strategically out-manoeuvred. The 
bataillon carré formation gave Napoleon unprecedented flexibility to operate on a broad 
front, concentrate, disperse, march through rugged terrain, and engage an enemy of which 
Napoleon had only a rudimentary understanding.214 
 
When he understood that the Prussians’ main body had deployed west of the Saale, Napoleon 
took his army along a straight line towards Naumburg and placed it behind the enemy, cutting 
the Prussian lines of communication, and forced them to fight on a reversed front. When the 
French corps deployed for battle, Napoleon had lost control of the situation. However, the 
Prussians were equally lost in the fog and friction of war. Napoleon acted with vigour and had 
his advanced forces deployed for combat during the night of 13 October, while the other corps 
were ordered to assemble at Jena. Two battles were actually fought the next day; Napoleon, 
with his main force against the smaller Prussian force at Jena and Marshal Davout’s IIIrd corps 
at Auerstädt facing the bulk of the enemy. Despite the usual uncertainty and chaos in war, 
French aggressiveness and superior leadership prevailed.215 
 
The next two weeks saw a relentless pursuit through Berlin to the Baltic coast and eastwards 
across the River Oder. The pursuit was a combination of direct pressure and outflanking 
movements to capture crossing points and cut off the retreating Prussian forces. The Prussian 
army was given no respite and was literally annihilated in the process, but Napoleon needed 
another six months to bring the Prussians to terms.216 
 
The campaign consisted of three distinct stages. The initial stage was the strategic operation to 
bring the Grande Armée across the Thuringian Forest and into the strategic flank and rear of 
the Prussian army. When Napoleon became aware of the location of the enemy, he had to 
regroup his forces to the area north of Jena. This action was an addition to the initial stage in 
order to rearrange and concentrate the corps on the battlefield, a manoeuvre Jean Colin states 
was the manifestation of grand tactics.217 The next stage was the battle itself, or, rather, the 
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two battles, of Jena and Auerstedt. The final stage was the pursuit leading to the capture of the 
remnants of the defeated Prussian army. The campaign was conducted according to 
contemporary doctrine; the strategic advance (opération by contemporary French terms) to 
gain a positional advantage and concentration before the battle, then the battle(s), and finally 
the pursuit to obliterate the remnants of the enemy forces. 218 
 
Napoleon’s strategic approach in the Jena campaign was, to a large extent similar to the ideas 
of the theorists of the ancien regime, which were developed a generation earlier and closely 
studied by the young Bonaparte. The most notable difference from Frederick the Great at the 
strategic echelon was the dispersion of the army for the approach march, utilising the 
flexibility of the bataillon carré, and the subsequent concentration before engaging in battle. 
These adaptations were made possible by the division of the army into sub-units (army corps), 
a system developed in the 1770s and already in use before Napoleon took command.219 The 
key to success was the strategic concentration of the dispersed corps before the battle 
commenced, which needed a commander of Napoleon’s character, as his marshals, with few 
exceptions, were incapable of independent command.220 
 
Napoleonic warfare was not constricted by the conditions that caused operational art to 
emerge a century later. Important incitements for the emergence of operational art, such as the 
massive increase in volume, range, and precision of fire, the subsequent expansion of the 
battlefield, and a highly specialised military staff system to manage multiple armies and 
industrial logistics, did not exist in 1806. None of these elements was present at Jena. Even 
Auerstedt was a traditional, if accidental battle, not a deliberate attempt to widen the front. 
Napoleon’s inability to even know about, or control, Davout’s lone battle less than 20 km 
away, demonstrates the limitation of command beyond visual range without a general staff 
and modern communications. Napoleonic warfare must be understood within the practical and 
theoretical framework it took place. To ascribe any visual similarities with twentieth-century 
warfare, such as dispersed marches or distributed manoeuvre with large forces, to some kind 
of military clairvoyance, would be unhistorical and fall into the trap of “‘seeing’ far too 
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readily the ‘modern’ elements”221 which were not present at the time. There were elements in 
the Jena campaign that “looked like” the most celebrated forms of operational art, especially 
large-scale deep armoured thrusts. However, a detailed examination indicates that it did not 
constitute a paradigm shift in the conduct of war. 
 
Thinking and theory 
 
The two formative thinkers of modern military thought are Baron Antoine Henry de Jomini 
and Carl von Clausewitz. Both applied the scientific methods of the Enlightenment to their 
analysis of decades of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. German romantic ideals 
further influenced Clausewitz. Clausewitz is the most familiar name among the classic 
military theorists. However, Jomini has had the most significant influence, especially in 
military terminology, which is bound to frame and influence thinking.222 This section will 
briefly study their use of operational terms and operations and their relations to operational 
art. 
 
Carl von Clausewitz 
 
Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian officer born in 1780 and participated in his first campaign 
in the winter of 1793 against revolutionary France. He was educated at the Kriegsakademie 
(the Military Academy) in Berlin and was influenced by Gerhard von Scharnhorst. Clausewitz 
fought in the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815. He resigned in protest against Prussia’s 
benign policy towards Napoleon and entered Russian service in 1812. Clausewitz wrote his 
first military article in 1805. His main work is On War (Vom Kriege), published 
posthumously by his widow in 1832. The eight-volume work was still under revision when 
Clausewitz died in 1831. On War is both a philosophical exploration of war as a phenomenon 
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In 1976 On War was published in a new English translation by the renowned historians 
Michael Howard and Peter Paret, with new editions in 1984 and 1989. The translation is 
acknowledged for making Clausewitz’s complicated German text available for a twentieth-
century audience but also criticised for its rationalistic interpretation and for imposing modern 
military terminology on a 150 years old text.224 Sibylle Scheipers sums up this tendency:  
 
Throughout the two centuries of Clausewitz reception, there has been a tendency to 
interpret his writings with a view to the interpreters’ strategic context. This resulted in a 
selective and sometimes manifestly erroneous reading of his thought.225 
 
This critique reflects Skinner’s concerns regarding the meaning and content of historical texts 
and is especially of concern in this chapter in regard to operational elements.226 Modern 
terms, such as operation and operational, were used over 330 times in the Howard-Paret 
translation, while Clausewitz used the German word Operation only 14 times. Eleven of those 
were composite terms similar to Bülow, such as lines of operation (Operationslinien) and 
base of operation (Operationsbasis). The twelfth term was “an operation of the mind” 
(Verstandesoperation). Clausewitz never used the adjective operativ (operational).227 The 
operational terms in the English translation span the entire field from the strategic conduct of 
war to (tactical) combat and imply a twentieth-century western doctrinal understanding that 
does not reflect the original text. 
 
An illustrative example is where Clausewitz wrote of separated engagements intended as one 
battle but ended up as two geographically separate engagements. In Clausewitz’ views 
 
It does frequently happen in war, however, that forces meant to fight in concert have to 
be placed in so far apart that, while their conjunction in battle remains the primary 
intention, the possibility of separate action has also to be considered. Such a deployment 
is therefore strategic. 
Dispositions of this type include marches by separate columns and divisions, advance 
guards and flanking corps, [...], and so forth. It is obvious that this is a constant 
recurring type of operation–the small change, so to speak, of the strategic budget, while 
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important battles and other operations comparable in scale may be considered its gold 
and silver.228 
 
 Clausewitz regarded this “constant recurring type of operation” as “small change [...] of the 
strategic budget” while it was the “important battles and other operations comparable in 
scale” that make up the main currency. There are some significant translation issues here. The 
term operation was not used in the original German paragraph. The Howard-Paret translation 
first inserted “type of operation” instead of the German pronoun sie (they), which refers to the 
activities in the previous sentence. Secondly, the original text auf gleicher Linie steht 
(standing on the same line) was translated as “other operations comparable in scale”.229 These 
insertions of the twentieth century military term operation into the early nineteenth-century 
text highlights two issues. 
 
Firstly, Clausewitz acknowledged only two distinct militarydisciplines: strategy and tactics, 
while operation was just a general term for military activities, mainly related to movements. 
Secondly, if the two separated forces that aimed to concentrate for a combined battle failed to 
unify, the result was just two separate battles. Still, the framework for those separate actions 
was strategic. It was not, for Clausewitz, an operational framework, as it may well have been 
in a twentieth-century context. The translation of “auf gleicher Linie steht” with operations, in 
this case, is problematic because it implies that operations were of equal standing as battles 
and thus that operations were significant in Clausewitz understanding of war. Such use of 
modern terms in the interpretation of classical texts may well unintentionally influence “the 
observer’s mental set” to expect that operational art was an element of warfare in the time 
when these texts were written.230 It was not. It only began to appear, piecemeal, a generation 
after Clausewitz’ death. 
 
In the tradition of the German translation of Maizeroy’s L’empereur Léon231 and the writings 
by Bülow, Clausewitz wrote in the paradigm of the two military disciplines of strategy and 
tactics. He hardly used anything that resembled twentieth-century operational terms. Quentin 
Skinner cautions us “of mistaking some scattered or incidental remarks by the classic theorists 
for his “doctrine” on one of the subjects which the historian is set to expect.” He further warns 
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of “supplying the classic theorists with doctrines which are agreed to be proper to their 
subject, but which they have unaccountably failed to discuss.”232 Contrary to the impression 
the reader may get from the Howard-Paret translation, Clausewitz was not familiar with the 
twentieth-century operational terminology or operational art. Svechin makes the same points 
in his discussion of the relevance of studying the classics that  
 
even Clausewitz, for whom the duration of a battle was only a strategic instant and the 
extent of the battlefront was only a strategic point, has undoubtedly become obsolete in 
many respects. He had no knowledge of operational art, because for him an operation 
did not present either spatial or temporal dimensions.233 
 
Antoine Henry de Jomini 
 
For us, Jomini stands above all the other military writers of the nineteenth century, just 
as much as Napoleon is above the other generals, and it is with good reason that we 
have been able to say that if Napoleon is the god of war, Jomini is his prophet; for no 
one has understood the teacher’s doctrines so well and so easily, and no one has brought 
them to light in such a precise manner.234 
 
In the nineteenth century, European and American military terminology was primarily 
influenced by Antoine Henry de Jomini and his interpretation of the Napoleonic Wars. Jomini 
was a Swiss banker who entered service in the French revolutionary administration and later 
became part of the Grande Armée as a member of Marshal Ney’s staff. Jomini read the 
military classics of the Enlightenment and wrote his first military text in 1803. He served as a 
staff officer, rose to the position as chief of staff in Marshal Ney’s corps, and took part in 
Napoleon’s campaigns from 1805 until he entered Russian service in 1813. He rose to the 
rank of general in the Russian army and wrote extensively.235 
 
Jomini’s major military work, his Précis de l’art de la guerre became the standard text-book 
in the education of higher officers and influenced thinking and teaching of war.236 He merged 
the scientific thinking of the Enlightenment, the writings of predecessors such as Guibert, 
Lloyd, and Bülow, with his analysis of Napoleonic warfare. Jomini assembled a set of 
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terminology that have influenced military thinking and doctrine to this day.237 According to 
Jomini, warfare (the art of war) “consists of five purely military branches,—viz. : Strategy, 
Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering, and Tactics.” This introductory sentence was followed 
by a discussion of diplomacy and a summary:  
 
To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts :— 
1. Statesmanship in its relation to war. 
2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for 
defense or for invasion. 
3. Grand Tactics. 
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies. 
5. Engineering,—the attack and defense of fortifications. 
6. Minor Tactics.238 
 
Grand tactics is the term used by Jomini that is often related to the development of operational 
art.239 He defined grand tactics as “the art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to 
the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the 
ground,”.   240 Jomini further asserted that grand tactics was “the art of making good 
combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress”.241 Jomini elaborated on 
the principles of grand tactics “which consist in this, viz. : in knowing how to direct the great 
mass of the troops at the proper moment upon the decisive point of the battlefield, and in 
employing for this purpose the simultaneous action of the three arms.”242 This paragraph also 
includeed Jomini’s emphasis on “the decisive point” and combined arms action, “the 
simultaneous action of the three arms” of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.243 
 
Jomini’s definition of grand tactics is an illustrating example of how the meaning of the term 
had changed since its introduction by Guibert in the early 1770s when grand tactics held the 
meaning that strategy had for Jomini and his contemporaries. Contrary to Clausewitz, Jomini 
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used the term operation more than 600 times, with similar meaning and content as his 
Enlightenment predecessors. The meanings of operations varied from strategic to tactical and 
offensive and defensive operations. Operation was used in combined terms such as lines of 
operations, base of operations, and zone of operations. Jomini’s widespread use of the term 
operation indicates the very general meaning of the term and its utility. In line with 
Clausewitz, Jomini’s Précis does not introduce any operational terminology in the way we 
understand it today. 
 
The Wars of Napoleon did not change the dualism of strategy and tactics from the way they 
were developed during the Enlightenment. Napoleon conducted campaigns that were to be 
decided by battles. Despite visual similarities between Napoleons dispersed strategic marches 
and twentieth century’s deep operations, Napoleon’s thinking and conduct of war constituted 
a continuum, not a break with the thought and practice of the Enlightenment. His corps 
commanders, the marshals, were tactical executors of Napoleon’s will and, with a few 
exceptions, incapable of independent command. Berthier, Napoleon’s chief of staff, was also 
an executor of the commander’s will and intentions and did not preside over a modern general 
staff apparatus capable of planning war years ahead. The two leading interpreters of 
Napoleon, Jomini and Clausewitz, were both consistent in terminology. The meaning and 
purpose of the terms they used were developed in the Enlightenment and through the 
Napoleonic Wars. Neither wrote about operational art as a third military discipline simply 
because it did not exist. Nor were the institutional and physical preconditions for operational 
art present in pre-industrial wars. 
 
The American Civil War 
 
The American Civil War was the most devastating war between modern states before the 
world wars. Several operational elements emerged during this war, but this development was 
cut short when the Union army demobilised and resumed the frontier wars in the American 
West. Some of the observations and lessons were captured in text-books for officers’ 
education. 
 
In 1947 Brigadier General J. D. Hittle wrote: “It has been said with good reason that many a 
Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini’s Summary of the Art 
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of War in the other.”244 Given the prominence of Jomini and Napoleon’s way of war in the 
curriculum at the US Military Academy West Point, this statement was valid for both sides, 
since West Pointers filled the majority of senior positions in both the Union and Confederate 
armies. Hittle also asserted “that Jomini’s writings were how Napoleonic technique was 
transfused into the military thought of the Civil War”.245 Major General Henry W. Halleck’s 
book from 1846, Elements of Military Art and Science, which was reprinted in 1862, is a 
representative example.246 Russell F. Weigley further highlighted the dominance of the 
Napoleonic ideal regarding the development of pre-Civil War American strategic thought. 
Weigley was critical of the lack of operational art among the Civil War armies, as he 
compared them to his reading of Prussian practice in the Wars of German Unification.247 To 
some extent, this critique is valid, but it takes nineteenth-century Americans to task for not 
knowing twentieth-century operational art. 
 
Commanders on both sides initially followed the Napoleonic quest for the decisive battle, but 
the decision proved elusive. Victories were at best decisive only in a tactical sense. There was 
always another fort or another army.248 US General Ulysses S. Grant acknowledged after the 
Battle of Shilo on 6-7 April 1862 that the war would not be won by decisive military victory 
on the battlefield, but by the destruction of the Confederacy “by complete conquest.” This 
resulted in a war where the resources of an entire society became an objective, aimed at 
blocking the supplies of the Confederate forces, an effect “causing the same outcome as if the 
army was annihilated.”249 
 
The two divergent political objectives of the Union and the Confederacy would dictate two 
different strategic approaches. The North had to subdue the South by strategic offensive, 
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while the South could choose to act defensively. It merely had to avoid losing. The Union 
initially opted for a strategy of gradual pressure along the entire Confederacy to force it to 
spread their fewer forces along their entire perimeter. The build-up of Union land and naval 
forces would then gain superior strength to invade the South on a broad front. Such a strategy 
demanded patience that was in short supply in the North. The perception of a short 
Napoleonic war of decisive battles prevailed. The result was humiliation in the opening 
battles and three years of indecisive action in the east.250 The large territory and navigable 
rivers in the west, conversely, allowed for Union forces slowly but surely to penetrate the 
Confederacy, river by river and fort by fort.251 
 
Strategy depended on steam and steel. Railways allowed for strategic movement of large 
forces, which could be sustained by those same railways. Similarly, steamships could navigate 
oceans and rivers independent of wind and currents and maintain an effective naval blockade. 
Naval forces could provide force projection, combat power, and logistics in support of land 
forces. Strategic manoeuvre was thus dependent on steam and steel and made Jomini’s 
doctrine of interior lines strategically irrelevant. The more extensive and superior railway 
system of the Union facilitated a more rapid movement of troops around the Confederacy 
compared to the movement of forces within the Confederacy.252 
 
Two campaigns will be examined and compared to illustrate how operational elements were 
emerging in the American Civil War. The first is the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania, 
culminating with the battle of Gettysburg. The second is the Union efforts to gain control over 
the Mississippi. Both campaigns have been introduced as examples of early operational art. 
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Gettysburg 
 
The battle of Gettysburg from 1 to the 3 July 1863 is the most iconic battle of the Civil War 
and a source of controversies over why the South lost the war.254 The campaign leading up to 
the battle has, on the one hand, been presented as an example of early American operational 
art and on the other, been criticised for failing to meet the criteria for operational art.255 The 
Confederate Army of Northern Virginia had inflicted a severe defensive defeat on the Union 
Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg in December 1862 and, despite being outmanned and 
out-manoeuvred at Chancellorsville in early May 1863, counter-attacked and forced the 
Union forces to retreat.256 General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, was again victorious against a stronger enemy. The army itself was as confident as 
Napoleon’s Grande armée had been before Jena-Auerstedt in 1806. 
 
The strategic rationale for the Confederate offensive in the eastern theatre the summer of 1863 
was to manoeuvre the Army of Northern Virginia deep into Union territory and defeat the 
Union Army of the Potomac on northern soil. The assumption was that a Union defeat on 
northern territory would cause a political shift that would force the U. S. Government into 
peace negotiations. There were even ambitions to destroy the Army of the Potomac, the 
Union’s main army in the east. The strategic aims were ambitious on a political scale, while 
the mean was the Napoleonic decisive victory. One of the controversies is over the alleged 
assumption that the battle was to be tactically defensive and forcing the Army of the Potomac 
to attack the Confederates in prepared positions. The outcome would be considerable Union 
casualties and a weakened army vulnerable to a determined counter-attack.257 This 
risky strategic option was also necessitated by the precarious supply situation, since the 
Confederate resource base was approaching exhaustion. The South could not sustain a long 
war.258 Lee was seeking to end the war by a decisive battle that would secure acceptable peace 
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terms for the Confederacy. Such a strategy might have succeeded against an ancien régime 
autocrat. However, when faced with an elected president backed by popular assemblies and an 
industrialised society, it stood far less of a chance.259 
 
Sketch 2.2. The Gettysburg Campaign. Operations (marches) late June and dispositions on 30 June, 
the day before the battle began and intended Union defences along Pipe Creek.260 
 
Lee’s first units left their fortifications around Fredericksburg on 3 June. Within a week the 
entire army entered the Shenandoah Valley by dispersed corps columns, foraging as it went to 
ease the logistical burden. Confederate cavalry screened the movement for the first two weeks 
while Lee slipped behind the mountains that shield the valley from the east. The Union Army 
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of the Potomac hesitated until it became apparent what Lee was up to and began to move 
north on 14 June in parallel with the Confederates, while protecting Washington D.C. as it 
marched. While Confederate cavalry left the army on a raid around the Union army, Union 
cavalry protected the advance and conducted reconnaissance. After the Army of Northern 
Virginia entered Pennsylvania, the three corps moved on diverging axes towards the east to 
gather supplies and forage. Union corps followed suit and when Lee became aware of the 
Union pursuit on 28 June, he ordered the scattered units to concentrate at the strong defensive 
terrain around Cashtown. Gordon Meade, the newly appointed commander of the Army of the 
Potomac, on 30 June ordered a defensive position along Pike Creek to be reconnoitred and to 
advance on 1 July on Gettysburg with two corps and proceed with one corps to Emmitsburg. 
The next day Confederate units searching for shoes clashed with Union cavalry just northwest 
of Gettysburg and initiated the battle by chance.261 
 
The first day of the Battle of Gettysburg began as a meeting engagement that expanded as 
more forces entered the field. The Confederate corps were already marching towards 
Gettysburg to concentrate and were within supporting distance of one another, while the 
Union corps arrived piecemeal as the fighting escalated. Lee won the battle on 1 July by 
default, since he forced the Union forces to retire. The lead Union corps established itself and 
built fortifications on the hills and ridges southeast of the town. Lee had seized Gettysburg by 
nightfall and had occupied the fields to the west, but did not press the attack to prevent the 
enemy from entrenching. Lee discussed further options with his corps and division 
commanders. Nevertheless, and despite opposition, he decided to attack the Union left the 
next day. Meade arrived late in the evening to find two of his corps occupying strong 
defensive positions and the other five corps on the road. Lee may have won the day but lost 
the battle when he allowed the Army of the Potomac to fortify the high ground. The Yankees 
out-generaled Lee and turned his strategy upside down by adopting the tactically defensive 
and forcing the Rebels to attack prepared positions.262 
 
During the night and the early morning on 2 July, the Army of the Potomac had six out of its 
seven corps deployed along the hills and ridges southeast of Gettysburg and Meade 
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outnumbered Lee 85,500 to 75,000 troops. Over the next two days, Lee launched two main 
corps size attacks against the entrenched Union troops but failed to dislodge the defenders. 
The outcome was nothing but mounting Confederate casualties. By 3 July, the Army of 
Northern Virginia had lost more than one-third of its soldiers. It had depleted its ammunition 
and other supplies, leaving Lee with no other option than to call off the offensive and return 
south.263 
 
The Confederate invasion of the North, the conduct of the battles around Gettysburg and 
especially the roles of the different southern commanders have been subjected to criticism. 
Also, Meade’s reluctant pursuit attracted its share of critique.264 The invasion of Pennsylvania 
displayed the features of a high-risk enterprise moulded on Napoleon’s great campaigns. The 
Confederate attacks were executed with the same determination and drive that had made Lee 
the master of the eastern battlefields the previous year. The strategic conduct of the offensive 
was according to the text-book: the purpose of the campaign, its political implications, and the 
role of operations and battles. Operations were conducted according to American 
interpretations of Jomini’s theories. They were elements of a campaign and were about 
moving an army, or another large force, to out-manoeuvre the enemy and bring him to 
battle.265 
 
Lee’s Gettysburg campaign was strategically sound according to doctrine, but the doctrine 
based on Napoleon was overtaken by the societies that waged war, especially the 
industrialised North. Superb tactical conduct might have given Lee a battlefield victory, but 
probably a pyrrhic victory, which the Confederacy would not have been able to exploit for 
purely logistical reasons. In any case, any Confederate victory in the east would have been 
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Vicksburg 
 
Vicksburg was the final obstacle in an almost two-year-long struggle to control the 
Mississippi River and its hinterland. By early June 1862, Union forces had secured the 
Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, gained control over Memphis and New Orleans, and 
destroyed Confederate naval forces in the west in the process. Vicksburg was the only 
remaining Confederate fortified site that prevented Union control over the Mississippi, which 
would have divided the Confederacy and prevented supplies from its western parts from 
reaching its heartland. The struggle over the next 12 months to capture the fortress of 
Vicksburg is a revealing example of the interaction between technology, terrain, 
infrastructure, and armed forces. The Union commander was Ulysses S. Grant; a West Point 
educated general that had never spent much time reading Jomini.266 
 
Grant grew up in Ohio and was in 1839 told by his father that he had been appointed as a 
cadet to the US Military Academy West Point. He was commissioned in the infantry and 
fought in the Mexican War from 1846-1848.267 He later left the army and struggled in civilian 
life until he was appointed a colonel and regimental commander in 1861. His first major 
actions were at Fort Henry and Donaldson on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. He was 
surprised as an army commander at Shiloh on 6 April 1862 but managed to halt the 
Confederate assault and counter-attack the next day. He was criticised after the battle, partly 
set aside and granted a month’s leave. He was convinced by his friend General William T. 
Sherman to stay. When there were demands for Grant’s removal, President Lincoln reportedly 
said: “I can’t spare this man; he fights”. Grant was reinstated as commander of the Army of 
Tennessee in the autumn 1862 and Vicksburg on the Mississippi gradually became an 
objective.268 
 
The Mississippi and the adjacent land areas were challenging environments in which to 
sustain and operate large forces. The river itself was capricious; consequently, its frequent 
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flooding made operations on or near the river unpredictable. Several attempts to dig canals to 
bypass enemy fortifications failed because of changes in the water level. The adjacent terrain 
was almost impassable through intersecting rivers, streams, bayous, and swamps. The 
overland manoeuvre was very challenging, so land forces operating along the river were 
dependent on river transport for supplies. When armies moved inland, they risked outrunning 
their logistical support and being intercepted by enemy cavalry. On the other hand, the area of 
operations also allowed for close cooperation between land and naval forces and would permit 
commanders to cooperate in joint operations. When the Confederacy lost its entire fleet of 
warships on the Mississippi, it had only land forces and fortifications to counter the joint 
operations of the Union Army and Navy.269 
 
During the Vicksburg campaign, Grant was in command of the Army of Tennessee 
numbering more than 60,000 troops organised in three corps.270 Rear Admiral David D. Porter 
commanded the Mississippi River Squadron of about 60 steam-powered armoured warships 
designed for riverine operations, in addition to troop transports and auxiliary vessels. The 
Confederate Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton commanded the Department of Mississippi and East 
Louisiana. He had five divisions totalling 43,000 troops at the most, but no corps headquarters 
to lead the troops in the field and no naval forces to navigate the rivers.271 
 
The first attempt made against Vicksburg moved out from Western Tennessee on 26 
November 1862 along the Mississippi Central Railroad. The aim was to outflank the 
Vicksburg river fortifications and attack them from the rear over land, an approach that had 
been successful along other rivers the previous year. The overland advance was supplemented 
by an expedition down the Mississippi to make a two-pronged assault. The overland 
manoeuvre was cut short when Confederate cavalry raided railways and supply depots in the 
Union rear. Furthermore, the river expedition made no headway against enemy defences north 
of Vicksburg. Grant pulled out most of his land force from Tennessee on 30 January 1863 and 
assembled his army in a staging area upstream from Vicksburg. He also took advice from 
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trusted subordinates to personally lead the entire campaign himself, instead of having a 
separate commander for the river advance.272 
 
Sketch 2.3. The Mississippi River. The theatre of operations, the central infrastructure of the 
Vicksburg Campaign, and initial operations from November 1862 to January 1863.273 
 
272
 Ballard, Vicksburg : the Campaign That Opened the Mississippi, 79-158; Brands, The Man who Saved the 
Union, 223-225; Donovan Jr. et al., The American Civil War, 71-74; Gabel, The Vicksburg Campaign - 
November 1862–July 1863, 18-26; Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare, 
189-192; Weigley, A great Civil War, 261-263. 
273
  Ballard, Vicksburg : the Campaign That Opened the Mississippi, 2; Griess and Krasnoborski, Atlas for the 
American Civil War, map 19a, 19b. 
  79  
Grant made five more attempts to circumvent Vicksburg by land and water during the three 
winter months of rain and flooding, but none made any progress in the face of a capricious 
river and enemy actions. Disease and poor sanitary conditions increased the number of 
casualties. Grant pressed on to escape the deadlock. When the flooding season was over by 
mid-April, Grant’s forces were making their way southwards overland on the western bank, 
out of range of Vicksburg’s observation and artillery. Admiral Porter managed to force a 
passage of the Vicksburg defences with enough naval forces to allow the transport of Grant’s 
army across the Mississippi River and provide fire support. Grant staged diversions directly 
against Vicksburg and by a cavalry raid through Mississippi and into Louisiana, all to keep 
the Confederates’ attention away from the advance by his main force. The first units were 
landed on the eastern bank on 30 April and fought off the Confederate forces sent to oppose 
them. Grant’s army was consolidated and resupplied on 9 May, ready to move out of the 
bridgehead.274 
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Within the next week and a half, Grant had moved his three corps towards Jackson, captured 
the city, and isolated the Vicksburg garrison from the rest of the Confederacy. He then out-
manoeuvred and fought off Confederate reinforcements that in total outnumbered his own 
forces. By the third week after breaking out of the bridgehead, Grant had surrounded 
Vicksburg and launched two failed assaults against its land-side fortifications. After a month 
and a half of siege and constant artillery bombardment from land and the river, Vicksburg 
surrendered on 4 July 1863. Soon after, Port Hudson just north of New Orleans surrendered. 
The entire Mississippi was in Union hands, dividing the Confederacy.276 
 
Grant’s operations against Vicksburg can be reviewed in the framework of operational art for 
some telling reasons. Grant was commander of the Union Army of the Tennessee in the west 
and responsible for a part of the Western Theatre. The campaign was directed towards an 
intermediate strategic objective, both for the USA and the Western Theatre: to open the 
Mississippi and divide the Confederacy. The Vicksburg campaign was not to win the war by 
itself but was a deliberate step towards the intermediate objective of splitting the western 
states from the Confederate centre. The close cooperation between the army and the Navy 
resembled a twentieth-century joint operation and also “looks like” modern operational art.277 
Similarly, to quote Svechin, the final operation combined manoeuvre, battles, and sustainment 
into “a whole series of tactical missions and a number of logistical requirements.”278 Ballard’s 
comment that the Vicksburg campaign “is, in a sense, a victim of its length, scope and 
complexity” indicates how modern the campaign was compared to the relatively 
straightforward and Napoleonic campaigns and battles in the east.279 
 
The Gettysburg campaign was, by contrast, almost pre-modern in its origin and execution. 
Lee’s deception and screened strategic invasion of Pennsylvania mirror Napoleon’s Grande 
Armée at its best. The Army of Northern Virginia manoeuvred as a bataillon carré ready to 
concentrate when called upon. The purpose of the campaign was to conclude the war on terms 
that would keep the Confederacy independent. Its means was the decisive battle. Grant had 
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already discarded any thought of decisive victory by battle the previous year. Instead, he 
conducted parallel and sequenced operations to bring the superior resources of the Union to 
bear and destroy the Confederate armies and the society that sustained them. 
 
The Vicksburg campaign and its operations were modern in their role in the overall strategy 
of how to conduct industrialised war. The operations utilised the means provided by 
technology and industry to accumulate the “series of tactical missions” into operational 
objectives as steps towards the purpose of the campaign. Despite Weigley’s criticism, the 
Union army in the west demonstrated a series of pragmatic adaptations that were better suited 
to the character of industrialised people’s war than those of their enemies. The campaign and 
operations also contained operational elements that distinguished them from the contemporary 
Napoleonic ideal. 
 
War on enemy morale and resources 
 
Grant was made Commander in Chief of the Union Army in 1864. Sherman was appointed 
commander of the western theatre, which mirrored a twentieth-century army group and 
included several armies. The command relations were stated in two letters, which were 
 
all the orders [Grant] ever made on this particular subject, and these, it will be seen, 
devolved on me the details both as to the plan and execution of the campaign by the 
armies under my immediate command.280 
 
Sherman also had been delegated some strategic functions within “the Military Division of the 
Mississippi” as part of his territorial responsibilities. However, Grant, as Commander in Chief 
of the Union Army, provided him with the strategic direction for the conduct of operations: 
 
You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up, and to get into the 
interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can 
against their war resources. 
I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the 
work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute it in your own way. 
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In early May 1864, Sherman moved towards the Confederate industrial centre of Atlanta. 
After two months of manoeuvres, counter-manoeuvres, and a few battles against the 
Confederate Army of Tennessee commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, Sherman’s three 
armies were positioned to attack Atlanta. Johnson had tried to force Sherman to attack him in 
strong positions, while Sherman manoeuvred to turn the enemy’s defences. Confederate 
cavalry was a constant menace to the rail-road, which forced Sherman to deploy security 
detachments at vital bridges and other crucial stretches of the line. Repair crews were 
continually working to keep the rail-road open and managed to secure a sufficient flow of 
supplies to the front.282 
 
The Union armies began to isolate Atlanta while fighting off fierce counter-attacks from the 
defenders, from 18 July led by the aggressive General John Bell Hood. Hood wore down his 
army in the attacks and could not prevent Atlanta from falling on 3 September. Hood and 
Confederate cavalry moved to attack the rail-road and forced Sherman to fight along large 
stretches of the line to keep it open. Sherman sent General Thomas with parts of the armies 
back to secure Memphis and Tennessee and departed Atlanta with the rest of the army on 15 
November. The famous “March to the sea” not only destroyed critical resources desperately 
needed to continue the war, but it was a devastating blow to Confederate morale. On 22 
December Sherman occupied Savannah after Confederate forces had evacuated the city. 
During the winter of 1865, Sherman continued his destructive campaign through the Carolinas 




Like Moltke in the Wars of German Unification, Grant combined strategic and operational 
functions in his direction and supervision of operations. As theatre commander in the east in 
1864 and 1865, Grant directed the operations of Meade and the Army of the Potomac and the 
other armies in the eastern theatre.284 Sherman, on the other hand, had more freedom of action 
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and did not need close supervision from higher headquarters. Nevertheless, he was operating 
under Grant and received instructions from and reported to the Commander in Chief.  
 
In 1864 and 1865, Sherman was an operational commander that directed the armies under his 
command towards intermediate objectives. These objectives were within the strategic 
direction from Grant, or more precise, the strategic direction Sherman had contributed to 
develop. Sherman conducted operational art in his operation towards Atlanta and marches 
through Geogia and the Carolinas. On the other hand, Grant combined the strategic function 
of directing the entire military effort in the war and the strategic direction of operations in all 
theatres. In the east Grant also conducted operational art when he oversaw and directed 
tactical actions by the armies. 
 
Hagerman suggests that while there were lessons from the war that were absorbed, it had limited 
influence on “European–and, arguably, American–military thought”.285 Given that the US 
Army spent the next generation in a completely different kind of low-intensity war, fighting 
Indians in the American West, such an assumption makes sense. What was absorbed was “The 
Strategic Tradition of U. S. Grant”, which qualified as a chapter title in Russell F. Weigley’s 
The American Way of War. European armies did not, to a large extent, regard the war as 
relevant. Moltke’s well-known comment that the American armies were only “two armed mobs 
chasing each other around the country, from which nothing could be learned” is illustrative.286 
 
The American Civil War, in many ways, represents the evolution of warfare in the long 
century from the French Revolution to the First World War compressed into four years. It 
started with the quest for the decisive battle to win the war according to the Napoleonic ideal 
but ended four years later as an industrialised people’s war of exhaustion. There was no 
Austerlitz on the American continent, but exhaustion, attrition, and extended trench systems. 
The war was finally won by campaigns that consisted of sequenced operations led by 
embryonic operational commands. The operations were able to harness tactics to the 
operational direction, while industrialised logistical system as a norm sustained the armies. 
The exception was Sherman’s march through Georgia and the Carolinas, where the armies 
lived of the land. The purpose of the march was at the same time to devastate the interior of 
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the enemy to undermine his morale and destroy the resources that sustained the war. The 
industrial people’s war had reached the people that supported it. 
  
  85  
Chapter 3: Experience and interpretations of 
industrialised war 
 
For there can be no question that the histories of different intellectual pursuits are 
marked by the employment of some "fairly stable vocabulary" of characteristic 
concepts. Even if we hold to the fashionably loose-textured theory that it is only in 
virtue of certain "family resemblances" that we are able to define and delineate such 
different activities, we are still committed to accepting some criteria and rules of usage 
such that certain performances can be correctly instanced, and others excluded, as 
examples of a given activity. 
Quentin Skinner287 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the way operational elements emerged in the mid-
nineteenth century and how operational thinking became part of military thought. Operational 
thinking began piecemeal to complement the established duality of strategy and tactics by 
exploring the interrelationships between the two. The term operational (German operativ) is 
derived from operation and operate; a term that was used in late nineteenth-century analysis 
of the Wars for German Unification. For the Germans, an operation was a subordinate 
element of strategy and was about the movement of forces.288 Nineteenth-century 
commanders were usually practical and not overly concerned with the nuances of military 
terminology. Their orders and instructions were normally short and directly related to the task 
at hand. The sources must be understood in that context and used carefully in the search for 
meaning in military terms, so as not to end up with “converting some scattered or quite 
incidental remarks by a classic theorist into his ‘doctrine’ on one of the mandatory themes.”289 
The mandatory theme to be aware of in this regard is operational art. 
 
The European and Japanese armies and wars between states are the objects for the analysis of 
the emergence of operational thought and operational art. The term operation will be the focal 
point for this chapter, comparable to Gerhard P. Groß’ discussion of the German term 
Operation in relation to strategy and tactics in his book on German operational thought.290 
Other terms that may indirectly reveal any operational elements, such as manoeuvre and 
grand tactics, will be studied to recognise indirectly operational content and context in 
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military thought and operations. The sources will be analysed to identify any operational 
elements in campaigns and operations to validate any assertions of the emergence of 
operational art.291 The interplay between theory and practice will be studied in search of 
evidence of evolution, continuity, and discontinuity in military thought and practice. The 
objective is to establish an understanding how the notion of the operational and its practical 
implications were recognised and developed. 
 
The mass armies that were equipped by the industrialised production of arms and ammunition 
had changed the physical conditions for warfare that prevailed during the Napoleonic wars. 
Military bureaucracies of general staffs were established to command and administer the 
increased complexity of expanding armies. The tactical defence had become stronger than the 
offence due to the massive increase in firepower. By the end of the century, the breech-loaded 
rifle had an effective range and rate of fire more than ten times greater than the smoothbore 
musket of the Napoleonic wars. The extended range exposed the attacking troops to larger 
volumes of precise fire over a much more extended period. Steel barrelled artillery and high 
explosives increased even further the lethality of the battlefield. The romantic image of the 
decisive bayonet charge was still very much alive, even when bayonet charges on the 
battlefield evaporated in a storm of lead and shrapnel. Attacks required superior firepower to 
succeed, which demanded much closer cooperation between artillery and infantry. This 
cooperation needed field headquarters capable of detailed planning and coordination of 
combined arms combat. Both sides could replace losses in a matter of weeks to restore an 
army that had lost a battle. Even a victorious army had to replace losses in men and 
equipment before being able to re-engage. When the tactical defence was reinforced by the 
increased use of field fortifications and ready-made obstacles, such as barbed wire, the task of 
the attacker became even more difficult and costly.292 
 
The capacity for strategic manoeuvre, which in this context meant to manoeuvre the 
defender’s army out of his entrenchments, had to overcome the logistical challenges of 
sustaining armies more than 100,000 strong. Beyond the railheads, supplies were pulled by 
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horses or carried by men, as in the previous centuries. By the end of the American Civil War, 
field fortifications had become complex trench systems that preceded the Western Front in the 
First World War by half a century.293 This section will not delve into details of the wars or 
campaigns, but rather emphasise elements in warfare that reveal emerging operational 
elements. Some selected campaigns and operations will be studied to illustrate both change 
and continuity and how the formative developments that led to operational art became more 
dominant as the character of warfare developed. 
 
The Wars of German Unification 
 
The Wars of German Unification were limited in scope and size, occasionally described as 
cabinet wars or modern cabinet wars, but the operations and combat were extensive and 
intense.294 Nevertheless, the Franco-Prussian War began in the final months to take on the 
character of an industrialised people’s war. These developments signalled how warfare was 
changing in an age of rising nationalism, technological developments, and industrial 
development. The armies that fought these wars continued their emphasis on interstate war 
and analysed the wars to fight future wars. Central themes were the changed tactical conduct 
that was caused by the massive increase of firepower and the consequences for strategy. 
 
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder was chief of the Prussian Great General Staff. He had never 
held a field command, but had served in several general staffs in field units. Moltke was 
educated at the Kriegsakademie (Military Academy) when Clausewitz served as director of 
the General War School. Moltke’s interest was geography and he experienced war when he 
served in the Ottoman army as a captain. He became chief of the Great General Staff in 1857, 
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The Austro-Prussian War 
 
The Austro-Prussian war in 1866 followed two years after Austria and Prussia formed the 
coalition that defeated Denmark. Diplomatic manoeuvring had tied up substantial Austrian 
forces on the Italian front, leaving Italy to declare war on Austria on 20 July. Prussian 
strategic planning led by Moltke developed a five-phased war plan that was partly tested 
during the 1865 fall manoeuvre and in staff rides.296 Moltke adjusted force composition and 
dispositions as both Austria and Prussia mobilised in the spring of 1866. The railway network 
was an essential factor in determining the strategic deployment that would provide the three 
Prussian armies with a head start against their opponent. Prussia had a 9:1 superiority in 
railways and could mobilise and deploy its army faster than Austria.297 
 
In late July, the Austrian North Army marched along a single railway line towards Saxony, 
while the three smaller Prussian armies were on the march from their separate railheads. 
When the Prussian armies moved along a semi-circle towards the Austrian front and flanks, 
the Austrians established themselves in the defensive terrain northwest of Königgrätz. The 
Austrian army was defeated on the battlefield on 3 July, but avoided annihilation and retreated 
from the field. This victory allowed Prussia to secure its political and strategic gains.298 
 
As its chief, Moltke developed and educated the General Staff after he took command. The 
key task was to plan and prepare future wars well in advance and test the plans in war-games, 
staff rides, and field exercises (manoeuvres). The idea of pre-planned wars was a 
fundamentally new way of thinking and gave Prussia a significant advantage during the Wars 
of German unification. In the decades prior to the First World War, other nations copied the 
Prussian model and caught up with Imperial Germany. 
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Sketch 3.1. The Prussian operations against Austria’s North Army. Railways and prominent 
features in the theatre of operations. Operations (marches and advances) by the armies.299 
 
The Prussian campaign consisted of an initial mobilisation and strategic deployments by rail 
to three jumping-off positions along a 250 km stretch of railway, followed by operations 
(marches) to bring the armies to converge at the field of battle.300 The campaign and 
operations were directed by Moltke and supported by the “mobile General Staff”, a nucleus of 
key senior officers. Orders to the subordinated forces were transmitted by telegraph to field 
commanders, who were already familiar with the planning and preparations of the previous 
years’ war games and staff rides.301 Moltke directed the Battle of Königgrätz from a small hill 
approximately 3 km from the actual fighting and aimed to encircle the Austrian army. As the 
third of the Prussian armies arrived on the Austrian right flank at 14:00 hours, the Prussian 
concentration was complete. The Austrians were forced to fight simultaneously on both flanks 
and as well at the front. Nevertheless, Moltke failed to drive his forces to enforce the 
encirclement. Chaotic battle conditions, insubordinate commanders, communication errors, 
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and the intermingling of different units made it impossible to direct the fighting from the 
top.302 
 
The major divergence from the Napoleonic strategic pattern was first and foremost that the 
entire Prussian campaign was pre-planned, analysed by the General Staff, and tested in war 
games and staff rides.303 Another notable difference was the deliberate concentration of the 
converging armies during the battle and not before. The norm of the Napoleonic wars was to 
concentrate the army before the battle, although there were exceptions. This issue of 
concentration before or during the fighting became an important matter in the post-war 
German military debate. The critical tactical point is that the battle was decided solely by 
superior Prussian firepower, so there was no need for a final bayonet charge to drive home the 
victory. The Prussian breach-loaded Dreyse rifles outclassed the Austrian muzzle-loaders in 
rate of fire, precision, and range.304 The Austrian’s insistence on shock tactics relegated them 
to “an “obliging enemy”—an enemy who not only makes errors, but of his own volition 
makes the kind of errors that maximise his opponent’s advantages.”305 
 
The role of the railways and Moltke’s command arrangements were both operational elements 
that signalled a different way of waging war. The introduction of command by directive 
increased subordinate commanders’ responsibility and their need to know the overall picture 
to understand the commander’s intent. This combination allowed, to a certain degree, 
commanders to act on their own initiative as long the direction of the action was within the 
overall intent. The railways played an increasingly important role in the US Civil War, but the 
Prussian use of railways both to mobilise the armies and then move them to widely separated 
assembly areas for a coordinated approach march towards the enemy, gave the railways a 
direct role in the conduct of operations. The railways increased not only the speed and volume 
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Operations were about manoeuvring the armies to the battlefield. The net result was that the 
Prussians could concentrate their armies and bring superior firepower to bear on the field of 
battle to enforce a decision. The plan was then to supply the armies by rail, but the war ended 
before the already strained logistical system was put to the test.306 Königgrätz turned out to be 
the decisive event in the theatre and shared many characteristics of a pre-industrial battle. 
However, the events on the Prussian side that were leading up to the battle reveals some 
operational elements that, at least in hindsight, brings to light how industrialised warfare was 
taking shape. 
 
The Franco-Prussian war 
 
By early August 1870, the Prussians had won the mobilisation race in the Franco-Prussian 
War, just over two weeks after the French declaration of war. Moltke had three armies 
totalling 320,000 battle-ready troops on the French border, while more were on their way. 
While Prussia had to mobilise its reserves, France had a regular army that in principle, could 
mount a campaign without a lengthy mobilisation. Such an immediate invasion was also what 
the Prussians feared the most. However, there was no French campaign plan, no plan to 
assemble the army at the border, and no planning preceding the declaration of war. By the end 
of July, there were about 150,000 French troops in one army and two separate army corps, all 
in some state of disorganisation, confronting the growing number of well organised Prussians.  
307 
 
If there was no proper planning in the French army, the Prussians had planned, war-gamed, 
and made preparations well in advance. Moltke began planning for war against France as soon 
Austria was defeated four years earlier. The initial preparations were related to different 
scenarios and wargaming of these in staff rides. Mobilisation plans and the railway travel 
plans were developed in detail. The plans were based on worst-case scenarios, which would 
include Austrian participation and would subsequently be adjusted according to the 
development of the situation. There was no plan for strategic manoeuvre, but a plan for 
mobilisation and initial deployment. The purpose was to defeat the French army in battle, to 
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break the enemy’s will to fight. Victory would be secured by the destruction of the French 
army, not by the conquest of territory.308 
 
Sketch 3.2. The Franco-Prussian War from July to early August 1870. The main operations 
and the sieges of Metz and Sedan. The French Army of Châlons was formed on 16 August by 
reinforcing the strategic reserve. The Prussian Army of the Meuse was formed as a response 
by detaching three corps from the 1st and 2nd Armies.309 
 
France took the initiative and advanced into Saarbrücken, just across the border, with six 
divisions on 2 August but retreated two days later under the threat of the Prussian advance. 
Moltke had deployed the Prussian armies in separate staging areas for logistical reasons and 
to provide space for manoeuvre. As the armies crossed the border, they were confronted by 
isolated French army corps that made good use of their superior Chassepot rifles, but they 
were left alone and unsupported. Without reinforcements, the individual French forces were 
driven off the field by aggressive infantry action supported by superior Prussian artillery. The 
Prussians adapted and made good use of their artillery to counter the French superiority in 
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small arms.310 The ineptness at the higher French command allowed the Prussians to maintain 
the initiative and exploit the enemy’s weaknesses in command and leadership. As the French 
disengaged and retired, they allowed Moltke to push his armies into the strategic depth and 
encircle the main French forces at the fortresses of Metz and Sedan. The Prussian operations 
were audacious and risky, but the French were unable to exploit the weaknesses exposed by 
Prussian armies manoeuvring in a dispersed fashion in enemy territory, with open flanks as 
well as long and vulnerable supply lines open to attack.311 
 
While one French army was surrounded in Metz, the other, together with Emperor Napoleon 
III, allowed itself to be encircled at Sedan, where it surrendered on 1 September. But in 
contrast to the battle of Königgrätz, the Prussian victory at Sedan did not decide the war.312 
Paris received the news the following day. The Emperor was subsequently replaced by a 
republican government that would continue the war. Paris and its 2 million inhabitants, 
400,000 troops, fortifications, and 1300 artillery pieces, made preparations to defend their 
capital. Negotiations between Prussia and the new French government stalled, so Moltke 
marched his forces from Sedan to besiege Paris. When Metz surrendered on 29 October 
almost all of the Empire’s army and its hardware were in Prussian hands. The Prussians had 
achieved their strategic goal of destroying the French armies, but France would not accept 
defeat. The Republic raised new formations in the provinces, but they lacked experienced 
officers and veteran soldiers. Besides, due to popular revolts, armed civilians took part in 
combat alongside the soldiers, which blurred the distinction between soldiers and civilians.313 
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Sketch 3.3. The Franco-Prussian War from September 1870 to January 1871. The main 
operations and the siege of Paris. The new republican government raised new armies. The 
Prussians responded partly with existing forces and created the Army of the South to deal 
with the French Army of the East’s advance to relieve Belfort.314 
 
Moltke kept to his strategic aim of the destruction of the French armies, whether imperial or 
republican. The surrender of Metz freed up two Prussian armies that were rushed south. Due 
to the worsening conditions for the besieged Paris, the Republic was forced to use its newly 
raised forces to relieve the capital instead of severing the exposed Prussian lines of 
communication, resulting in conventional combat against the battle-hardened regular Prussian 
armies. There were some raids by irregular forces against railways and supplies, but with 
negligible effect.315 Despite some initial success, the republican forces were defeated as they 
attempted to relieve Paris and engaged and defeated by renewed Prussian offensives. The rest 
of the French armies melted away in January 1871. When Paris' defences were destroyed fort 
by fort by Prussian siege artillery, few French military means were left to continue the war. 
The capital was also within days of starvation and rebellion. With neither civilian nor military 
means to continue, the Republic asked for peace terms.316 In the end, Moltke had destroyed 
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the French armies and their will to resist but escaped a war of conquest like the one Union 
Armies had fought in the previous decade. France was spared a Prussian Sherman that would 
have waged a destructive scorched earth campaign. 
 
The superiority of infantry fire that the Prussians had benefitted from in the war against 
Denmark and Austria was reversed against France. The Prussian responses were adaptations 
in infantry attack tactics and a closer infantry-artillery cooperation. Prussian attacks proved 
the most successful when the defenders were locked in a gradual frontal assault and 
enveloped on one or both flanks, similar to Königgrätz. This approach culminated in the 
complete encircling of the remaining French forces at Sedan. 
 
The French Empire was in dire straits strategically a few days after the declaration of war. 
The Prussians had planned, war-gamed, and rehearsed war against France since 1866 and 
mobilisation and deployment went according to plan. The actual conduct of the campaign was 
not planned. It was conducted according to the strategic aim of defeating the French armies 
and render France defenceless. The Prussian operations were therefore aimed at the French 
armies. Moltke aimed to manoeuvre against the enemy’s flanks and rear and destroy them in 
battle. Prussian strategic aggressiveness and risk-taking were assisted by French ineptness and 
lethargy. When the war became a protracted siege of Paris, the strategic aim remained intact 
although tactics had been adapted. 
 
In their writings on the German Wars of Unification, Bucholz, Krause, and Showalter discuss 
Moltke’s role in the development of operational art, which Showalter describes as “the 
shadowy level between strategy and tactics”. He further asserts that Moltke’s role “is 
controversial.” Moltke was the pragmatist who integrated the current understanding of the 
nature of war with all the new innovations that modernity had to offer in terms of technology, 
professionalism, and the bureaucracy of the Great General Staff. Moltke’s other contribution 
to the development of warfare was his clear distinction between war and policy.317 Bucholz 
claimes that Moltke, with his mobile General Staff, command apparatus, and supported by the 
telegraph-based information system, “was forging a new chapter in military history, by 
defining and illustrating ‘operational warfare’.”318 Krause uses the term operational level in 
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his chapter on Moltke, not operational art. He concludes that warfare consists of three levels, 
“the strategic and tactical levels […] and the operational level that Moltke conceptualised and 
situated between the conduct of war and battle.”319 Richard Harrison notes that just as in the 
American Civil War, battles were fought continually in both time and space. One battle would 
start while another was still being fought. Due to the size of the armies and the substantial 
space it occupied, an army might enter one battle while simultaneously concluding another.320 
 
Gerhard P. Groß has a different perspective. He explains that  
 
it was hardly possible during Moltke’s era to make a distinction between operations and 
tactics, and it was probably not even yet necessary for his contemporaries. This explains 
the existing confusion of terms, and at the same time makes it clear why it was so 
difficult to define the new phenomenon precisely.321 
 
Groß underlines that Moltke’s “operational warfare” had its limitations: “Thus, people’s war 
illustrated that even excellently conducted operational warfare did not guarantee a quick 
decision of the war.” According to Groß, it is challenging to separate operations from tactics 
in the German context since the latter was not explicitly defined. Besides, operations were 
disconnected from strategy and emphasised encirclement and destruction in a short war. This 
disconnect was made possible because strategic issues related to policy were the realm of the 
Military cabinet or War Ministry.322 
 
To quote Svechin, these “series of tactical missions”323 within the same operation were 
changing the character of the operation. The operation changed from its pre-modern role of 
being a strategic activity concerned with manoeuvring forces, to include continuous 
manoeuvring and fighting. Continuous battles with modern rapid firing rifles and artillery 
consumed large amounts of ammunition, which in turn significantly increased logistical 
demands.324 The Wars of German Unification were short and limited to the initial campaign, 
except for the Franco-Prussian War when the Republic replaced the Empire. But even that 
war ended before its character changed from industrialised cabinet war to industrialised 
people’s war, comparable to the American Civil War. The Prussian strategic command in the 
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wars was based on the General Staff and its mobile field headquarters. The limited theatres of 
war did not necessitate an operational command that was subordinated and strategically 
coordinated by the Commander in Chief, such as Sherman’s in the west during the final year 
of the American Civil War. The complexity of the German Wars of Unification did not reach 
such a level where Moltke could not lead the armies himself from his mobile general staff.  
 
The Russo-Japanese War 
 
The Russo-Japanese War was a disaster for Russia and generated a thorough review by the 
Russian General Staff. One central issue in the analysis was that Russian General Staff 
officers identified operational art as a third military discipline. It was only partly developed 
before the reformers were ousted in internal power struggles. The emerging operational 
thought did not influence the Russian army’s approach to modern war.  
 
Years of tension between Russia and Japan erupted on 8 to 9 February 1904. Japanese torpedo 
armed destroyers attacked the Russian Pacific Squadron inside the Port Arthur naval base, 
where three capital ships were damaged. Both countries declared war two days later. Japan 
had planned the war in advance and had clear strategic aims for the war, while Russia had no 
contingency war plan for its possessions in Manchuria and had to improvise when the war 
began.325 Russia was concerned with a possible war with China. Its neglect of the looming 
Japanese threat “was to prove one of the most significant intelligence failures of the Russian 
General Staff,” despite a growing Russian understanding of Japanese intentions and 
capabilities. Nevertheless, valuable intelligence collection and analysis were more often than 
not either disregarded and overlooked by the “arrogance and lethargy that had gathered at the 
very highest levels of the Russian government,”.326 The war was the last great power conflict 
before the First World War. Many of the characteristics of modern warfare revealed 
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Japan was constrained financially and diplomatically and had to win by a short and decisive 
war before Russia could mobilise and reinforce its forces in Manchuria from Europe. The 
plans were to first remove the Russian naval presence in the region and then land armies to 
capture Port Arthur and Liaoyang, both central to Russian control over Manchuria. On the 
other hand, Russia was hampered by incomplete war plans and logistical challenges that 
forced them to stay on the defensive until reinforcements could arrive by the yet unfinished 
Trans-Siberian Railway. The Russian plans were also hostage to the assumption that Russia 
would maintain sea control and that there would be sufficient time to mobilise and transfer 
forces to the theatre of war.327 Japan’s initial strike against Port Arthur and subsequent force 
transfer to Korea and the Kwantung peninsula nullified both preconditions.328 
 
Both armies were armed with modern small calibre magazine rifles and modern field artillery. 
Still, there were marked differences in training, where the Japanese were the better 
practitioners of modern warfare. Machine guns were not used in the beginning, but in larger 
numbers by both armies as the war dragged on. Cavalry was mainly used for reconnaissance 
and fought both mounted and dismounted. The Russian logistical system depended on the 
8,000 km single track Trans-Siberian Railway, where trains had to be ferried across Lake 
Baikal until a circumventing route was opened in September 1904. The capacity was low, so 
it took from two to nearly six weeks to reach Manchuria from Moscow. From the railheads, 
supplies were carried by carts or porters over poor roads to the forward positions.329 
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Sketch 3.4. The Russo-Japanese War. The main operations and retreats.330 
 
As soon as the Japanese forces had disembarked, they pushed rapidly to isolate Port Arthur 
and capture critical cities along the railway. The Russian army units first encountered the 
Japanese lead elements in northern Korea. Still, they could not block their advance or prevent 
them from crossing the Yalu River and enter Manchuria. The Japanese had isolated the 
Kwantung peninsula and Port Arthur by mid-May 1904, they then turned north with their 
main forces and left one division to secure the peninsula. These initial actions had been with 
relatively small forces. The Yalu River was forced by 42,500 Japanese against 20,000 Russian 
troops. Nevertheless, to continue the war, both sides had to transfer substantial reinforcements 
to the theatre. General Oyama was given command over the Japanese armies and was directly 
subordinated to the high command in Tokyo. Oyama was thus de facto an army group 
commander. The Russian general Kuropatkin arrived in March to take command over the land 
forces, while admiral Alekseev was the formal commander of all Russian forces in the theatre. 
Neither was particularly competent nor suited for independent command. The dual command 
 
330
 Rotem Kowner and Ben-Ami Shillony, Rethinking the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-05, (Folkestone: Global 
Oriental, 2007). xxvi map 2; Connaughton, Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear - Russias war with Japan, 129. 
  100  
setup required both commanders to report to St. Petersburg. The fact that the two commanders 
failed to co-operate was made even worse by direct interference by telegraph from the 
capital.331 
 
The Japanese armies had advanced along the railway, forced the Russians back to Haicheng, 
and simultaneously opened the mountain passes from Takushan and the Yalu River. By early 
July, the Japanese had built up four small field armies totalling 125,000 troops and 170 pieces 
of artillery. Oyama used three armies for the offensive north towards Liaoyang, while one 
army besieged Port Arthur. The main effort of the offensive was to be launched by the First 
Army from the southwest. The Russians had almost 160,000 troops organised in one army of 
seven corps with 483 guns. By late July, the Japanese armies were threatening the 
communications hub of Liaoyang. Kuropatkin was under pressure from St. Petersburg to give 
battle, although his forces were not yet ready. The Russians organised the defences in three 
lines in semi-circles stretching from the southeast to the west of Liaoyang. The furthest was 
30 km from the city and 70 km wide, while the two others were closer to the town and 
narrower. The Russian corps were organised in two groups, each with their own 
commander’s, while Kuropatkin kept overall command and kept one corps as a reserve. The 
defence was reinforced with field fortifications and the Russian artillery was also dug in and 
fired from concealed positions.332  
 
The battle of Liaoyang began on 25 August 1904. After two days of heavy fighting, the 
Russians retreated to their second position, stretching 22 km in a semi-circle 10 km outside 
Liaoyang. The Russians manned their frontline positions thinly and kept half their force in 
reserve, out of fear of encirclement. The Japanese attacked again on 30 August and aimed for 
a double envelopment to cut the railway north of the city. On the first day, the attacks were 
forced to a halt by effective Russian artillery and machine gunfire. During the night and early 
morning, the Japanese misunderstood the situation, assuming a Russian retreat and moved to 
envelop the Russian left. The Russians, thinking the Japanese flanking manoeuvre was more 
substantial than it was, pulled out and retreated to their third defensive position. The Japanese 
followed closely as the Russians retreated and pre-empted a Russian counterstrike. Heavy 
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fighting the following night exhausted the Russian reserves. In the morning on 3 September, 
Kuropatkin ordered a general retreat. The Japanese were too exhausted to exploit the victory 
handed to them by the Russian decision to leave the field.333 
 
The Russians counter-attacked on 22 September southwards from Mukden with almost 
200,000 troops along a 65 km wide front. The Russian army was still divided into an eastern 
and western detachment, but Kuropatkin maintained the right to veto any detachment 
commanders’ dispositions. His ineptness and unclear orders reinforced this limitation of 
subordinates’ initiative. The Japanese exploited the Russian slow progress and repeated 
pauses to regain the initiative and launched a counter-offensive that drove the Russians back 
to the Sha-ho River, where both sides dug in along a 45 km wide front. Following the failed 
offensive Kuropatkin was given full command of all land forces. The first Russian front (army 
group) was created as the land forces were organised into three field armies under one 
commander. The Russians received reinforcements in February, while the three armies, 
totalling 330,000 troops, were deployed along a more than 100 km wide front. The Russian 
dispositions lacked depth and Oyama planned to attack to fix the Russian centre and envelop 
both flanks with his 270,000 strong force. The Japanese had brought in the Third Army after 
the fall of Port Arthur on 2 January 1905. Also, they brought forward the newly established 
Fifth Army, aiming for a “Far Eastern equivalent of Sedan.”334 
 
Both sides prepared for offensive operations in the winter of 1905. Russia spread its superior 
numbers evenly along the over 100 km wide front and kept two corps in reserve. The Russian 
fortifications were strong, but had no depth, either to absorb a Japanese offensive or to mass 
their forces for a decision if Kuropatkin decided to counter-attack. Oyama concentrated two 
armies on each flank and kept one army as a central reserve. He aimed once more for nothing 
less than surrounding and annihilating the Russian armies. The Japanese attacked the eastern 
stretch of the Russian defensive line on 18 February, which forced Kuropatkin to weaken his 
western flank and commit his reserves. Oyama then launched his left armies on a western 
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flanking movement around the Russian right on 27 February, while the other armies sustained 
the pressure along the entire front. Kuropatkin responded with half-hearted countermeasures 
that barely kept up with the aggressive Japanese push towards the Russian rear. Oyama 
committed his reserve to reinforce the western flanking movement. Kuropatkin just managed 
to prevent the Japanese from cutting the railway north of Mukden. A limited Russian retreat 
began on 7 March, but poor execution allowed the eastern Japanese armies to push westwards 
and threaten to cut off the retreat. When the Japanese armies closed the gap on 11 March, 
most Russians had managed to pull back northwards. The Russians established a new 
defensive position on 30 March at Siping, 160 km north of Mukden, and Kuropatkin was 
relieved of command. The Japanese were once more too exhausted to continue. Both Russia 
and Japan accepted the American President Theodore Roosevelt’s proposal to begin 
negotiations. A peace treaty was signed on 5 September 1905.335 
 
The Russo-Japanese war began with opposing forces some tens of thousands strong that 
fought battles that lasted days. It ended at Mukden, where several armies numbering more 
than a quarter of a million on each side were continuously engaged in combat for three weeks. 
It was a ten-fold increase in forces throughout the engagements. There was an even larger 
increase in the frontage they occupied and manoeuvred to outflank the defender. The armies 
no longer manoeuvred over any distance before they made contact, but started operations 
facing each other from trenches and field fortifications. When one army fell back, the other 
maintained contact. Both armies dug in along a new front and were facing each other in 
trenches within firing distance. Compared to the Franco-Prussian war, where the Prussian 
armies moved from one overlapping battle to another within the same operation, the fighting 
along the railway was beginning to display the main characteristics of modern operations that 
contained a “series of tactical missions and a number of logistical requirements”.336 
 
The complexity of these operations and the logistical system needed to sustain forces larger 
than a quarter of a million troops in the field created a demand for commanders and staff 
officers organised in well-run headquarters. While Moltke could manage his armies in the 
Franco-Prussian war from his nucleus of the mobile general staff, an army group as large as 
the ones in Manchuria needed a semi-independent headquarters outside the high command. 
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Kuropatkin and Oyama were army group commanders with several modern operational 
functions. Their understanding of modern war and the staff officers’ quality had a substantial 
influence on their armies’ fighting qualities.337 
 
Svechin devoted a chapter in his second volume of his Evolyuciya voennogo iskusstva (The 
Evolution of the Art of War) to the Russo-Japanese War.338 He was very critical of the 
Russian scholastic approach to operational art; the intellectual heritage of Leer rooted in 
Napoleon, the ignorance of the experiences of the German Wars of Unification, and the recent 
analysis of modern war. He stated that the Japanese knew well the German experiences and 
that Japanese commanders “were extremely consistent in striving to apply operational views 
cultivated by the Moltke school.”339 On the other hand, the Russians were “confused by the 
teachings of Jomini” on main and secondary theatres of war. The Russians, therefore, 
regarded Manchuria as a “secondary theatre” for most of the war. The main theatre was on 
Russia’s western border. Svechin regarded the conduct of operations as even worse, partly 
because of Manchuria’s remoteness and the subsequent ignorance of the area as a secondary 
theatre by the army’s high command.340 
 
Both the Japanese and the Russians established designated headquarters for their armies in the 
theatre directly subordinated to their general staffs. These army group headquarters acted as 
operational commands in a modern sense, although the term was not yet developed. They 
planned and conducted operations by the field armies assigned to them and directed the 
armies’ tactical actions over an area of operations that was too extensive for any single army 
to manage. Due to the size of the opposing forces and the sustainability made possible by 
modern logistics, armies had become too robust to be destroyed by tactical action alone. The 
command and supply of several armies of more than a quarter of million men were dependent 
on specialised bureaucracies, telegraph communications, and machine powered industrialised 
sustainment. These were the new strategic realities that required a separate headquarters 
subordinated the high command to manage the complexity in bridging strategy and tactics in 
the modern industrialised war. 
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The increased range, precision, and volume of firepower reinforced the tendencies from the 
previous decades of dispersion, field fortifications, command challenges, and sustainment. 
Long-range, precise, and massed fire broke up attacks in closed columns. Troops were forced 
to disperse to avoid rapid firing rifles, machine guns, and artillery firing high explosive 
grenades. Dispersion made direct command and control of troops difficult because of the 
increased distances between soldiers and between units. The increasingly lethal battlefield 
made movement and combat leadership arduous and life-threatening. The spade became as 
important as the rifle, leaving soldiers to dig in as soon as movement halted. The result was 
that tactical action became more fragmented, covered more extensive areas, and lasted longer. 
Combat had to be planned and managed differently from the past when tactical action was one 
or a few large battles in a campaign where the high command also directed the battles. The 
modern operation had gradually and jerkily emerged during the half-century before the First 
World War, but it was not yet fully understood or developed into doctrine.  
 
Thinking and theory 
 
Military thought in Europe after 1871 was shaped by the expected future war between France 
and Germany; a war other great powers knew they with some certainty would become part of. 
The experiences of industrialised warfare, technological development, and increasing 
nationalism challenged established military traditions, doctrines, and professionalism. There 
was no straight and linear development of either operational thought or doctrine. Several 
competing forces within and outside the armed forces caused the development of military 
thinking and theory to take divergent directions. In their turn, these struggles influenced the 





One challenge in studying Prussian and German military thinking and conduct of operations is 
their conceptual approach to planning and conduct of campaigns, operations, and battles. 
Planning was centralised mobilisation planning, while the conduct was decentralised and 
dependent upon commanders’ professionalism. The Germans did not, or do not, have a term 
for operational art but use the term operational leadership: operativer Führung. Operational 
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elements should thus be identified in the domains of planning, command, and leadership. 
Another challenge is that the use of the terms Operation (operation) and operativ 
(operational) must be contextualised at each occurrence, due to imprecise use of terminology 
and the lack of standard definitions.341 The chief of the Great General Staff from 1857-1888, 
Helmuth von Moltke, regarded operations as elements of strategy that had no substance as an 
independent discipline. Operations were related to moving the forces in the field, where the 
aim of the operation was to manoeuvre the forces into the optimal position for battle. The aim 
and purpose of the operation was the battle, but battles were not an integral part of the 
operation.342 Moltke’s understanding of the operation was thus similar to Jomini’s; an element 
of strategy that brings the forces to the battlefield, an understanding that was shared by the 
majority of other armies. 
 
The analysis of the Wars of German Unification was to a great extent influenced by the 
expectations of a future war for the new German Empire. Antulio Echevarria traces the 
observations, analysis, and lessons from the initial tactical crisis in the middle of the 
nineteenth century to the various interpretations of future war on the eve of the First World 
War.343 Echevarria also reminds the modern reader of the forceful rhetorical style of the 
military debate; as a consequence, middle positions would be difficult to identify, partly due 
to exaggerations and the manner in which arguments were presented.344 The increased 
lethality on the battlefield was acknowledged, including the fact that artillery was initially 
outranged by breech-loading rifles. This radically improved firepower thus challenged the 
tactical offensive. During the first decades after the Franco-Prussian War, the attempted 
responses to the crisis were predominantly tactical. The emphasis was on the combination of 
fire and movement, technical perfection, and tactical adaptations. By the turn of the century 
technological developments, the industrialisation of new technology, and the experiences 
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Echevarria asserts that the principle of interior lines was the root cause of the debate, in 
addition to the question of whether to concentrate the army before the battle or concentrate 
while the battle was being fought. Both issues were fundamental to Jomini and his 
interpretation of Napoleon, where the 1813 campaign in Saxony and Silesia and the Battle of 
Leipzig were counter-cases both strategically and tactically. The assumed advantage of 
interior lines was nullified by the coordination of the forces operating by exterior lines. Better 
railways in the American Civil War allowed Union forces to exploit their exterior lines and 
outmanoeuvre the Confederate interior lines of lower quality.346 
 
As strategic means of communications, railways and telegraph could cause the geographical 
feature of interior lines to be less relevant and therefore diminish the strategical advantage of 
Germany’s central position vis-à-vis France and Russia. Moltke’s thesis of “march separated, 
fight concentrated” could be turned against Germany if its enemies could utilise railway and 
telegraph to coordinate their armies strategically and attack the Central Powers 
simultaneously at all fronts. This was what the Union armies did against the Confederacy in 
the American Civil War.347 
 
The problems concerning the breakthrough of a continuous front became an issue after the 
Russo-Japanese War. The prevailing strategic method of flank envelopment was challenged 
when a continuous front failed to offer any flanks to envelop. A breakthrough would require a 
series of costly frontal attacks, precisely what the strategic envelopment aimed to avoid. The 
theorists developed various approaches to conducting a successful tactical breakthrough, but 
the question persisted of how to expand it and gain any strategic advantage after the front was 
pierced. One option was to use both sides of a breakthrough as open flanks and continue to 
roll up the enemy lines in one or both directions. However, experience from Manchuria 
indicated there were severe problems in bringing up reserves and supplies to sustain the 
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The best-known strategic debate at the time was the infamous Strategiestreit (strategy 
controversy) between the civilian historian Hans Delbrück and officers of the Great General 
Staff. This controversy is only indirectly relevant to strategic-operational elements, through 
Delbrück’s insistence on the historical methodology of Sachskritik (topical criticism) of 
military historical sources, where historical events should be criticised based on the context in 
which they occurred. Delbrück’s view contrasts to the General Staff’s applicatory approach, 
where contemporary doctrine was projected onto historical cases and where selected historical 
examples were used to validate doctrine.349 One central historical question was whether 
Frederick the Great waged war according to a strategy of exhaustion (Ermattungsstrategie) or 
a strategy of annihilation or destruction, (Vernichtungsstrategie). This question became an 
issue in the contemporary debate over the right strategy to adopt in modern war. The Chief of 
the Great General Staff, Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, and the General Staff used Frederick’s 
conduct of the Seven Years War as an authoritative argument for a modern strategy of 
annihilation. Delbrück, on the other hand, argued historically that the premises for the 
interpretation of Frederikian strategy were false. Therefore, the historical authority of 
Frederick was not applicable to contemporary war.350 Besides, there was the issue of whether 
Moltke’s strategic approach in the Wars of German Unification represented something 
unique, or if it was just a continuation of Napoleonic methods. This debate was in one way the 
Strategiestreit in reverse: was Napoleon’s strategic method still valid, or would technological 
and industrial developments alter the material conditions for strategy, as they did for 
tactics?351 
 
In the decade before the First World War, the General Staff struggled with the strategic 
problem of a two-front war and how to win decisively on one front before attacking the next. 
Moltke the Elder’s prediction that the next war would be an all-out industrial people’s war 
was generally accepted. In a war of exhaustion, Germany and Austria-Hungary would 
therefore lose in the long run. The only way to avoid military defeat was to quickly defeat one 
continental enemy before the other could mobilise and attack and then exploit Germany’s 
superior rail network to move the entire army to the opposite front. The resulting strategic 
approach is known as the Schlieffen Plan, named after the chief of the Great General Staff 
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from 1891 to 1906, Count Alfred von Schlieffen and remains a topic of debate among 
historians.352 
 
Echevarria discusses Schlieffen’s Gesamtschlacht (translated as “the overall battle”) in the 
context of Germany’s strategic challenges in the first decade of the twentieth century.353 The 
Gesamtschlacht was discussed in “his famous and controversial” essay Der Krieg in der 
Gegenwart (Contemporary War) in the magazine Deutschen Revue in January 1909, three 
years after Schlieffen retired.354 According to Echevarria, the Gesamtschlacht was the totality 
of the number of battles and engagements that were “to contribute to the overall progress of 
the attack” and was one of several elements in the understanding of the characteristics of 
modern war. Other essential elements were speed, aggressiveness in attack, the fluidity of 
combat, a defensive-offensive approach, and various degrees of un-readiness by all involved 
armies.355 The concept of the Gesamtschlacht can also be seen as an attempt to express the 
emerging operational challenges and the diminishing role of the battle as the decisive action 
in war but without any new operational terminology to articulate it outside the strategy-tactics 
paradigm. 
 
All these elements reflected the Prussian and Imperial German Armies’ approach to strategy 
and the direction of campaigns and battles. Strategy was understood as a system of 
expedients. Its delegated command approach Auftragstaktik (commonly translated as mission 
command), would allow commanders to quickly exploit these expedients (battles and 
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engagements) to one’s own advantage and force a decision by aggressive tactical 
offensives.356 
 
General Sigismund von Schlichting was one of the German writers who grasped the 
implications of the fact that warfare was changing. He was in opposition to Schlieffen and his 
strategic approach to future war. There are indications that he was forced to retire in 1896, but 
Schlichting continued to write in retirement and took part in the public strategic debate. He 
was an influential military writer at the turn of the century and analysed the changes in 
warfare during the second half of the nineteenth century. Svechin also credited Schlichting 
with comprehending the differences between Napoleon’s and Moltke's strategic approaches, 
where technology had made Napoleonic warfare obsolete. Schlichting was similarly credited 
with having analysed and developed Moltke’s strategic conduct of the wars of 1866 and 1870-
1871 into strategic theory.357  
 
Schlichting’s view of history was in opposition to the Great General Staff’s applicatory 
method. He argued that a comparison of campaigns and battles between different historical 
periods was not only futile but harmful.358 He claimed that modern war had changed 
fundamentally since the Napoleonic wars, although the Napoleonic legacy still dominated 
military education and thinking. In pre-industrial war, armies would as a norm move to the 
battlefield, deploy for battle and then engage in combat. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
breech loaded rifles, machine guns and quick-firing artillery could hit and kill anything within 
sight. The immediate consequence of this technological advancement was that troops had to 
deploy into combat formation directly from marching formation and was subjected to lethal 




 Gerhard P. Groß, "Myth and Reality. The History of Auftragstaktik in the German Army," in Mission 
Command – Wishful thinking?, ed. Palle Ydstebø and Tommy Jeppsson (Stockholm: Kungl 
Krigsvetenskapsakademien [The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences], 2018). 
357
 Eric Dorn Brose, The Kaisers Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 117; Rudolph von Caemmerer, 
The Development of Strategical Science During the 19th Century (London: Hugh Rees Ltd., 1905), 248-271; 
Donald Cranz, Understanding Change: Sigismund Von Schlichting and the Operational Level of War (Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Armv Command and General Staff College, 1989), 24-32; Walter Görlitz, The German 
General Staff (London: Hollis & Carter, 1953), 136; Aleksandr A. Svechin, "Voyennoye iskusstvo v epokhu 
imperializma," in Postizheniye Voyennogo Iskusstva, 62; "Manevr tekhniki," 403. 
358
 Hoffmann, "Die Kriegslehre des Generals von Schlichting," 19. 
359
 Cranz, Understanding Change: Sigismund Von Schlichting and the Operational Level of War, 11-21; 
Hoffmann, "Die Kriegslehre des Generals von Schlichting," 10, 19-21. 
  110  
The retired general and prolific writer Friedrich von Bernhardi devoted a chapter in his 1913 
book On War of Today (Vom heutigen Kriege) to “the operative element”. He maintained that 
operations had always been important in war, but their significance varied according to the 
role of combat: “There have been times in which the art of war degenerated almost entirely 
into operational artificialities, […] and where the importance of the actual combat was 
completely underrated”. He also wrote about the opposite scenario, combat ruled by brute 
force “unrestrained by any thought”.360 
 
In another chapter in On War of Today Bernhardi discusses “the operative forms of attack and 
defence” and the different forms of attack and defence with the main body of the army, 
having examined tactics and technique earlier in the book.361 Bernhardi’s use of operation 
relates to the realm of strategy and strategic troop movements, such as when he discusses 
German troop transfers between theatres of war by rail. He also refers to operation to describe 
the Prussian retreat and manoeuvre between Ligny and Waterloo. The Russo-Japanese war is 
his most recent example, where he described the Russian defensive line as a strategic front. 
He used tactical terminology in the discussion of the actions of the different armies: “to co-
operate tactically at the Mandarin Road with Nogi’s army which had enveloped the right”.362 
 
Bernhardi’s purpose was to “elucidate the nature of the art of operating, […] namely, the 
endeavour to move the troops in such a way as to bring about the tactical issue under 
particularly favourable conditions.”363. The tactical issue was combat, while the operation 
should bring the troops to the most favourable position for battle. Bernhardi used both 
historical examples and hypothetical scenarios to forward his arguments such as a German 
strategic flanking operation against France, the Schlieffen plan, or a Russian offensive against 
Berlin. Bernhardi ended the chapter by concluding that strategic mobility was the key to 
success in a future war.364 He wrote within the military theoretical paradigm of his time, 
where strategy and tactics were the military disciplines and operations an element of strategy 
concerned with manoeuvring the forces to their battle positions. Operations and operating 
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were how the strategic commander moved forces, either for battle or for strategic force 




Brigadier-General Ferdinand Foch published two well-known books based on his lectures at 
the École supérieure de guerre (the French Command and General Staff College) while he 
was commandant of the École.366 Early in the First World War, Foch grasped the new 
character of warfare and developed methods that held many characteristics of operational art. 
One might therefore expect to find expressions of operational thinking in his pre-war books. 
But few are in evidence. Foch was in line with the majority of his contemporaries in Europe 
in his understanding of the next war.367 In the preface to the second edition of his book on the 
Franco-Prussian war, there were a few statements in his analysis of the Russo-Japanese war 
that suggest an understanding of changes in warfare (Foch used the term “the forms of war”, 
les formes de la guerre): 
 
At Mukden Nogi’s army was not so much concerned with crushing the Russian Right 
by a flank attack as with getting behind it in order thus to compel the retreat of all the 
enemy forces. Hence we may say that the manoeuvre-battle of the Napoleonic epoch 
and of 1870 was transformed into an operation-battle lasting several days. One may say 
that the decision, even on the battlefield itself, had become a strategic affair and that the 
union between strategy and tactics was far closer than it has been in earlier days.368 
 
This quotation from Foch is interesting in the sense that he concluded his analysis of modern 
war with “We have seen in all this that the mind retains the same universal conception of the 
essential act of war” and that essential act was still the battle. Modern industry and the 
increased space of the area of operations will only modify “the forms of war” in an 
evolutionary manner, not cause any revolution. Moreover, while some observers referred to a 
widening gap between strategy and tactics, Foch maintained the idea of a close union. 
Contrary to another prominent French author, Colonel Jean Colin, Foch did not use the term 
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grand tactics in either of his books. Foch did not further explain the meaning or consequences 
of the operation-battle. 369 These observations by Foch were little more than what Skinner 
called “scattered or quite incidental remarks” among the dominant paradigm and were not 
developed further in this or any other book.370 
 
In 1885, the French colonel and second in command at the École supérieure de guerre, 
Victor-Bernard Derrécagaix, published the two-volume work La guerre modern (The Modern 
War), which was translated to English and published in the USA in 1888 and 1890.371 
Derrécagaix was a prolific writer and had published his book on the Franco-Prussian War as 
early as in December 1871.372 The La guerre moderne was the publication of Derrécagaix’ 
course in military history, strategy, and tactics at the École supérieure. The work illustrates 
French military thought and theory 15 years after the defeat in 1871, exemplifying how the 
Napoleonic heritage was questioned and interpreted in light of the industrialised people’s 
wars. It further contributed to preparing the French army professionally and culturally for the 
next war.373 Derrécagaix maintained the understanding of war as strategy and tactics; the two 
volumes were subtitled strategy and tactics. He did not use grande tactique as a term, only 
occasionally tactique generale, but the American translation translated tactique and tactique 
generale as grand tactics, including naming the second volume Grand Tactics.374 The 
translation was elsewhere true to the original’s terminology. 
 
Strategic marches (des marches stratégiques) were interpreted by Derrécagaix as elements of 
strategy and defined as “those undertaken by armies either for the purpose of moving from 
their bases of concentration to a first objective, or from one objective to another.”375 Strategic 
marches were furthermore “the operations which conduct armies to decisive battles” and 
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“their influence upon the results of a campaign is considerable; and it may be said that, after 
combats themselves, they are the most important operations of war.” The principles for 
strategic marches were those from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and “this glorious 
epoch still offers the most complete instructions in this regard.”376 Derrécagaix was in line 
with his contemporaries in his understanding of operations and strategic marches; they were 
strategic manoeuvres to the battlefield. It was the tactical battles that would decide the 
outcome. The term operation was also used as a general term about several activities, 
spanning from mobilisation and strategic deployment to battle: “the crowning operation of the 
war, which represents both the first objective of the armies and the aim of all their 
movements”.377 This use of the term was comparable to Jomini’s Précis de l’art de la guerre, 
where opération was a general term for military activity, without any resemblance to 
twentieth-century operational terminology. 
 
Jean Colin published his book Transformations de la guerre in 1911, which was translated 
into English the following year and republished in “a popular edition” in 1914.378 One central 
premise for Colin’s analysis of modern war was that he regarded the Napoleonic Wars as the 
most valid model for understanding future war. There would be “new weapons, larger masses, 
more efficient means of transport” and some Napoleonic principles of war would not be valid, 
but “we shall dwell at length upon the principles and the procedure of Napoleonic war.”379 
Peter Paret briefly mentioned that Colin’s analysis of Napoleon’s warfare is still influential 
and carries authority for students of Napoleon, an opinion also shared by Azar Gat.380 
 
Operational terms were present in Colin’s descriptions of grand tactics and the operation, 
where both were given definitions that superficially mirror a modern definition of operational 
art.  
 
This new part of the art of war takes its place between strategy and tactics. It melts into 
the one and the other. Strategy, which deals with the general control of operations, also 
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touches the distribution of forces and the combining of movements regulated so as to 
obtain a predetermined result.381 
 
Colin identified the emergence of “a new part of the art of war”, in which there were elements 
of twentieth-century operational art. The way he used the phrase “melts into the one and the 
other” indicated the interdependencies between strategy, grand tactics and tactics. In the 
following sentence, Colin pointed to “[o]n the other hand” that grand tactics did not include 
the battle, just the manoeuvres up to and the preparation for battle.382 This view was also 
apparent in the way he used Napoleon’s conduct of campaigns as the model for his 
understanding of grand tactics: 
 
Napoleon achieved these results by combined movements of his columns. These 
combined movements are the subject of grand tactics. The Emperor is doing grand 
tactics when he calculates the marches of his divisions or army corps in such a way as to 
concentrate, to outflank, to manoeuvre, to effect a surprise, or to guard against the 
unforeseen.383 
 
Colin identified the evolution of grand tactics in the period of Frederick the Great and the 
Napoleonic wars, with the division of the army in subunits, such as divisions and corps. These 
subunits would enable them to execute some independent and delegated tasks, detached from, 
but still as part of the army. Grand tactics emerged as a method to manoeuvre the subunits of 
the army (army corps or divisions) and still maintain control of the dispersed units and 
concentrate the army to meet any contingency.384 Colin described the difference between “the 
operations of the armies of former days, marching in one single mass, following one single 
route, and those of modern armies, parcelled out in divisions, in which it is necessary to 
combine the movements of the columns,”. He concluded, using the analogy of an orchestra, 
that “the operations of modern war demand a Chief of the Staff.”385 
 
Colin stated that the approach marches that led to the battles of Austerlitz and Jena-Auerstedt 
were good examples of Napoleonic grand tactics.386 The Jena campaign was also the object 
for discussion in David G. Chandler’s chapter “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena 
Campaign”. Dennis Showalter and Claus Telp also forward the operational dimensions at 
 
381




 Ibid., 262. This is very well illustrated in Napoleon’s use of the bataillon carré in the manoeuvre to Jena. 
384
 Ibid., 207-214. 
385
 Ibid., 216-217. 
386
 Ibid., 259-269. 
  115  
Jena.387 But, does Colin’s interpretation of Napoleonic grand tactics equal operational art, or 
was it nothing more than separated approach marches within the prevailing strategy-tactics 
paradigm? It is necessary to explore how Colin understood the operation to answer these 
questions: 
 
Operations in their entirety have for object the preparation of the battle for him who 
hopes for victory ; the exploitation of the battle for him who is victor ; the avoidance or 
the attenuation of the battle for him who fears the encounter ; the concealing and 
reconstituting of his forces for a fresh struggle for him who is beaten. The thought of 
battle dominates all operations of war.388 
 
According to Colin, the function of grand tactics was limited to the preparation for, the 
exploitation of, or the avoidance of battle. This understanding excluded the battle as an 
integral element of the operation. Herein lies the superficial similarity that makes Colin’s 
interpretation of grand tactics resemble operational art. Grand tactics and operations were 
both subordinated to the battle, while the battle was the precondition for both. This dominant 
role of the battle was also recognised in Colin’s assessment of Moltke’s grand tactics: 
 
Truly the grand tactics of Napoleon are superior to those of Moltke. The latter only 
consider the case of a battle in which the enemy has placed himself precisely on the line 
of march ; they contain no provision for the unforeseen.389 
 
Like Foch, Colin recognised and acknowledged a “new part of the art of war”, but interpreted 
it within the Napoleonic paradigm. The roles of grand tactics and operations were similar to 
those outlined in Jomini’s Précis. Colin’s analysis was more comprehensive than Foch’s and 
a step in the emergence of operational art, but contrary to Schlichting, he did not leave behind 
the Napoleonic paradigm. In Colin’s analysis of the Russo-Japanese war, operations were 
about the manoeuvre of forces within the battle, such as in the battle of Mukden. The battle 
was analysed in the framework of Napoleon, who “as we have seen, conceived three 
operations in battle, each fairly clearly defined”. These were a frontal attack to fix the main 
enemy force, a disrupting flank attack, and the final attack to break the enemy.390 As with the 
Franco-Prussian war, Colin concluded that the strength of the defensive would prohibit frontal 
attacks. The only viable option was the turning movement, which the Japanese successfully 
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used in Manchuria.391 The operation was neither developed further nor becoming an 
independent discipline of war but understood within the existing paradigm of strategy and 
tactics. 
 
Colin’s steps in the direction of operational art were not reflected in contemporary French 
high-level doctrines, either in the 1895 or the 1913 field service regulations for large units.392 
The term grande tactique was not used in any doctrines. Operation was used as a general term 
for military activities, similar to Jomini’s Précis. The doctrines were in line with the teachings 
of Derrécagaix and did not reflect any of Colin’s explorations of grand tactics. The army 
group was introduced in the 1886 edition of the 1883 field service regulations, but only 
briefly mentioned regarding rail transport and command issues.393 The original 1883 edition, 
which replaced the 1832 regulations, did not contain any reference to the army group.394 The 
army group was an organisational entity in both the 1895 and 1913 doctrines. It was given a 
clear and superior role in the latter to impose the general battle (bataille générale) on the 
enemy. Its subordinate armies were to fight battles and army corps to engage in combat.395 
The strategic-tactics paradigm was thus perpetuated in France. Like Schlieffen’s 
Gesamtschlacht, the bataille générale indicated a growing complexity of warfare.396 But, as 
with Schlieffen, the contemporary terminology was insufficient to articulate the changes of 
the character of warfare, or rather, the consequences of the changes were not fully realised. 
 
The United States 
 
Text-books at the US Army Military Academy West Point between the Civil War and the 
First World War were in the pattern of Henry W. Halleck’s Elements of Military Art and 
Science from 1846.397 Halleck and his successors continued the tradition of Jomini and 
understood war in the realms of strategy and tactics, but also with an emphasis on logistics. 
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Tactics were divided into grand tactics and minor tactics, but grand tactics was given little 
attention beyond defining it according to Jomini.398 
 
James Mercur also begas his book of 1898 by quoting and paraphrasing Jomini to set up the 
structure for his study of war. He defined grand tactics as combined arms tactics by large units 
and minor tactics as carried out by smaller forces and single arms.399 He concluded his 
definition with a reservation: “This division is general and not well defined, since the two run 
imperceptibly into each other.”400 In his fifth chapter “Grand Tactics.” he developed its 
understanding more thoroughly as combined arms combat. He explained how grand tactics 
“includes planning battles, perfecting the preliminary arrangements, conducting them during 
their progress and securing the results of a victory, or avoiding the consequences of a defeat.” 
Mercur concluded his initial paragraph by pointing to the relations between different levels 
and functions, where grand tactics 
 
reaches out on the one hand into the domain of logistics and strategy, in the movements 
of troops and the character of battle sought ; and on the other into that of minor tactics, 
in the handling and placing of the different arms upon the field.401 
 
These quotes and their context illustrate how grand tactics was understood by Mercur as 
combined arms tactics. The reservation also indicates that the division had an arbitrary 
element and that grand tactics had little to do with modern operations. 
 
In his book Elements of strategy, first published in 1916, G. J. Fiebeger presented a modern 
understanding of strategy, campaigns, and operations. Strategy was refered as  
 
the art of directing the employment of the armed strength of a nation to best secure the 
objects of war. It is not sufficient to create military force by raising, equipping, and 
training armies and navies, and constructing fortresses, but it is necessary to direct 
properly the employment of this force, lest it be dissipated in useless operations or 
destroyed in unnecessarily hazardous ones. Strategy deals with the problems of warfare 
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Strategy had a clear role in directing operations, which went beyond preparing and equipping 
the forces. Campaigns and operations were seen together. A campaign 
 
is now more generally applied to such movements and combats as are connected with 
some important or decisive event in the conduct of the war; thus in our civil war we 
have the Campaign of Gettysburg and the Campaign of Vicksburg, to designate the 
movements of the armies and the minor combats connected with the battle of 
Gettysburg, and the capture of Vicksburg. The term operations is employed to designate 
the minor subdivisions of a campaign; [...]. A war is therefore made up of campaigns, a 
campaign of operations.403 
 
An operation was not characterised as a discipline in itself and, leaning on Jomini and 
Clausewitz, Fiebeger concluded his discussion in line with these classics. Strategy was “the 
intermediary between national policy which furnishes the means and determines the object of 
a war, and tactics, through whose decisive battles results are alone possible.”404 
 
Fiebeger discussed strategy by using operations from Frederick the Great to the First World 
War, emphasising warfare during and after the US Civil War. The book described strategy 





The Tsarist army fought two major wars in the half-century prior to the First World War, the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Those two wars 
gave Imperial Russia an abundance of experience, which together with domestic and 
international military literature and observations of foreign wars, provided Russia with a vast 
amount of knowledge and experience to analyse the changes in warfare and to make 
assumptions about future war.  
 
The Russian approaches to military theory, strategy, and doctrine were developed and debated 
at the General Staff Academy. The approaches were subjected to the inherent tension between 
the dominant schools of thought; “the academic theorists” and “the nationalistic 
practitioners”. A consequence of this tension was that the acknowledged need for reform 
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based on military science was resisted due to tradition and inertia.405 The debate also tried to 
address the two primary paradoxes of, on the one hand, the “contradiction between the purely 
theoretical and purely applied aspects of science and on the other, the static and dynamic 
nature of empiric reality.”406 
 
N. P. Mikhnevich was a renowned Russian strategist before the Russo-Japanese war. His 
book Strategy was published in 1899, its third edition was printed in 1911, but without any 
revision based on the 1904-05 experience. In his analysis of Napoleon and Moltke, 
Mikhnevich noted the difference between Napoleon’s concentration before reaching the 
battlefield and Moltke’s concentration on the battlefield. Beyond that difference, he concluded 
that they both relied on “the principle of individual victory”. Future war would not be won by 
individual battles, but “consists of one or more campaigns; each campaign - from one or more 
operations” and armies would also be combined into army groups.407 Mikhnevich’s thinking 
represented an important step in bringing Russian military thought in line with modern 
warfare. His findings reflected leading German thinkers, such as Schlichting. Mikhnevich’s 
acknowledgement of the declining role of the battle and the importance of operations in a 
modern sense was an essential precondition for the development of operational art as a 
military discipline. 
 
A military misadventure such as the war against Japan contributed significantly to military 
thinking and new initiatives within the Russian army. A consistent form of operational 
thinking emerged among a few Russian general staff officers. This thinking was not 
conducted in a vacuum. In addition to Russian experiences and other domestic elements, the 
Russian army was part of an international exchange of ideas and experiences. Foreign books, 
military periodicals, military and diplomatic exchanges and visits, were all channels for the 
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The Russian Colonel Alexander Vladimirovich Gerua brought Russian and German thinking 
together to bridge the divide between the established fields of tactics and strategy. Menning 
suggests a German influence when Gerua proposed to name this intervening part operatika, 
derived from the German word operativ (operational). The purpose of this intermediate 
function was to bring together all the disparate elements of modern war into “the makeup of a 
modern operation.” Gerua’s views failed to gain ground and did not manage to challenge the 
established views on strategy nor influence the contemporary emphasis on indigenous 
experience.409 
 
In his book on modern war in 1911, General Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Neznamov 
described the transformation from the Napoleonic emphasis on the single decisive battle to the 
succession of battles in modern war. He utilised many of Schlichting’s ideas and envisioned 
modern war as “series of engagements and operations linked to one another by the overall 
concept of the war plan”, where strategic objectives were to be accomplished by operations.410 
The commander in modern war had to differentiate between and manage the interplay 
between these categories. Neznamov further discussed the role of railways in influencing 
strategy and especially for the enormous Russian landmass with its extensive borders.411  
 
The Soviet military historian Alexander A. Strokov defined Neznamov’s thoughts on modern 
operations as operational art, where modern war no longer was about the battle itself.412 
 
This means that as the whole war breaks down into a whole series of operations, so each 
operation breaks down into a whole series of immediate tasks, [...], and all of them are 
united together by a single purpose of the operation, just like all operations are 
connected the main guiding idea of the war plan “in purpose and direction.”413 
 
Neznamov also understood operations as conducted by army groups, not restricted to armies, 
where the army group was directly subordinate to the military-strategic level of command. 
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Firepower and not bayonets would decide future battles; infantry must move in open order 
and not in closed ranks. Just as the teachings of the German theorists, the flanks had become 
much more critical. Neznamov did not use the term operation concerning battles but used the 
term actions.414 The operation had a similar meaning for Neznamov as for Svechin, which 
indicates a line of continuity in Russian operational thought from the Tsarist Empire to the 
Soviet state. 
 
A central element in the debates within the army that clearly illustrates the disagreements was 
the Russian doctrinal debate. In this contentious question, the General Staff officers, “the 
academic theorists”, clashed with “the nationalistic practitioners” and “often fell victim to 
imperial whimsy.”415 The question of a unified Russian army doctrine was finally laid to rest 
by Tsar Nicholas II in the summer of 1912: “Military doctrine consists of doing everything 
which I order.”416 The Tsar stated that doctrine was his orders and said that orders were to be 
given “to Neznamov that he is no longer to publish articles on this question.” Higher-level 
interference the same year removed the reformists from their key positions and replaced them 
with more conformist officers.417 David Alan Rich has termed these attitudes elements of a 
de-professionalisation of the Russian general staff officers in the two decades leading up to 
the First World War, within a dysfunctional autocracy that “prized the capabilities of grand 
dukes over professionals”.418 Such an environment could explain why the foresighted analysis 
that identified the key elements of operational art could not survive or impact the planning 
and conduct of the next war. 
 
Russian General Staff officers identified some of the central elements in the changes in 
warfare that followed the Russo-Japanese War and developed responses that reflected 
advanced operational thinking. Despite such intellectual progress within the formal structures 
of the General Staff, when reform encountered tradition, all progress was cut short by “a 
dysfunctional autocracy”. The intellectual and operational legacy of the late Tsarist army went 
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on to form the foundations for the development of operational art in the Soviet state after the 
First World War.419 
 
On the eve of war 
 
The term operation emerged as one of the early military terms in Renaissance Europe, with a 
very broad meaning and content and the least defined military term. Operation was mainly 
associated with the movement of larger forces within a campaign (strategic operations), but it 
was also used about manoeuvres on the battlefield (tactical operations). The term was further 
applied to a cluster of military activities in general. By the end of the nineteenth century, land 
warfare had changed from campaigns where a few battles were to decide the war to 
campaigns of several operations. Each operation consisted of several battles, which often 
overlapped and continued over a prolonged period. The accumulated effect of these battles 
could be decisive regarding the outcome of the war. The wars between great powers had 
begun to be decided by attrition or exhaustion, not by decisive outcomes of one or few 
isolated battles. 
 
By the last decades of the nineteenth and the first of the twentieth century, the term operation 
was beginning to acquire new content and meaning in some military circles. Officers at the 
Russian General Staff combined one line of German strategic and operational thinking with 
indigenous analysis and experience of modern war. The outcome was an understanding of 
operations where the purpose was to bring together and direct the multitude of fragmented 
actions in modern industrialised warfare. On the one hand, this task was too extensive for 
tactical commanders who had to concentrate on fighting battles and engagements. On the 
other hand, it would flood the high command with large quantities of tactical and logistical 
details that would impair the headquarters’ capacity for strategic command and 
administration. Operations were acquiring some of the characteristics of operational art, 
which Svechin outlined a few years later. The Russian reformers were ousted from the 
General Staff. The conservative autocracy secured control before the nascent operational 
thinking had any chance to mature and influence the Russian army’s organisation and 
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By 1914, the European armies prepared for a war that was expected to be decided by battles, 
by clusters of battles (Gesamtschlacht), the general battle (bataille générale), or operation-
battles (bataille-opération), all which would last for several days. Operations were still an 
element in strategy related to the movement of armies to the battlefield, where the decisive 
battle(s) would be fought. Military thinking that focused on operational elements was, with a 
few exceptions, not translated into doctrine. The Napoleonic approach to war and warfare was 
still held in high regard. The recent experience was interpreted within the paradigm of the 
decisive battle or a cluster of battles. Other experiences, such as the US Civil War, were 
shelved as the US Army went on to conduct counter-insurgency and “civilise” the Indians. At 
the same time, the Jominian paradigm was relearned in new editions of military textbooks. 
 
A new continuity in the development of warfare that began in the mid-nineteenth century was 
a development in bits and pieces, in uneven paces. At times, it was cut short by changes in 
tasks for armies or by internal power struggles. The puzzle that emerged as operational art in 
the second decade of the twentieth century revealed itself as a seemingly random collection of 
fragments of a puzzle that did not have any blueprint. Few recognised the significance of 
these pieces among all the other experiences of modern war, leaving the established pre-
industrial strategy-tactics paradigm to maintain its dominant position. Thomas Kuhn’s 
observation of how paradigms shifts happen and how resistance last is somewhat revealing: 
 
Though some scientists, particularly the older and more experienced ones, may resist 
indefinitely, most of them can be reached in one way or another. Conversions will occur 
a few at a time until, after the last holdouts have died, the whole profession will again 
be practicing under a single, but now a different, paradigm. We must therefore ask how 
conversion is induced and how resisted.420 
 
Only when the disciples of Jomini faced the modern battlefield through their trench 
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Chapter 4: Endeavours 
The system of battles for attrition was incapable of finding an operational solution to 
the problem of breaching the continuous front, and was therefore senseless. As for 
exhausting the enemy, the system exhausted the attackers more than the defenders. The 
whole thing was a senseless system of self-attrition. 
Georgii Samoilovich Isserson421 
 
This chapter will study two endeavours to adapt land warfare to be able to conduct offensive 
operations to reach strategic goals. These two are the Russian Brusilov offensive in the 
summer of 1916 and the German Michael and Mars offensives in March-April 1918. Both 
efforts employed innovative tactics and yielded significant tactical and operational gains but 
failed strategically. They are both examples of emerging operational art. The strategic-
operational and operational-tactical relations in the operations are essential indicators of the 
emergence of operational art. On the other hand, dysfunctional strategic-operational 
interactions were also the reason why successful operations did not yield strategic results. 
 
The Russian offensive by the South-Western Front in Galicia in the summer of 1916 was a 
stunning operational success that influenced the Soviet development of operational art after 
the war. It was an offensive that utilised the means available and exploited vulnerabilities in 
enemy defences to a point where tactical successes could be developed into substantial 
operational gains. In March 1918, the Germans launched a massive offensive in Picardie on 
the Western Front that threatened to collapse the Allied defences and decide the war. The 
infiltration tactics and artillery techniques have influenced modern military theory. Still, the 
offensive was criticised for its lack of strategic direction and whether there were any 
operational perspectives in the planning and execution.  
 
These two operations displayed some unique operational qualities that qualify them as 
examples of incomplete steps towards the successful conduct of modern war. The chapter will 
explain how operational practice managed to utilise innovation in tactics and fire support 
systems and combine these in modern operations. What was missing to transform the Russian 
and German operational successes into strategic gains, was their respective leaderships' ability 
to provide strategic direction for the operations. This argument reflects Svechin’s critique of 
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the German operational successes: even highly successful operations are of little value if they 
are not oriented towards clear strategic objectives.422  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether the planning and conduct of these 
operations reveal any understanding of the nature of operational art. Some operational 
elements will be examined to answer the question. Firstly, it will examine the strategic 
context of both operations and the way the Russian and German high commands planned to 
use the operations within the respective campaigns. Secondly, it explores the operational 
commanders’ planning and conduct of the operations for evidence of understanding of 
operational art. Finally, it considers the way tactics were adapted to serve the purpose of the 
operation. Both operations will then be compared and criticised in light of the inter-war Soviet 
theory of operational art. 
 
Entente strategy development and strategic coordination 
 
The Great War began in the west when Germany unleashed its campaign to defeat France in 
six weeks. The campaign plan is known as the Schlieffen Plan, after Graf Alfred von 
Schlieffen, chief of the Great General Staff between 1891 and 1906. It is also named the 
Moltke Plan after Schlieffen’s successor Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, nephew of 
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder.423 Moltke modified the plan according to changed 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the campaign failed when the French army managed to block the 
main effort and counterattacked with the support of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). 
The Western Front settled into a system of trenches after the attempts of outflanking 
manoeuvres reached the Channel late October 1914.424 The Eastern Front was characterised 
by decisive tactical victories, such as the Battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, none 
which yielded any strategic outcome. There were further offensives in the east the next year 
when the Central Powers pushed the front hundreds of kilometres eastwards. These did not 
either reach any strategic decision.425 
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While the Entente had to act offensively to force the Germans from the ground and vital 
resources they occupied in Northern France and Belgium, the Germans could allow 
themselves to defend what they had conquered. On the Eastern Front the force density was 
lower and the room for mobile warfare greater, but even clear-cut German victories against 
Russian armies did not decide the war. There was simply too much terrain and too many 
Russian reserves for the available German and Austrian-Hungarian forces in the east. The 
Russians themselves lacked both strength and capability to mount any successful 
offensives.426 What followed was an ongoing quest to find alternative ways to conduct land 
warfare. These attempts included technology, such as chemical weapons and tanks, and tactics 
and techniques, such as infiltration tactics and elite assault troops. In addition, there were 
alternative strategic approaches, such as physical attrition of enemy troops and resources, or 
attempts at indirect strategies, such as Gallipoli and Salonika.427 
 
A joint Entente strategy began to evolve in late 1915 with the planning conferences in Calais 
and Chantilly in December. Despite friction between politicians and generals on both sides of 
the Channel, a political framework for strategy was established, and military strategy 
followed suit. Germany’s advantage of an interior position, where it could shift forces 
between the eastern, western, and Italian fronts and fight their enemies separately, was to be 
countered by simultaneous Entente offensives along all fronts. Coordinated and continuous 
pressure along all fronts would prevent Germany from shifting reserves and bringing Entente 
superiority to bear.428 
 
The plans called for coordinated Entente offensives by the summer of 1916. The method to 
reach the strategic aims was  
 
“coordinated offensives” in the principal theaters and that these offensives should occur 
as soon as possible after March 1916. If the enemy attacked one of the allied powers, 
the others would provide as much assistance as they could. The representatives also 
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agreed that “attrition of the enemy should be pursued with partial and local 
offensives”.429 
 
 The tactical problem of breaching the enemy’s fortified lines, “rupture des lignes fortifiées”, 
was considered easier on the Eastern Front.430 It was acknowledged that it would not be 
possible to conduct decisive manoeuvres to force a military decision by the defeat of the 
enemy armies in the field, but aim to wear down the adversary, “l’usure des armées 
adverses”.431 The strategic means was tactical attrition and not breakthrough and decisive 
manoeuvre. In the west, there would be a British-French offensive on the river Somme along 
a front up to 70 km, while Russia and Italy would mount simultaneous offensives.432 
 
In the preceding months, the French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre had strived to 
improve the offensive tactical methods but acknowledged that it was impossible to break 
through the elaborate German defensive system in one operation. Joffre realised that the 
means to defeat the enemy was to wear him down and protect one’s forces from attrition. 
Joffre stated that the British army had to wage attrition in 1916, as the French army had to 
recover from the losses during the offensives of 1915.433 General Philippe Pétain, commander 
of the Second Army, stated clearly the role of attrition in his report of 1 November 1915 of 
the lessons learned from the September offensive in Champagne. Methodical attrition must be 
the precondition for launching the decisive attack to force the enemy to retire. Petain’s 
analysis revealed that his army failed because the Germans could bring in reinforcements 
unhindered from their reserves and restore the defences.434 Attrition does not appear to have 
been an end in itself in Petain’s opinion, but a means to weaken the enemy so he could be 
attacked and forced out of his defences. 
 
After the Champagne offensives in September 1915, General Curières de Castelnau, 
commander of the Central Army Group, concluded his report with some recommendations for 
future offensives. An offensive against German forces was expected to be a series of 
operations (d’une série d’opérations), where each position in the enemy defensive belt was to 
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be taken by a new operation with fresh troops. The rupture of the enemy front must be 
considerable in breadth and depth, and the assault troops would have to be rotated and 
reconstituted to avoid them being worn down themselves. These series of operations were to 
be tactical operations within the framework of an army, and the focus was on the army corps 
and its divisions. It was also acknowledged that the processes and methods differed between 
the armies within the army group to the extent that they did not “speak the same language”, 
which reduced interoperability between the different units and services. 435 
 
In Joffre’s January 1916 instructions for offensive combat by large units, terms of attrition or 
tasks and missions to wear down enemy forces were not present. The emphasis was placed on 
close cooperation between infantry and artillery, and following up success in attack with 
sufficient artillery support to secure the gains and widen the breach. For the army and army 
corps, the ambitions were to immediately exploit a breakthrough and rush cavalry through the 
breach.436 The stated purpose of the attack in these instructions was not attrition but 
breakthrough and pursuit. The role of attrition was a separate issue in the memorandum of 15 
February from Joffre for the 1 March conference in Chantilly. The Allies were to act 
cautiously until they were ready for the planned series of coordinated offensives outlined in 
the December conference. Despite indications of a German offensive in the west (not 
expected until April) the reorganising of the Russian army would to a great extent determine 
the timing for the concerted Allied offensives.437 
 
The Entente’s strategic plan for 1916 was disrupted when the Germans launched a massive 
offensive at Verdun in February. As the German effort and pressure increased, France was put 
under severe pressure and had to reduce its role in the planned British-French offensive. The 
March 1916 conference at Chantilly was delayed until 12 March, and in the introduction 
paper, Joffre pressed to advance the dates for the coordinated offensives and even urged 
Russia to launch an offensive “without delay” and with the means available.438 At the 
conference, Joffre got assurance from the Entente to launch supporting offensives on the 
Russian front on 15 May and in the Balkans and Italy on 30 May, while France held against 
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the German onslaught at Verdun. The Russians would also mount a local offensive 
immediately (une action locale importante dès maintenant).439 
 
The British had to take more responsibility for the offensive on the Somme as Joffre had to 
reduce the French contribution because of the strain at Verdun. While the offensive on the 
Somme was being planned, two central generals argued over strategy. Pétain and Ferdinand 
Foch were critical to either the form of attack or to the offensive itself. Petain was now 
commander of the Central Army Group, (Groupe d’armées du centre (G.A.C.)). He recalled 
the 1915 Champagne offensive and proposed limited offensives on all fronts to deplete 
German resources. Foch, commander of the Northern Army Group (Groupe d’armées du 
Nord (G.A.N.), argued for delaying any French attacks until 1917 and reconstitute the French 
army. An Austrian attack against Italy on 14 May made the Russian offensive even more 
important. By the spring and summer of 1916, the Entente used the Chantilly strategy as the 
basis for coordinated offensives in France, Italy, and on the Eastern Front to ease the German 
pressure against the French forces at Verdun. 440 
 
The Chantilly conferences developed and maintained the agreed Entente strategy that 
provided the framework for each nation’s military strategy. The key element concerning the 
war’s strategic conduct was to coordinate offensives in time and space to negate the Central 
Power’s ability to transfer reserves to any threatened front in turn. When the German Verdun 
offensive disrupted the Entente’s plan for synchronised offensives in 1916, the Entente’s 
Chantilly strategy allowed for the coordination of relief offensives within the same 
framework. 
 
In the protocols from the Chantilly conferences, the terms operation and campaign were only 
used in a few instances in relation to the offensives. However, they were not used in ways that 
would reflect their role as modern operational terms. The term operation was still used about 
military activities in general, and in the December 1915 conference mainly by the Italians.441 
Half the instances of the term operations were “theatre of operations”.442 On the other hand, 
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the use of campaign (campagne) was in two-thirds of the instances a synonym for “field” in 
field fortifications, field artillery, and field army.443 By the March 1916 conference, operation 
was used in a similar way and still as a general term, while campaign was mainly used in 
relation to artillery.444 Campaign and operation were used throughout these documents, and 
the terms showed some degree of hierarchical relations, where campaign was related to 
strategy and operation to activities in general. Although there were instances where terms that 
resemble modern operational terminology, these were just “incidental remarks” that do not 
indicate any institutionalised use and understanding of operational art or operational 
terminology.445 Castelnau’s observation of “a series of operations” was a farsighted exception, 
but still an incidental remark in the bigger picture. 446 
 
The 1916 Brusilov offensive 
 
The strategic context for the Russian offensives in 1916 was the Entente’s Chantilly strategy. 
When the German Verdun offensive unhinged the purpose of the Chantilly strategy, Russia 
conducted their offensives to relieve the pressure on the French army. As the German Verdun 
offensive gained momentum, the French requests for a Russian relief were answered.  
 
The Russian losses in the previous year were to some extent replaced, and the Russians 
outnumbered the Central Powers in men and materiel almost two to one on the Eastern Front. 
The Russian Western Front, commanded by General Evert, was to be the main effort of the 
March offensive. The North-Western Front, commanded by General Kuropatkin, would 
conduct supporting attacks.447 The Russian army opened the offensive with feeble artillery 
preparations on 18 March 1916. The artillery barrage did little damage to the German 
defenders, and the massed assault lines of infantry were submitted to devastating artillery and 
small arms fire. The lack of infantry-artillery cooperation contributed to the disaster, and 
cooperation between the two fronts was almost non-existent. Renewed attacks only reinforced 
the disaster and contributed to nothing but mounting numbers of casualties. Despite some 
local Russian successes, the Germans recaptured the terrain they had lost. The offensive 
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offered no relief to the defenders of Verdun. Norman Stone argues that this Battle of Lake 
Narotch was a decisive battle, as it exposed the “extreme incompetence with which affairs had 
been combined in March,” and cured the North-Western and Western Fronts of any future 
offensive attempts.448 While Russia was committed to the Chantilly strategy and to support its 
allies, its leading field generals were hesitant. 
 
Planning and preparations 
 
The plan for the 1916 summer campaign was developed by the supreme headquarters of the 
Russian Imperial army, in accordance with the Chantilly strategy. Despite opposition from 
generals Kuropatkin and Evert, still commanders of the North-Western and Western Fronts, 
the chief of the general staff General Mikhail V. Alexeev maintained that the offensive must 
proceed. The Tsar had committed Russia to the Chantilly strategy of simultaneous offensives 
at all fronts, but not even the Russian local superiority of five and six to one against the 
Germans could convince Kuropatkin and Evert to attack. A compromise was agreed to allow 
two more months for preparations and the transfer of a thousand pieces of heavy artillery. The 
only commander who declared himself ready for an offensive was General Aleksei 
Alekseevich Brusilov, commanding the South-Western Front south of the Pripet marshes. His 
front had no particular superiority against the Austrian armies opposing him. Still, Brusilov 
was allowed to launch an offensive although Alexeev’s had reservations. As a result of 
Brusilov’s decision to commit his forces to an offensive, the Russian army was to embark on 
a summer campaign of offensives along the entire front, from the Baltics to the Rumanian 
border. The North-Western and Western Fronts would be reinforced. The Western Front 
would be the main effort, while the South-Western Front would support the campaign by an 
offensive to tie up the Austrian forces and prevent them from reinforcing the defence against 
the Russian main effort.449  
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Sketch 4.1. The Eastern Front June 1916. Strategic attack directions, main effort, and 
operational formations.450 
 
General Aleksei Brusilov was a cavalry general from a family of military men. He served 
with distinction as a dragoon in the 1877-1878 war against the Ottoman Empire. He joined the 
Cavalry Officer School and served in various postings at the school until he took command of 
a cavalry division. Brusilov visited several European great powers to study training and as 
corps commander was noted for his approaches to training. He was put in command of the 
Eighth Army at the beginning of the First World War and made several successful offensives, 
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but had to retire due to failures elsewhere. In late March 1916, Brusilov became commander 
of the South-Western Front.451 
 
Despite receiving reinforcements of heavy artillery and ammunition, Kuropatkin and Evert 
were still dragging their feet and wanted to cancel or postpone the offensive. Brusilov, 
conversely, assembled his army commanders and laid out his plan for the offensive, a plan 
that was remarkably different from previous Russian offensive practice. He counted on 
minute planning and thorough preparations. Instead of massing his forces against one main 
objective, Brusilov intended to launch an offensive with all of his four armies simultaneously 
along his entire front. Brusilov directed his four army commanders to identify attack sectors 
with a width of at least 15 km, one sector for each army. The northern attack towards the rail 
junction at Kovel was Brusilov’s main effort. The Ninth Army at the Rumanian border was 
also prioritised, since success there might induce neutral Rumania to enter the war alongside 
the Entente. This illustrates the offensive’s political and strategic potential. Since the armies 
concentrated their forces along a narrow front, they would gain local superiority, while the 
entire front attacked, the enemy would not be able to move reserves to every threatened 
sector.452 
 
Instead of massing the sparse artillery in a massive artillery preparation, the guns were to be 
used in close cooperation with the infantry against selected targets to open the way for the 
assault forces. The infantry was to dig their way as close to the enemy trenches as possible 
and prepare hidden assembly areas. Brusilov also adopted recent tactical innovations from the 
French and the Germans and adapted them to the local context and the characteristics of the 
Russian army. The assault tactics for the infantry mirrored the French experience of small-
scale advances following a rolling artillery barrage but was extended to be executed along the 
entire front. A blend of deception and secrecy and overwhelming the enemy with large 
amounts of information, real or fake, were all means to bewilder the Austrian and German 
defenders. Brusilov’s armies would attack by a mixture of infiltration tactics, close infantry-
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artillery cooperation, and thorough preparations to deceive the enemy. All of those 
preparations were aimed at increasing the chances of surprise and breakthrough.453 
The South-Western Front consisted of the Eight Army in the north, which was reinforced and 
the front’s main effort. To the south were Eleventh Army, Seventh Army, and the Ninth Army 
facing Chernowitz and the Carpathian Mountains. The Central Powers facing the South-
Western Front were mainly Austrian-Hungarian troops. To the north was Heeresgruppe 
Linsingen (army group) of two composite army detachments and the Fourth Army. To the 
south was Heeresgruppe Böhm-Ermolli with the First and Second Armies. Further south was 
the Deutsche Südarmee (German South Army), which included the Korps Hoffmann, a 
German division alongside an Austrian-Hungarian corps. The German and Austrian strategic 
assessment was that the Russians were not able to mount any large offensives in 1916 due to 
the heavy losses in the previous year. The Russian March offensive at Lake Narotch was 
clumsily executed and stopped dead in its tracks and suffered heavy casualties, further 
reassuring the Central Powers that Russia would remain on the defensive. Austria had 
transferred troops to the Italian front and Germany was committed at Verdun, so the Russians 
had numerical superiority in the east.454 
 
The area of operations was characterised by large rivers and their numerous tributaries. In the 
northern sector, the rivers ran northwards into the Pripet and the Bug ran past Brest-Litovsk 
and turned north-west. In the south, the main rivers drained the Carpathian Mountains flowing 
southeast towards the Black Sea. River lines were essential defensive features and important 
fall-back positions in a retreat. There were few railways on the Russian side and only a north-
south single-track line west of Kiev. The Austrian and German side of the front line, had 
higher railway density, many double-track, more rolling stock, and rail traffic was far better 
managed than on the Russian side. The most important was the north-south line through the 
important rail hub Brest-Litovsk along the entire front via Lvov and Stanislau to Chernowitz. 
This lateral rail line allowed the Central Powers to shift troops along the front faster than the 
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The Austrian defences facing the South-Western Front consisted of three fortified belts of 
several trenches in each belt and was supported by superiority in artillery and machine guns 
with interlocking fields of fire. The trench systems had shell-proof underground shelters and 
concrete bunkers and were reinforced with barbed wire obstacles and landmines. The 
Austrians had transferred their best troops to the Italian front, while those that manned the 
defences facing Brusilov’s front had spent more time constructing defences than training to 
fight in them. Another weakness of the Austrian defences was that only the first belt was close 
to being completed. The second and third belts were left more or less unfinished. The 
defences lacked depth, which might not have mattered against the kind of uncoordinated 
human wave attacks the Russian had mounted so far in the war. But the lack of defence-in-
depth was a vulnerability that Brusilov planned to exploit when he chose his unorthodox 
offensive method.456 
 
Execution and outcome 
 
The artillery of the South-Western Front opened up at 4 AM on 4 June. The entire width of 
the front was shelled for three hours, but there was no massive concentration at any point, just 
a steady, deliberate fire to destroy wire obstacles and trenches. As the guns fell silent the 
defenders emerged from their shelters ready to face massive Russian attack columns. But 
there were only small reconnaissance forces to probe the defences and assess the damage. An 
hour later the artillery began a deliberate fire against chosen targets, but still no massive or 
concentrated barrages. At this point, the Austrians and Germans expected no more than local 
attacks to relieve the pressure on the Italians. The perceived lack of determination in the 
Russian probing attacks confirmed these expectations.457 
 
456
 Brussilov, A soldier's notebook, 193, 199-200, 229-232; Bundsgaard and Poulsen, "Brusilov-offensiven," 33-
37; Dowling, The Brusilov Offensive, 35-36, 48-59; Jeřàbek, "Die Brussilowoffensive 1916," 253-254, 293-294; 
Nikolay Yakovlevich Kapustin, Operativnoye iskusstvo v pozitsionnoy voyne [Operational art in a positional 
war] (Moscow, Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo, 1927 ), 244; Strokov, Vooruzhennyye sily i voyennoye 
iskusstvo v pervoy mirovoy voyne, 386-387; Tunstall, "Austria‐Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive of 1916," 33. 
457
 Brussilov, A soldier's notebook, 241-243; Dowling, The Brusilov Offensive, 62-67; Jeřàbek, "Die 
Brussilowoffensive 1916," 254-257; Strokov, Vooruzhennyye sily i voyennoye iskusstvo v pervoy mirovoy voyne, 
399-402; Tunstall, "Austria‐Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive of 1916," 38-41. 
  137  
 
Sketch 4.2. The Eastern Front June 1916. The force groupings south of the Pripet Marshes, 
Brusilov’s operational plan, its main effort, and attack directions.458 
 
While the Russian advances in the centre were limited to breaking into the Austrian tactical 
defences, the attacks in the south broke through all the Austrian defensive lines before fresh 
reserves managed to halt the advance. During the next two weeks, the Russians had advanced 
15 km along the Rumanian border and captured the city of Czernowitz. The attack collapsed 
the defences in the north and had within a week pushed 50 km into the depth of the Austrian 
defences and captured the city of Lutsk. Attempts by the Austrians to stem the Russian 
offensive were shattered time and again. The Russians occasionally even lost contact with the 
retreating Austrians. But by the second week the Russians were forced by the lack of supplies 
and reserves to halt the advance and pause for resupply. At the strategic level, the two other 
fronts had not moved into action. Alekseev “was unable (or unwilling) to convince Evert and 
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Kuropatkin to attack in support of the South-Western Front.”459 Alekseev did however 
transfer three army corps from the North-Western Front to Brusilov to guard the offensive 
from a possible German thrust from the north.460 
 
As Brusilov was pressing towards Kovel he faced increasing resistance as the Germans 
reinforced the Austrians and managed to stabilise the front. On 19 June, Brusilov ordered his 
forces on the Kovel front to dig in and prepare to renew the offensive in July. The main effort 
of the entire Russian campaign was moved from the reluctant North-Western and Western 
Fronts to Brusilov’s South-Western Front. What was intended as a supporting operation 
became the campaign’s main operation by default, leaving the strongest fronts to only conduct 
secondary operations (Dowling uses the term “demonstrations”). The South-Western Front 
was attached the adjacent Third Army from the Western Front. Furthermore, the Guards 
Army was transferred to Brusilov’s command. As more forces were transferred south, the 
Russian railways’ lack of capacity slowed the force transfer, while the well managed German 
and Austrian rail net allowed them to win the reinforcement race. Brusilov was also obliged to 
align the renewal of the offensive with the Anglo-French offensive at the Somme in July, 
which allowed the Central Powers more time to prepare for the next blow. By early July 
Brusilov had an approximately two-to-one superiority but had lost his perhaps most vital 
asset; the element of surprise. The high casualties caused a shortage of troops and officers 
trained according to his new and unorthodox tactics. The senior commanders of the Guards 
Army that he received as reinforcements were not held in any high regard, lacking any 
understanding of modern war and mainly owing their senior positions to their nobility and 
court connections. None of Brusilov’s reinforcements understood or were trained in the 
South-Western Front’s successful infiltration and artillery tactics.461 
 
General Evert’s Western Front finally attacked in the first week of July but still with 
outmoded tactics and sustained huge losses without influencing the Central Powers’ strategic 
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dispositions, literally “a complete and bloody failure.”462 The attacks by the Western Front 
had largely run their course when Brusilov renewed the offensive against Kovel on 4 July. 
But, despite initial success, the advance was halted along the Stockhod River. A further 
transfer of troops from the two northern fronts to the South-Western Front increased the 
numerical superiority, while Kuropatkin’s North-Western Front was ordered to conduct a 
supporting offensive to coalesce with Brusilov’s renewal of the offensive mid-July. Brusilov’s 
armies made significant gains in the centre and had captured Brody by the end of the month. 
But the lack of coordination between the Russian fronts and armies allowed the Germans and 
Austrians to shift their reserves southwards and halt the attacks, while inflicting heavy 
casualties.463 
 
When Brusilov resumed the offensive in early August, the plan was to concentrate on Kovel, 
attack in the centre to tie up German and Austrian reserves, and press the offensive in the 
south. Before the offensive got started, the Austrian initiated a counteroffensive that struck 
Brusilov’s southern army and delayed the Russian attack. The offensive began according to 
plan in the centre but was halted within days when German reserves was transferred from the 
quiet sectors in the north. In the south, the artillery opened up in the morning of 7 August and 
the infantry followed by noon. After a few days of heavy fighting and severe losses, the 
Russians reached the Carpathian passes leading into Hungary but lacked reserves to follow up 
the success. The Germans and Austrians were again able to reinforce the threatened sectors, 
thus the last Russian attack was defeated on 12 August. The final offensive towards Kovel ran 
into well prepared German and Austrian defences and was defeated with heavy Russian 




The summer campaign was Russia’s major contribution to the Entente’s Chantilly strategy to 
launch simultaneous offensives against the Central Powers and prevent them from transferring 
reserves from one front to another. This strategy was disrupted by the German Verdun 
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offensive, but it served as a framework to coordinate relief offensives by Russia and Great 
Britain. The first Russian March offensive at Lake Narotch was a costly failure which did 
nothing to ease the pressure at Verdun. The Russian summer campaign failed strategically 
despite Brusilov’s operational success south of the Pripet Marshes. After the Brusilov 
offensive had reached the Carpathians, Rumania decided to leave its neutrality and join the 
Entente. But its army was not ready for modern war and a well-conducted German-led 
counter offensive defeated the Russian and Rumanian forces, captured Rumania’s natural 
resources, and increased Russia’s defence responsibilities.465 
 
The Germans did not transfer any troops from the Western Front to counter the Brusilov 
offensive until 9 June and only two of a total of eight German divisions were transferred 
before the main operations at Verdun were over. The Central Powers’ reserves to counter 
Brusilov’s offensive were drawn from Italy, from quiet sectors of the Eastern Front, and from 
the strategic reserves. Even the Austro-Hungarian divisions from Italy were withdrawn after 
the Italian offensive had ended, so the Brusilov offensive had no impact on the force ratio in 
Italy either.466 Brusilov himself concluded in his memoirs that “[t]he campaign had no 
strategic result”.467 The campaign failed when the North-Western and Western Fronts were 
unable to do their parts. Brusilov’s weaker support operation was alone not able to secure the 
success of the Russian summer campaign. The strategic transfer of forces from the north to 
the south came too late. However, the Russian rail network could not transfer troops and 
supplies fast enough compared with the enemy’s railways. Von Moltke the Elder asserted that 
it is impossible to correct flawed initial strategic dispositions during the subsequent 
campaign.468 Svechin regarded Moltke’s well-known idea as obsolete since modern railways 
and operational reserves allowed for rectifying of initial strategic errors.469 Whatever the case, 
the inadequate Russian rail network and the dysfunctional command relations only created 
more friction. One successful unsupported operation was not able to compensate for a 
strategic failure. Consequently, the Russian efforts during 1916 served neither Entente nor 
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Brusilov managed to exploit the tactical vulnerabilities of the Austro-Hungarian defences to 
gain surprise, breakthrough, and local superiority while tying up all enemy reserves by 
attacking along his entire front. Brusilov justified his approach of a wide front offensive and 
refers to General Ludendorff’s War Memoirs to defend his action based on the impact the 
offensive had on the German-Austrian conduct of the war.470 The operational advantage lasted 
only until the enemy could shift strategic reserves to counter the operation, without any 
interference from the other fronts, and Brusilov’s own reserves and supplies were spent. But 
Brusilov’s initial conduct was not without flaws either. In a conference in 1920, Svechin 
criticised Brusilov for not pushing his northern army more vigorously, to exploit the initial 
tactical successes to gain a strategic breakthrough with the possibility of annihilating the 
enemy.471 
 
The continued progress of the Brusilov offensive depended on the two other operational 
commands; the North-Western and Western Fronts. The failure of the Russian high command 
to influence and direct the other front commanders reduced the strategic gains of the South-
Western Front, although its operational success was significant. The two strongest fronts’ 
inactivity allowed the Central Powers to move troops from the north and concentrate against 
Brusilov. This failure is closely linked to the dysfunctions of an archaic military top 
hierarchy, where incompetent archdukes were more influential than professionals.472 The 
operational success of the Brusilov offensive was nullified by the inept conduct of the Russian 
high command and systemic incompetence, as much as by enemy resistance and counter 
moves. 
 
Brusilov developed and tailored tactical solutions to the specific opponent and challenges 
facing his front, accumulated the tactical successes and utilised the logistical resources that 
allowed the operation to develop successfully. He furthermore directed and coordinated the 
tactical offensives within the operational framework designed to limit the enemy’s ability to 
defend himself. The planning and conduct of the Brusilov offensive was operational art. The 
South-Western Front was an operational formation directly subordinated to the high 
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command.473 Brusilov’s operational conduct in the latter part of the offensive was not without 
flaws. These were to a large extent caused by the increased friction caused when the South-
Western Front received large reinforcements and became the de facto main effort of the 
Russian campaign. The Brusilov offensive was a unique modern Russian operation that the 
Russian high command and the rest of the Russian army were not able to comprehend or 
manage. In that sense, Brusilov’s operation was a bridge too far for the Imperial Russian 
Army. 
 
The 1918 German spring offensives 
 
The German army launched several large-scale offensives on the Western Front from late 
March to mid-July 1918, with the aim of deciding the war by military victory in the field. The 
two first offensives, named Michael and Mars, will be the object of study in this section, 
which seeks to explore and analyse German approaches to the planning and conduct of 
modern operations. The Michael offensive was the closest the Germans came to breaking the 
Allied armies apart. This is the rationale for emphasising this offensive and not study the 
other offensives. The planning and execution of these offensives are illustrative of the 
strategic-tactical relations within the Imperial German Army. It also illustrates the way 
operations and the operational (German: operativ), the ambiguous functions and processes 
between tactical conduct and strategic direction, were understood in the German army late in 
the war. 
 
The strategic context of the German spring offensive consisted of a window of opportunity. 
The collapse of the Russian Empire created it, but the United States would close it in months. 
The Germans were under pressure to act fast and decisively or be crushed by the Western 
Allies’ combined industrial might. The Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Russia’s Bolshevik 
leadership allowed the Oberste Heeresleitung OHL (Supreme Army Command) to free large 
forces in the east for transfer to the Western Front and gain a temporary numerical advantage 
over the Allies. The advantage was temporary because American forces were arriving in 
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The OHL, de facto led by General Erich Ludendorff, chose to exploit German geopolitical 
and strategic advantages (secure borders and resource base in the east) to train and equip their 
best divisions for mobile warfare for a strategic offensive to win the war in the west. The 
OHL opted for a military all-or-nothing gamble where there was no room for any alternative 
political approaches to end the war. While the decision to attack had been made at the end of 
1917, the decisions on where, how, and towards which end, had yet to be made.475 
 
General Erich Ludendorff impressed his superiors at the General Staff Academy and entered 
the Great General Staff directly from the Academy. He gained fame in early August 1914 
when he took command of a brigade that had lost its commander and captured the citadel in 
Liège. He became chief of staff to General Paul von Hindenburg when he was assigned as 
commander of the Eighth Army in East Prussia. Hindenburg and Ludendorff established 
themselves as an effective command team in the east. In August 1916 Hindenburg became 
Chief of the Great General staff and Ludendorf First Quartermaster-General, acting as the de 
facto chief. Ludendorff was the brain and driving force behind the offensives on the Western 
Front in the spring of 1918.476 
 
The decision to move from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive on the Western 
Front was made by the OHL and illustrated how the army leadership dominated German 
policy and politics. The discussions that took place between the decision to attack and the 
decision to launch the Michael Offensive reveal a lack of strategic conceptions. Ludendorff 
was unable to define the objective that would achieve the political aim (victory in the west) 
and guide the planning. Despite some attempts to raise operational questions, the closer the 
first offensive came to its launch, the more tactical the focus became at every level of 
command. The terrain that promised a tactical breakthrough was where the first of a series of 
offensives was to be launched. In accordance with the German General Staff’s credo, 
“Strategy follows tactical success”, Ludendorff’s experience from Russia would define 
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operations although they carried the offensive in a direction that contradicted the strategic 
objective.477 
 
A decision was reached to split the BEF from their French allies by launching the offensive 
between Arras and the river Oise. A successful breakthrough would offer the possibility to 
roll up the BEF, cut it off from the French army, and either destroy it or drive it back to the 
Channel. Despite requests by senior German commanders, Ludendorff did not set any 
particular objectives for the offensive, but referred to the practice on the Eastern Front of 
aiming for “an intermediate objective, and then discovering where to go next.”478 Such an 
approach was the anti-thesis of both strategy and operational art because the aims became 
subordinated to the means and methods.479 
 
French intelligence monitored the transfer of German troops to the Western Front and 
registered a steady increase from January to March 1918, a clear indication of the building of 
an offensive capacity. Two likely areas for a massive offensive were identified: the southern 
British sector and along the French front on both sides of Reims. The earliest time the 
offensive could be launched was assessed to be late March. The Entente also had a reasonably 
good picture of how the offensive would commence, based on the German offensives on the 
Eastern Front in previous years. While waiting for the Americans to arrive in strength, the 
British and French argued about strategy and the top French generals argued among 
themselves.480 
 
Planning and preparations 
 
David T. Zabecki argues that, despite Ludendorff’s narrow tactical focus, the German army 
“clearly recognised a body of warfighting activity that was neither tactical nor strategic.”481 
The terms Operation (operation) and operativ (operational) had been in use since Moltke the 
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Elder. Although the terms were vague and not clearly defined, they indicated an 
understanding of some unique military activities in between strategy and tactics, but the 
understanding was fluid.482 Operativ was understood more on the basis of what it was not 
than based on a positive definition. The Imperial German Army had not come to terms with 
any agreed definition of what operativ meant, or what role and function it had concerning 
strategy and tactics.483 As a consequence, it is challenging to use a modern operational 
framework to analyse and assess the historical case of the German spring offensives in 1918. 
On the other hand, a critical application of modern operational terminology may throw light 
on German planning and conduct.484 
 
The key issue is that the entire framework for the offensives was defined by Ludendorff, who 
explicitly rejected operations as such. He also created both a command and a force structure 
that would deny army group commanders (the operational level commanders) the means to 
command and manage the direction of the operation. This was done by dividing the 
responsibility for the operation between the two army groups, which allowed the OHL to 
better micro-manage the operation. Ludendorff not only controlled planning and preparations 
but also set himself in position to direct in person events at lower echelons of command.485 
 
The conduct of the German 1918 offensives was based on improvements in tactics and 
techniques that had been tested on a large scale in Russia, then against the Italians in Tyrol, 
and on a smaller scale on the western front. The best-known elements were the stormtroop 
infiltration tactics, the improved artillery tactics for neutralisation and suppression of the 
defences, and the rolling barrage to pave the way for the assault troops.486 The same offensive 
system was used in the counterattack to recapture the ground lost in the British Cambrai 
offensive on 20 November 1917. The success of this operation convinced the OHL that it 
would be effective on the Western Front.487 A critical German weakness when aiming for a 
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breakthrough was the lack of mobile forces to exploit success. In 1918, that would have been 
either light armour or cavalry, but the Germans invested little in armour. Furthermore, the 
lack of horses in 1918 forced mounted troops to fight as infantry.488 Some early studies have 
also criticised the Germans for not exploiting the opportunities they created: “It was senseless 
to break down a door if there was no one to go through it.”489 
  
There are several explanations for the strategic aim and purpose of the offensives and a fair 
amount of critique of German misjudgement and errors at all levels of command. Groß argues 
that it was the success of the tactical breakthrough that was the defining element in 
Ludendorff’s analysis. This led him to launch the offensive where the chance of a tactical 
breakthrough was most promising, not where operational exploitation of a breakthrough 
might lead to a strategic result. Ludendorff was quoted in defence of his purely tactical 
approach: “I disapprove of the word operation. We’ll cut a hole. The rest will follow. That’s 
how we did it in Russia.”490 By such a solely tactical focus Ludendorff risked the entire 
offensive by choosing the breakthrough for the sake of breaking through and not where any 
strategic gain could be achieved.  
 
The literature is somewhat ambiguous on the purpose or objective of the offensives. Foerster 
quotes Ludendorff in a meeting on 11 November 1917 that the aim was to break through the 
southern flank of the BEF and roll up the entire front in a north-westerly direction.491 Groß 
contends that the strategic-operational dimensions of the offensive overwhelmed Ludendorff’s 
organising capacity to such an extent that he could not balance the dilemmas facing him. The 
dilemmas were between the tactics required for the breakthrough, operational freedom of 
action to encircle and annihilate the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and a strategic option 
for peace based on military victory.492 Robert T. Foley argues that the purpose was to break 
into the open and regain mobility to wage mobile warfare (Bewegungskrieg) according to pre-
war doctrine. The strategic aim was then to destroy the enemy armies in decisive battles and 
dictate peace conditions, in line with the Wars of German Unification and the battles in the 
fall of 1914.493 If the offensives’ strategic purpose is difficult to grasp, the method was a 
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return to Bewegungskrieg, mobile warfare, where opportunistic exploitation of fleeting 
tactical opportunities would, as it was hoped, secure strategic aims.  
 
Sketch 4.3. The German plan for the Michael and Mars offensives.494 The planned 
directions of the assaults reflect the strategic intent to cut off the BEF against the Channel 
and destroy its armies by annihilation battles.495 
 
Zabecki stresses the German planning process and preparations leading up to the offensives 
and how various aims and objectives were discussed. Army group commanders criticised 
Ludendorff and the OHL for not stating specific strategic or intermediate (operational) 
objectives. He also notes that tactical tasks and attack directions were adjusted right up to the 
final days before the start of the offensive.496 Ludendorff’s approach was the logical 
perversion of the General Staff approach, where strategic victory was to follow tactical 
success. Moltke’s statement that strategy had to align itself with the outcome of tactical 
victories was interpreted as strategy having to yield to tactics and to adjust its direction to the 
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altered realities.497 But in 1918, as in 1914, there was no Moltke the Elder to manage the 
overall strategic direction of the campaign and harness tactics to strategy. Nor was there a 
German politician of Bismarckian qualities to rein in the army and secure the primacy of 
policy. The tail was free to wag the dog. 
 
The 1918 German army in the west had to reconfigure itself from a defensive trench war to an 
offensive mobile war. Equipment, tactics, and techniques for mobile warfare differed 
significantly from the previous three years of defensive war. Even the Verdun offensive 
became more of a mobile siege than a Bewegungskrieg. Commanders at all levels had to be 
able to think, assess, and act in very different ways in a mobile and fleeting war of 
manoeuvre, than in the static, fire-saturated trench war. The German army’s wartime 
expansion and the high rate of casualties had depleted the pre-war officers’ corps. The junior 
leaders, on the other hand, were young and fit and experienced in modern war. The army 
relied on its well-tested command approach of Auftragstaktik (mission command) that was 
second nature to German leaders at all levels and integrated into the conception of mobile 
warfare. Experience from the German Wars of Unification and the 1914 Bewegungskrieg 
indicated that subordinate commanders at times tended to allow tactical success or personal 
ambition to override higher command intentions and limitations. Such Autoritätsverlust (loss 
of authority) is an integral element of Auftragstaktik that could pull tactics away from the 
strategic aim if higher-level commands uncritically allow tactical success to follow the line of 
least resistance.498 
 
The emergence of modern command and control systems, such as the telephone, also 
influenced the established German conduct of operations. In 1918 the telephone network was 
well developed after almost four years of static trench war. As a result, higher command 
levels would bypass lower levels and approach field headquarters with detailed inquiries and 
disrupt both command procedures and commanders’ freedom of action. Ludendorff was 
particularly skilled in utilising modern information technology to immerse himself in minute 
tactical details.499 The command and control of the German offensives in 1918 was an odd 
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combination of freedom of action at the lowest levels and a tendency at the highest level to 
micromanage as far forward as the telephone line would reach. The intermediate operational 
and higher tactical commands were easily left bewildered in between. 
 
When the Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht (AGR) was assigned the Seventeenth Army, 
the army group had five armies to command. The Second Army was then transferred to the 
Army Group Crown Prince Wilhelm (AGW), while the Fifth Army and an army detachment 
from Army Group Duke Albrecht were formed into a new army group. This reorganisation on 
1 February 1918 would leave each commander with fewer armies to control. However, it 
would divide the responsibility for the Michael operation between the two most prestigious 
army groups. As the unity of command was diluted, the new command structure was 
deliberately designed to facilitate direct interference by Ludendorff and the OHL.500 
 
Logistical constraints allowed for just 52 divisions to be ready for the offensives in the spring 
of 1918. One critical limitation was the lack of horses and trucks to allow artillery and 
supplies to follow the attack forces beyond the enemy trenches and deep into the rear of the 
Allies. Road construction through the old Somme battleground would demand huge 
construction resources and the roads were to be prioritised for supplies and not troops. There 
were preparations to use conquered railways, while large amounts of railway repair materiel 
and construction units were prepared to follow the assault troops.501 
 
The final order of operations from OHL issued on 10 March set the initial tactical objectives 
for the Michael offensive that was to start on 21 March. It indicated the subsequent direction 
of the offensive. The AGR should aim to reach the line Arras-Albert, turn north, and roll up 
the British front. It was to be supported by the Mars offensive along the British front to the 
north to fix the British forces in their trenches. To the south, the AGW was to support the 
main effort by capturing the Somme River and Crozat Canal and be prepared to extend its 
right flank to Peronne. However, less than a week before the attack there was a significant 
alteration of the offensive following suggestions by General Hutier, commanding the 
Eighteenth Army, which had its mission extended from a supporting attack to a main attack of 
its own. In a last-minute telephone exchange, Ludendorff outlined follow-up objectives that 
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would alter the operational direction of the offensive. The result was diverging axes of attack. 
Zabecki is critical of the limited and tactical orientation of the operation and shows how 
operational commanders requested operational or strategic objectives beyond the immediate 
tactical horizon. As examples of the German strategic and operational ineptness, he uses the 
lack of understanding of the vulnerable British logistic system and its dependence of a few of 
harbours and critical railway junctions such as Amiens and Hazebrouck.502 Both junctions 
were crucial to the limited railroad network that conveyed supplies for the Channel ports to 
the British armies. If one or both hubs had been captured, the BEF could only with difficulties 
supply the troops. 
 
Sketch 4.4. The Western Front on 20 March 1918. 503 The army groups’ and armies’ 
boundaries that were part of or adjacent to the Michael and Mars offensives. Note the 
British Fifth Army’s wide front and the concentration of the reinforced German assault 
armies Seventeenth, Second, and Eighteenth. Note also the division of the assault armies 
between Army Group Rupprecht and Army Group Wilhelm.504 
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The Allies had set up a Supreme War Council (SWC) in early November 1917, which then 
had been over two years in the making. The SWC consisted of a permanent military 
representative (PMR) of each country and the Prime Minister in addition to another 
unspecified minister. The politicians would bring a military advisor, typically the Chief of the 
General Staff. The PMRs would be based in Versailles and act as a secretariat, while the SWC 
was to meet each month. The SWC would not have the authority to direct policy or act as any 
kind of unified command but would be 
 
an instrument for arriving at a common policy – although it could not compel a member 
nation to carry out that policy in practice – and not an instrument for carrying out that 
common policy. The council was, in fact, merely a more regularised way of conducting 
the international conferences that had come to characterise the political side of the 
conduct of the war.505 
 
The SWC was not without friction. But it was able to respond with joint allied efforts against 
common threats such as the German U-boats. It also decided to establish a general reserve to 
be controlled by an Executive War Board, which also included an American representative in 
addition to the British, French, and Italian. The question of control of a general reserve was, 
on the other hand, so contentious, that when the Germans launched their Michael offensive, it 
had still to be solved.506 
 
During January the British Fifth Army under General Gough took over the front from the 
French Third Army as part of an extension of the BEF’s responsibility, to allow the French 
army to build larger reserves to meet the expected German offensive. The new area for the 
Fifth Army included the 1916 Somme battlefield, which was littered with craters and where 
most of the infrastructure was damaged. Fifth Army also occupied a devastated area east of 
the German positions that the Germans evacuated during the retreat to the Hindenburg Line in 
the winter of 1917. The defensive zone was little developed since the French Third Army 
expected to be relieved and had done little construction to strengthen the defences.507 Despite 
forced construction of trenches and obstacles, both the Fifth and the right sector of the 
adjacent British Third Army “might be permitted to give ground, if this became necessary, 
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without uncovering any vital point.”508 The railway centre at Amiens 60 km behind the front 
line was such a vital point. 
 
Zabecki referrers to Travers who contends that the fall-back option was a “post facto 
rationalisation to cover the fact that Haig and General Headquarters (GHQ) were slow to 
recognise the threat to the southern end of their line”.509 Fifth Army was ordered to stand and 
fight. If forced to conduct a “fighting retreat” it was to fall back no further than the Somme. 
Whatever the thought and reasoning before or after the events and despite construction work 
and added reinforcements, the front of the Fifth Army was the least fortified part of the BEF’s 
front and the thinnest manned. There was an emerging understanding between the Third and 
Fifth armies of where and how the Germans would attack. This was confirmed by German 
prisoners the final days before the attack. Intelligence assessed that German deception 
activities on other parts of the front “might be or might not be feints”. Furthermore, an attack 
against the French could not be ruled out. To make thing worse, Gough had also placed most 
of his troops in the first defence line, which made them vulnerable to the German artillery 
preparations and infiltration tactics.510  
 
Execution and outcome 
 
The execution of the Michael offensive reflects both the narrow tactical outlook of the 
German leadership and the debates and decisions during the planning in the months preceding 
the offensive. The emphasis on innovative tactics and techniques, especially infantry-artillery 
combined arms, bore fruits in the stunning tactical results during the first week of the 
offensive. The level of relative unpreparedness of the British Fifth Army contributed to the 
German gains. The greatest weaknesses were a thinly manned front and a lack of defence in 
depth to absorb and disrupt the storm-troopers. Nevertheless, the Germans did not reach their 
initial tactical objectives the first day and were behind schedule from the onset in what was a 
high-risk offensive where they were also fighting against the clock. The attacks had met the 
strongest resistance in the critical sector in the north. The supporting attack in the south had 
better progress. Ludendorff responded tactically to the lack of progress by reinforcing the 
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success of Hutier’s Eighteenth Army in the south and choosing not to follow up Michael with 
the Mars support offensive in the north.511 This decision reflects the changes in Hutier’s 
mission from supporting the centre and northern part of the offensive to becoming another 
main effort. Ludendorff’s decisions the first day of the offensive continued the “tacticisation 
of strategy”, which had begun immediately after the order of operation was issued and 
substituted tactical opportunism for strategic direction and operational objectives.512 
While the Fifth Army took heavy losses, the Germans managed to break through in only two 
places on the first day. The Third Army stood firm, while the Fifth Army was allowed to 
withdraw. Commander of the BEF, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, and Pétain, Commander-
in-Chief of the French Army, took decisions to forward both British and French reserves to 
the threatened sector. More than half of the nearly 40,000 British casualties the first day were 
prisoners, which indicates the scale of the German tactical success. The British retreat 
prevented higher casualties the next days as units retreated before they were bypassed and 
encircled by the advancing storm-troopers and their follow-on forces.513 
 
It took two more days for the German armies to reach the first day’s tactical objectives. On 
the second day, Ludendorff began to expand the original tactical mission to encircle and 
destroy the British forces facing Cambrai (the Flesquières salient). He also let the two 
northern armies advance further west before linking up. The Eighteenth Army in the south 
continued to push westwards. By 23 March the three armies were on diverging axes of 
advance. Ludendorff was pursuing three different objectives instead of concentrating on the 
original aim to split the BEF from the French army. In addition to separating the BEF from 
the French forces, the offensive should also have defeated the BEF and disrupted the French 
reserves. Amiens was identified as a direction for the advance of the Second Army in the 
centre, but not as an objective in itself. Ludendorff also committed more and more reserves, 
especially in the south, which would leave him empty-handed if a gap to be exploited 
appeared in the enemy defences. The day of 23 March ended with the Eighteen Army being 
 
511
 BAMA PH5I-29, 268-269; Stevenson, With our backs to the wall, 53-56; Zabecki, The German 1918 
offensives, 138-143. 
512
 An early use of the term “tacticisation of strategy” is by John Ferris, "The Biggest Force Multiplier? 
Knowledge, Information and Warfare in the 21st Century" (paper presented at the Conflict, the State and 
Aerospace Power, Canberra 2002), 153. See also Rob Johnson, "The Changing Character of War," The RUSI 
Journal 162, no. 1 (2017), 8. 
513
 Sheffield, The chief, 268-270; Stevenson, With our backs to the wall, 53-56; Zabecki, The German 1918 
offensives, 139-142. 
  154  
ordered to advance towards the south-west and to cross the river Oise, while the Seventeenth 
Army was to diverge south reinforce the progress of the Second Army.514 
 
The British Third and Fifth armies withdrew their remaining forces from their forward 
positions along the front in reasonably good order, while the Third Army evacuated the 
Flesquières salient. Despite the failure of the SWC to create a general reserve, Haig and 
Pétain agreed that the British and French armies had to be kept together to prevent the 
Germans from dividing them. They also decided to use their own reserves and the first French 
reinforcements arrived on 22 March. By 23 March, four French divisions had reinforced the 
British Fifth Army. The French agreed to take over the southern part of the Fifth Army’s front 
and had six more divisions ready to move to support the BEF. Haig had also begun to move 
about half of his 40 division strong general reserve. The Fifth Army was ordered to make a 
new stand and hold the river Somme at all costs.515 
 
The Germans continued to divert from the initial plan and pushed west to the south-west on 
24 March, while falling behind their daily objectives. The Seventeenth Army in the northern 
sector made no progress towards Arras and was ordered by the OHL to turn away from its 
intended push north-west towards St. Pol and head west in the direction of Doullens. The 
Second Army in the centre was to diverge south to cover the Eighteenth Army, which was 
slowed by exhaustion and supply problems. The Eighteenth Army’s supporting role had now 
effectively become the offensive’s main effort, so the Second Army had to divert its forces to 
support it.516 
 
By the evening the next day, the German Eighteenth Army had split the BEF from the French 
forces and was turning the French flank at Roye on the River Avre. But it was too little too 
late as two French armies were deploying behind the southern part of the British Fifth Army. 
On 26 March, the AGR ordered its two armies to continue west in the direction of Doullens 
and Amiens, while the rail hub Albert fell in the afternoon. The Eighteenth Army took Roye 
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and Noyon, formed a defence towards the south along the river Oise by Noyon, and continued 
its westwards drive.517 
 
On 26 March, Ludendorff issued a “directive for the continuations of the operations” based on 
the advances during the first part of the day, where the aim of splitting the British and French 
armies seemed to be within reach.518 The directive gave immediate and subsequent objectives 
that would pull the armies even further apart. The Second Army was given Amiens as an 
objective, the Seventeenth would advance on a front from south of Doullens over Arras to St. 
Pol, and the Eighteenth across the Oise in a continued south-western direction. At this stage, 
the logistic constraints were beginning to tell. Artillery and supplies fell behind the advancing 
infantry. The combat units took losses of officers and trained assault troops that were hard to 
replace. Horses that were intended for officers and dispatch riders were used to pull supplies. 
While the losses in combat units were influencing the assault units directly, the attrition of the 
supply system would reduce the German ability to sustain the operation as the combat units 
were deprived of ammunition, food, and other supplies.519 
 
The crisis caused by the Michael offensive caused British and French politicians and leading 
generals to meet to agree to coordinate the defence. At a conference at Doullens on 26 March, 
the British and French governments tasked General Ferdinand Foch with coordinating the 
allied armies on the Western Front.520 
 
Ferdinand Foch was commander of the Second Army’s XX Corps on the German border in 
1914. He was just two years short of retirement when the war began but led his corps well in 
the initial battles on the frontier. On 28 August was Foch given command of an army 
detachments of two corps and four divisions, which later became the Ninth Army. Later he 
was posted as deputy to the deputy of commander-in-chief and worked closely with the 
British in the north. His role on the Somme in 1916, when he was in command of the French 
Northern Army Group (Le groupe d’armées du nord, G.A.N.) and responsible for the French 
participation, was the cause for him to be relieved of command. Foch had been active in 
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improving tactical methods and combined arms combat, emphasising artillery-infantry 
cooperation. He held several posts in 1917, including Chief of Staff of the French Army, and 
in command of French relief troops to Italy.521  
 
Foch’s new role became the supreme commander of the Allied forces, but there were 
conditions: 
 
Le général Foch est chargé, par les gouvernements britannique et français, de 
coordonner l'action des armées alliées sur le front ouest. 
Il s'entendra à cet effet avec les généraux en chef, qui sont invités à lui fournir tous les 
renseignements nécessaires.522 
 
Despite his limited authority, Foch was able to bring the actions of the British and French 
armies together in a coordinated defence against the German onslaught. If the Germans had 
gained a temporary operational objective in splitting the British and French armies on 25 
March, the appointment of Foch as a strategic coordinator was a lasting victory by the Allies, 
an appointment that was only made possible by the clear and present danger of the German 
offensive 
 
French intelligence reported on 25 March that there would be no German offensive in the 
Champagne region. This meant that Pétain could safely bring more of his reserves to counter 
the Michael offensive. The Reserve Army Group (Groupe d’armées de Réserve ou de Rupture 
(G.A.R.)) established on 14 February 1918 and commanded by General Fayolle was ordered 
on 11 March to prepare to keep the British and French defensive zones together. The G.A.R. 
was attached the French First and Third Armies and deployed to relieve the southern part of 
the British Fifth Army and block the German offensive south of the Somme.523  
 
The German advance continued south of Albert the next week, while the British defence held 
between Albert and Arras and the French were moving more forces forward to stem the tide 
in the centre and south. As the Germans forced open gaps between the British and French 
forces, French commanders moved to plug them. Montdidier fell late on 27 March. The next 
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day a gap between the British and French armies was again open and the Germans could 
advance northwards along the river Avre directly to Amiens. The AGW was, on the other 
hand, not able to reach Amiens despite the fact that the OHL had ordered both the Second and 
Eighteenth Army to attack. The Michael offensive was reaching its culmination point.524 
 
Sketch 4.5. The Michael and Mars offensives, plan. To the left are the original strategic aims 
and planning for the Michael offensive to aim north-west towards the Channel and cut off 
the BEF from their French allies and a supporting attack to the south-west. 
Sketch 4.6. The Michael and Mars offensives, execution. To the right displays how the 
offensive diverged 90 degrees and projected its main effort to the south-west.525 
 
At 0300 hours the same morning, the long-overdue Mars offensive was finally initiated 
towards Arras. At the same time, the Seventeenth Army launched its final attack to capture 
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Arras. Both attacks met well-prepared defences and were fought to a standstill by the late 
afternoon. The attacks towards Amiens made little progress and the Michael offensive was in 
reality cancelled in the late afternoon on 30 March. Pétain had deployed the Fifth and Tenth 
Armies behind the G.A.R. ready to support either Fayolle or Haig. Attempts to renew the 
offensive on 4 and 5 April made no progress and the offensive was terminated by the OHL.526 
The conclusion in the initial OHL operational assessment was that “a great tactical victory is 




The relationship between the OHL and the army groups (the operational formations) in 1918 
mirrored the Entente, including Russia, but was dominated by Ludendorff as the de facto 
strategic commander of the Imperial German army. He had a tactical understanding of 
warfare and thus a tactical approach to the planning and conduct of the offensives. The 
widening gap between the large-scale strategic aim and the ongoing tactical fight was bridged 
ad hoc by new tactical gains as the offensive commenced. However, what is striking was 
Ludendorff’s apparent inability to connect the strategic ambition to the tactical activities and 
logistic realities needed to realise that ambition. The strategic-tactical bridge that operational 
art is meant to provide is hard to detect. The single issue of not identifying the strategically 
important railway hub at Amiens as the critical intermediate objective is the most glaring 
example of this problem that Zabecki observes of Ludendorff: “in many ways he was a 
reflection of the German army as a whole in the first half of the 20th century: tactically gifted, 
operationally flawed, and strategically bankrupt.”528 This judgement is too harsh since the 
operational conduct was sound, given the realities the German army faced in the spring of 
1918. However, the inability to provide direction for the operation or harness the tactical 
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Ludendorff retained the coordination authority himself in order to be able to directly influence 
operations and tactics, citing experiences from the November 1914 operations in Poland.530 
Given his personality and strategic outlook, this meant direct interference and detailed control 
of events based on his emphasis on tactics. This attention to tactics was rational as the 
strategic outlook mirrored Moltke’s statement of strategy as a system of expedients. These 
expedients were created and exploited in war of movement (Bewegungskrieg). But the 
German approach to such a war of movement was to emphasise delegated authority and great 
operational freedom to subordinate commanders.531 The ability to exploit fleeting tactical 
opportunities in a chaotic Bewegungskrieg depended on commanders leading from the front 
and able to feel the pulse of the fighting while simultaneously maintaining the strategic 
direction. Ludendorff’s lack of strategic understanding undermined the effects of the high-
tempo Bewegungskrieg the Germans hoped to force on the Allies in the spring of 1918. 
 
Ludendorff’s infamous statement, “Tactics had to be set above strategy” (Die Taktik war über 
die reine Strategie zu stellen) is repeatedly used as evidence of German strategic ineptness.532 
Seen in context this quotation referred to the futile Entente offensives during the first three 
years of the war, where strategy was made irrelevant by the inability to break through the 
tactical defences.533 Foley also criticises such an interpretation, since “Ludendorff focused on 
tactics because he rejected the step-by-step approach enshrined in the Entente concept of 
battle. Instead, he remained wedded to the German concept of a flexible battle of 
manoeuvre.”534 Foley’s critique highlights the challenges in attempting to analyse past events 
based on contemporary ideas and concepts, which is the approach Zabecki uses when he 
applies contemporary US Army definition of operational art to explain the German 
operations.535 Ludendorff explained his tactical focus of the offensives in an interview in 1923 
and concluded: “What would an operation that lacked any tactical basis be for me?” (Aber 
was sollte mir eine Operation, für die die taktischen Grundlagen fehlten?).536 The problem 
was not the tactical basis for the breakthrough, but that tactics overruled strategic and 
operational objectives during the operation. Svechin’s logic, where strategy should guide 
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operations, was turned upside down when operations and strategy were at the mercy of 
tactical opportunism.537 While Svechin credited Ludendorff for “outstanding achievements in 
operational art” he also maintained that “Ludendorff’s partial successes were only a step 
towards ultimate defeat.”538 This critique's central point is that there was no strategy for the 
operational successes to serve, not least because of failed policy. 
 
Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs that as the defence north of the Somme hardened, the main 
effort (Schwerpunkt) had to be modified and directed towards Amiens. Ludendorff hoped “we 
would be able to conduct an operation” [author’s translation] (wir würden zu einer Operation 
gelangen), which the English edition translated “we should get through to open warfare”.539 
This statement is in line with Foley’s argument that the German purpose with the Michael 
offensive was to break through and restore “a flexible battle of maneuver” according to the 
pre-war concept of Bewegungskrieg.540 
 
This use of the term operation by Ludendorff is in line with the German understanding of 
operation as related to movement and not the new understanding that was emerging and later 
defined by Svechin: “We call an operation an act of war if the efforts of the troops are 
directed toward the achievement of a certain intermediate goal in a certain theatre of military 
operations without any interruptions.”541 What the Germans was missing was the 
“intermediate goal”. The German army group commanders were not given specific goals for 
the operation. The Michael operation was not an intermediate objective in a campaign, but a 
strategic war-winning offensive in itself. Industrialised warfare in 1918 had changed the 
physical conditions for the German mobile warfare of 1914 vintage.542 Should the Imperial 
German army as an institution be criticised, the criticism must be directed towards their 
inability to acknowledge that the character of war had changed and to adapt as skilfully in 
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The final analysis of the spring offensives in the German official history had a section entitled 
“Operational considerations” (Operative Erwägungen). The discussion delved into strategic 
issues and in particular the question of one massive blow instead of the series of offensives 
that were conducted. It also considered whether the Michael offensive should have had a 
larger share of available assault forces and artillery and whether the offensive should have 
aimed exclusively at the British instead of simultaneously fighting the French.543 Operational 
considerations significantly, were discussed in the section “Tactical considerations” 
(Taktische Erwägungen) in the previous pages. These considerations referred to the lack of an 
explicit focus of effort (eine ausgesprochene Schwerpunktbildung). A related question was 
whether such a focus was possible, given the inability to sustain larger forces in the field 
when the troops moved away from the railheads. The lack of a strong tank force was 
acknowledged as was the enemy’s strength in the air.544 Although the 1918 volume was 
completed as late as 1944 and published in 1956, there was a consistent use of operational 
terminology and discussions of operational considerations in the framework of tactics. This 
uneven use of terms suggests strongly that the conduct of operations was not regarded as an 
independent military discipline in the German tradition. It confirms a continuity in using the 
terms from the Imperial army through the Second World War. 
 
The Imperial German Army, in other words, understood operativ and Operation differently 
than modern-day militaries’ understanding of operational art and operations. For the majority 
of the officers, operations meant bringing the forces to the point of battle where the battle, or a 
cluster of battles (Schlieffen’s Gesamtschlacht), was still regarded as the means to reach the 
strategic objectives. The battle’s strategic purpose was the annihilation of the enemy forces. 
Mobile warfare (Bewegungskrieg), leading to decisive battles was how to pursue that aim. 
The question persists whether the German army was able to escape its dogma of tactical 
annihilation and establish a broader and more comprehensive understanding of modern 
industrialised war. In such an understanding, tactics would be harnessed to changing strategic 
realities. Such questions go beyond this study and are more about the German understanding 
of the changing character of war than the role of operations and the strategic-tactical 
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Observations and conclusions 
 
Both the Brusilov offensive and the Michael offensive were innovative in their tactical use of 
forces. Their outcomes were also unusually large for First World War offensives. They 
resembled more offensive operations in the Second World War than those between 1914 and 
1918. The army group was the headquarters directly subordinated the respective high 
commands. Both offensives were also conducted with multiple armies and coordinated by one 
or more army groups. The army groups served as operational level commands since they were 
directly subordinated the strategic commands and commanded the largest tactical formations 
(armies). These army groups were to achieve the strategic objectives set by the high 
command. Beyond these issues, the offensives were completely different. 
 
While the Brusilov offensive was hampered by the Russian high command’s fundamental 
inability to provide strategic direction, the Michael offensive was hampered by Ludendorff’s 
micromanagement and interference in tactical details. Brusilov had unity of command within 
his command authority (the South-Western Front) and reasonable freedom of action from the 
General Staff. On the other hand, Ludendorff deliberately let two operational commanders 
direct the armies in the Michael offensive to ensure there was no unity of command apart 
from his own.545 Both cases illustrate that there were ways of bridging the strategical-tactical 
gap based on innovative tactics. But, since the ability to direct operations to serve strategy 
was missing in both the German and Russian cases, the operations “had no strategic result.”546 
The bridge lacked a solid strategic abutment. The next chapter will study how strategy 
managed to adapt to modern warfare and harness and direct operations towards the strategic 
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Chapter 5: Materialisation, the Allied 1918 
offensive 
 
The necessity of conducting several successive operations in order to attain a final 
military goal, is almost beyond doubt when two large and strong modern states clash. 
An operation just pursuing an intermediate military goal, limited in its essence, is 
typical in contemporary art of war. The capacity to conduct such a limited operation 
does not exhaust the full content of the art of war. Strategy is the art of grouping 
operations in order to obtain the final goal of war. 
Alexandr A Svechin547 
 
This chapter will consider operational art and operational elements in the planning and 
execution of the Allied offensives of 1918. Just when the final German spring offensive 
culminated in mid-July, the Allies counterattacked. General Ferdinand Foch laid out the 
strategic direction for the Allied operations. His aim was to ensure that the entire Allied effort 
on the Western Front served a unified strategic purpose. This purpose was agreed upon and 
developed by Allied politicians and supreme commanders. It was therefore designed 
explicitly to serve the aims of policy.548 The Allied campaign would direct army group 
commanders to conduct operations according to the strategic purpose. The question to 
examine is whether the strategic-tactical gap was bridged in the planning and conduct of the 
Allied offensive between July and November 1918. In other words, were the Allied offensives 
directed operational art? Or, conversely, was Isserson right that the Allied offensive was 
nothing but “the highest manifestation of the dead-end at which military art had arrived 
during the epoch of imperialism”?549 Was the Allied victory just a default accumulation of 
industrialised mass and political collapse?550 
  
The essence of operational art is its function as a bridge between strategy and tactics, a 
function based on strategic-operational and operational-tactical interactions. Operational art 
must plan and direct tactical forces to achieve the objectives given by strategy if it is to act as 
that bridge. The Germans’ emphasis on tactics made them lose sight of the strategic 
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dimension and went for a tactical wild goose chase in the 1918 spring offensives. The 
Russians’ inability to carry out strategic coordination left Brusilov to conclude that “the 
campaign had no strategic result”, despite the remarkable operational success in Galicia in 
1916.551 The Allied offensive in 1918, on the other hand, was successful precisely because 




The methods to conduct offensives had developed substantially since the beginning of the 
war. Technology, tactics, and techniques evolved to counter the enemy trench systems, while 
the defence also continuously adapted to parry new offensive methods. The concept of the 
sudden attack, attaque brusquée, which consisted of artillery preparation, breakthrough, and 
exploitation, was developed early in 1915. A prolonged artillery preparation precluded any 
surprise; furthermore did vulnerable frontline communications made coordination very 
difficult. Offensives quickly outpaced the artillery support and ground to a halt against the 
enemy’s second trench line. Another approach was the scientific battle, conduite scientifique 
de la bataille, was based on the assumption that the breakthrough had to be through a long 
and methodical action. It was used at the 1916 Battle of the Somme, where the French Sixth 
Army reached the enemy’s second defensive belt, but there was no means to continue the 
attack. The Germans adapted their defences faster than the Allied progress. Trench lines were 
developed into defensive belts and just as at Verdun offensives degenerated into a battle of 
mutual attrition.552 
 
As commander of the Second Army, General Robert Nivelle achieved some remarkable local 
offensive successes at Verdun from October to December 1916. A brief and violent artillery 
preparation preceded these attacks. Then the infantry advance commenced protected by a 
rolling barrage. Nivelle was then promoted to command the armies on the north-Western 
Front and sought to implement the Verdun School, école de Verdun, on a large scale at the 
Chemin des dames in Champagne. Michel Goya describes the new method as a return to the 
attaque brusque, but with modern means of combat. German intelligence detected the 
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preparations and surprise were also lost due to the prolonged artillery preparations. The 
offensive stalled the first day but had some limited success the second. The Germans had 
improved their defensive constructions based on the lessons from the Battle of Somme. Thus, 
the German defensive responses to the Allied attacks proved once again more effective than 
the improved offensive method. The large casualties of the failed offensive sparked mutinies 
and collapse in the army’s morale. General Philippe Pétain replaced Nivelle on the fifteenth 
day of May 1917.553 
 
Shortly after he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French army, Pétain published his 
well-known Directive No.1 of 19 May 1917. In this document, Pétain acknowledged that 
there was an even balance between the adversaries on the northern and north-western part of 
the front. He closed by stating that should the situation and the balance of forces change, new 
directives would be issued. The current strategic ambition was an economy of force approach 
that aimed at preserving and restoring the French army without yielding the initiative to the 
Germans.554 The means used to keep the initiative was limited offensives with existing forces, 
to attrit the enemy by massive use of artillery and securing limited objectives. These short and 
quick offensives should follow in rapid succession to fix the enemy and prevent him from 
shifting forces to counter one offensive before the next one began in another sector. There 
should be a continuous improvement of the defences to prevent the Germans from exploiting 
the situation by transferring forces from the Eastern Front following the Russian revolution. 
This was the first of a series of directives that was to create a new doctrinal framework for 
future offensives by the French army.555 Pétain’s focus on successive offensives was based on 
experiences that dated back to the Champagne offensive in the autumn of 1915.556 
 
The French front was reorganised to accommodate the new resource-intensive offensives. 
Roads parallel to the front were constructed to facilitate lateral movements of troops and 
especially artillery and ammunition. The defences were rearranged to facilitate offensives. 
Assault trenches were dug closer to the enemy. Furthermore were communications trenches 
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and storage areas for ammunition and equipment established. The purpose was to concentrate 
superior forces and firepower quickly and covertly to secure surprise and fire superiority for 
Pétain’s new limited offensives. The offensive method proved successful locally, but was 
very costly in ammunition and would not alone defeat the German army. However, they 
helped to reconstitute the French army’s morale and further develop tactical attack methods. 
Special raiding parties and techniques were developed, which varied from company size raids 
to larger than divisions sized attacks with limited objectives. Artillery and machine guns were 
often used massively to support these actions.557 
 
The cost of the artillery preparations for the battle of Fort La Malmaison on the Chemin-des-
Dames ridge in October 1917 reached the stunning costs of 500 million francs. It was twice 
the productions cost of the more than 4000 tanks produced in France during the war. New 
artillery directives refocused the use of artillery in attack from destruction to the neutralisation 
of enemy resistance for a limited time. The artillery would neutralise enemy artillery by 
counter-battery fire and suppress enemy infantry to allow the attacking forces to cross no 
man's land and assault the trenches. The increased motorisation of the artillery would both 
allow for field artillery to follow the attacking infantry and the heavy artillery to relocate for a 
new offensive along the front line.558 What was still missing, was a way to develop Pétain’s 
tactical successful attacks into a strategic offensive to win the war. 
 
Foch had argued that the Allies should begin to plan a counter-offensive in early May 1918, 
even as the Germans were still conducting their offensives. In a note of the twelfth day of 
May and his General Directive no. 3 of 20 May, he envisioned offensives to reduce the salient 
protruding towards Hazebrouck in Flanders and recapture the mining areas in the region. He 
also stressed the need to reduce the German bulge threatening Amiens.559 One part of Foch’s 
argument was to include the British and take a comprehensive view of the situation of the 
Allies. Foch insisted that British and French attacks between the rivers Oise and Somme must 
be understood as fundamentally linked together since they aimed for results that would 
complement each other (des résultats qui se complètent l'un l'autre).560 But while Foch was 
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pressing for counterattacks and offensives, Pétain was more concerned with the next German 
offensive.561 
 
There were two distinct dimensions in Foch’s arguments. The first is where Foch strived to 
counter the series of German offensives with counterattacks against the salients gained in the 
offensives. This argument brought about the well-known tension between himself and Pétain. 
The latter claimed that the French army lacked resources for the offensive. The second 
dimension was the clarity of Foch’s strategic concept and his ability to maintain it until the 
situation had improved for the Allies. His perception of the essential geographical areas for 
the counter-attacks, as well as the strategic purpose of these operations, would lead him to 
develop the successes of the initial counter-attacks into an Allied counter-offensive. Foch’s 
general strategic vision embraced initial successes to forge a specific strategy for an offensive 
campaign to win the war. 
 
Allied unified command in the field emerged after Foch was given a coordinating role of 
operations at Doullens on the twenty-sixth day of March 1918. He soon argued that the role 
had to be expanded to include directing operations. At the meeting between the Allies at 
Beauvais on 3 April, Foch had his authority widened to include “the strategic direction of 
military operations. The Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French and American Armies 
will have full control of the tactical action of their respective Armies.”562 This limited 
authority of “the strategic direction of operations” was as far as the nations would go 
regarding unified command. The execution of Foch’s strategic direction demanded its full 
share of military-diplomatic tact: 
 
But by persuasion he could stimulate or restrain their Commanders-in-Chief, decide 
upon the policy to follow, and thus bring about those concerted actions which result in 
victory, even when the armies concerned are utterly dissimilar.563 
 
Foch himself had no illusions of his authority: “What later was known by the term ‘unified 
command’ gives a false idea of the powers exercised by the individual in question – that is, if 
it is meant that he commanded in the military sense of the word”.564 In a modern 
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understanding of command authority, Foch possessed only a coordinating authority. He was 
dependent on the forces he was to coordinate allowing themselves to be coordinated.565 
 
There was a remarkable absence of a direct role for the Supreme War Council (SWC) in 
Foch’s execution of “unified command”. A week before the German Michael offensive, the 
14-15 March meeting of the SWC failed to agree on a strategic reserve or a unified 
command.566 The July meeting of the SWC was unable to enhance the role of its Permanent 
Military Representatives (PMR) in the strategic planning of the offensives in 1918 and 1919. 
On the other hand, Foch threatened to resign rather than have his authority reduced. More 
critical was the SWC’s role in streamlining and standardising logistics.567 Modern war had 
become extremely dependent on a constant and uninterrupted flow of supplies.568 The Allied 
1918 campaign would not have been possible had supplies not been available and forwarded 
to the armies. Elizabeth Greenhalgh made it absolutely clear that “It is undeniable that the 
allied solutions to the logistics problems were war-winning.”569 Although the SWC did not 
interfere in Foch’s direction of operations, it did, make the operations possible by its logistics 
arrangements. 
 
Foch’s coordination of the defence against the German offensives was not without friction 
and disagreements. However, his position was confirmed at the meeting of British and French 
politicians and top military leaders in Paris on 7 June.570 Foch maintained the pace of the 
campaign by extending Pétain’s tactical method of limited attacks to the strategic level. The 
campaign would consist of parallel and sequential operations along the entire width of the 
front to keep up a steady pressure on the Germans and deny them any respite. Contrary to 
John Terraine’s claim that Foch was one of the last of the great old fashioned generals, Foch 
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was in fact inventing modern coalition warfare.571 To quote Alexandr Svechin’s analysis of 
modern war, “We reduce the whole essence of the strategic art of warfare to an understanding 
of the logic of grouping operations to achieve the goals of the war.”572 Foch’s strategy in 1918 
was all about grouping operations within the context of the campaign. He might have been an 
old fashioned general before the war, but by 1918, Foch had redefined strategic generalship 
and reshaped Allied strategy to accommodate modern operations. 
 
The command structure of the Allies in 1918 balanced between the need for a unified 
command and national concerns, burden sharing, and different roles among the Allies.573 Foch 
was a supreme commander in the name only. His authority was limited to directing operations 
within the campaign. While Foch directed and coordinated operations, it was the army groups, 
which acted as operational commands, that planned and conducted the operations.  
 
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig commanded the BEF and was also the senior British officer 
on the continent. The BEF was organised as an army group alongside the French army groups. 
The French army was commanded by Pétain and was organised in three army groups. 
Bordering the BEF was the Reserve Army Group (Groupe d'armées de Réserve ou de Rupture 
(G.A.R.)), which was commanded by General Emile Fayolle. To the east was the Central 
Army Group (Groupe d'armées du Centre (G.A.C.)), under General Paul Maistre. General 
Édouard de Curières de Castelnau commanded the Eastern Army Group (Groupe d'armées de 
l’Est (G.A.E.)) that was deployed along the German border.574 Foch’s direct involvement in 
command, at times bypassing the French army commander Pétain, provided him with the 
means to exert strategic direction over offensive operations. Pétain, on the other hand, did 
occasionally direct the tactical conduct within the operations, bypassing army group 
commanders. The Allied chain of command was partly parallel and partly overlapping with 
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When the German Marneschutz-Reims offensive was stopped dead in its tracks on 17 July, the 
Allies counterattacked the following day in the Second Battle of the Marne. The subsequent 
Allied 1918 offensive campaign developed out of this successful counterattack. The success at 
the Marne was developed into a strategic offensive. The next was the British-led British-
French Amiens-Montdidier operation (the battles of Amiens and Montdidier), which began on 
8 August. The Amiens-Montdidier operation was followed by two more offensives, one east 
of Hazebrouck at the Lys River and later the American attack at Saint-Mihiel. The aims were 
initially limited to securing Paris and removing German threats to vital rail junctions. But 
from these initial successes, a general offensive emerged. Its purpose was to force German 
forces out of France and secure starting positions for the final offensive into Germany by the 
spring of 1919.576 
 
Foch hosted a conference with the Allied commanders at his headquarters in Bombon on 24 
July 1918 to present his four-step strategy to win the war. The first step was to halt the 
German offensives, the second to counter-attack, the third to advance the entire front, and 
finally end the war with a massive Allied offensive in 1919. The offensive on the Marne 
turned out to be the opening round of the second step.577 The precondition for Foch to press 
for the offensive was the growing Allied superiority in men (with 250,000 Americans arriving 
monthly), a steadily increasing material advantage, and rising Allied morale. At the same 
time, German morale was suffering after the failed spring offensives.578 
 
The Allied offensive on the Western Front is commonly referred to as the Allied Autumn 
Offensive or the Hundred Days. The British tradition tends to start with the Battle of Amiens 
and refer to the hundred days of fighting that lead to the armistice, with reference to 
Napoleon’s hundred days leading to the battle of Waterloo.579 Historian Nick Lloyd regards 
the French Marne offensive as a prologue, which makes sense since Foch first laid out his 
strategic concept on 24 July, capitalising on the initial success on the Marne.580 On the other 
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hand, Doughty emphasises that the strategic offensive was an opportunistic exploitation of the 
success in the Second Battle of the Marne and became the opening round of Foch’s offensive 
campaign. Elizabeth Greenhalgh maintains it was the Allied seizure of the initiative that 
constituted the turning point.581 The German official history acknowledges that the Allied 
Marne offensive consumed the available German reserves poised for future offensives. The 
prospect of an overall retreat, similar to the 1917 withdrawal to the Siegfried Stellung, was 
emerging as the only realistic German option, although it would have far-reaching political 
effects. There was an implicit acknowledgement that the strategic initiative was lost for 
Germany, although German troops fought well in defence.582 
 
Prelude: The Second Battle of the Marne583 
 
The third series of German spring offensives, the Blücher, Yorck and Goerz, was launched on 
27 May across the River Ailette between Reims and the River Oise. The aim was to draw 
Allied reinforcements away from the British sector before a renewed effort to split the French 
and British armies. Similar to the Michael offensive, opportunistic exploitation of tactical 
success prevailed over strategic purpose. The limited aim of a diversion was expanded into a 
decisive operation and an advance deep into the French defences. The unintended outcome 
was a salient about 45 km wide and 30 km deep that protruded from the front line southeast of 
the Amiens salient. Rail and road communications were so restricted that the troops could 
only be supplied with difficulty.584 The final German offensive, the Marneschutz-Reims 
offensive, was launched on 15 July to capture Reims with its vital railroad junction. The 
French army had prepared a thorough defence in depth, so the offensive gained little ground, 
while the defenders inflicted heavy casualties on the assault forces.585 
 
A French counter-offensive against the protruding German salient south-west of Reims was 
conceived as early as late May. It was prepared by moving the majority of the strategic 
reserves from other sectors to reinforce the armies assigned for the offensive. Four armies of 
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two army groups were involved. They were further reinforced by American and British 
troops, which also made the offensive an Allied effort. Artillery and armour were 
concentrated to ensure fire superiority and mobility to the attack force. A tight security and 
secrecy regime was imposed to reduce the risk of German intelligence detecting the 
preparations. The purpose of the offensive was to remove the direct threat towards Paris and 
open the railroad juncture at Château Thierry.  
 
Sketch 5.1. The Western Front on 24 July 1918.586 Army group areas of operations, front 
line, the Second battle on the Marne and planned operations against German salients at 
Hazebrouck, Amiens and Saint-Mihiel.587 
 
The operational and tactical preparations were in accordance with Pétain’s Directive No. 5 of 
12 July 1918 concerning the conduct of the offensive.588 Pétain stated firstly that from now on 
the armies were to attack. Success would depend on thorough planning and preparations, 
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secrecy and surprise, rapid execution and penetration into the trench systems, and immediate 
and deep exploitation. The directive further emphasised the role and responsibility of 
commanders and staff officers. The troops must be properly trained in their tasks and fight in 
combined arms teams, which should include tanks and close cooperation with artillery. These 
issues were further described in detail and also in specified tasks for artillery, aeroplanes and 
tanks.589 
 
Foch initiated the counteroffensive in the early morning of 18 July, as soon as the German 
Marneschutz-Reims offensive was brought to a halt by French counterattacks on 17 July. The 
attack hit the Germans when their offensive ground to a halt and were most vulnerable. In the 
west, the Germans were taken completely by surprise since there was no massive artillery 
preparation by the French Tenth Army, just a creeping barrage immediately followed by tanks 
and infantry. The Tenth Army’s gains of 8 km the first day ripped open the defensive zone, 
penetrated the German defences, and cut the western supply route into the salient. By noon 
the German troops were ordered to evacuate their bridgehead across the Marne. The French 
Sixth, Ninth, and Fifth Armies attacked the next day, but now the Germans were prepared; 
therefore, these attacks progressed much more slowly. Resistance in the west also hardened, 
but the pressure of superior force, supported by artillery and tanks, forced the Germans 
relentlessly backwards. Fearing rising casualties, the German army group commander 
suggested withdrawal from the salient on 24 July. But Ludendorff declined this 
recommendation. The sustained allied pressure forced Ludendorff to accept defeat and order a 
retreat two days later. The Germans lost most of the terrain gained in the Blücher offensive in 
May and were back in defensive positions along the Aisne and Vesle rivers by 3 August. 
French casualties were high, but their gains were irreversible. The Germans had lost the 
initiative and would never regain it.590 
 
The Second Battle of the Marne had limited ambitions that were tailored to the means 
available. The latest tactical methods were utilised to exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities. The 
offensive was terminated in the tension between reaching the final objectives and the costs to 
get there. Contrary to some of the previous Allied offensives on the Western Front, the 
Second Marne was halted when the Germans were well entrenched in strong defensive river 
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lines along the Aisne and Vesle. There would be no breakthrough attempts. Pétain’s limited 
offensives designed to reduce French casualties were combined in a sort of cognitive tension 
with Foch’s offensive drive. The result was a massive offensive operation of sequenced 
tactical actions, each with limited aims.591 The Second Battle of the Marne fits well within the 
defining characteristics of a modern operation.592 
 
The evolution of a campaign 
 
Germany had lost over 800,000 first class assault troops in the spring offensives.593 The 
salients created by the advances extended the defensive lines by 120 km. The spring 
offensives brought the German troops well forward of their heavily fortified Siegfried 
Stellung, which was prepared in late 1916 and occupied in 1917.594 These newly occupied 
positions were not the well-fortified deep defensive zones that had withstood the massive 
Allied offensives the previous years, but rather hastily dug field fortifications. The German 
army was still a formidable opponent, but the spring offensives had worn down their combat 
strength and created vulnerabilities that the Allies were poised to exploit. These 
vulnerabilities consisted of both the physical attrition of troops and equipment and exposed 
defensive positions. The troops also suffered from weakened morale since the offensives did 
not bring about the peace that the German High Command had promised the exhausted 
soldiers. Finally, the attrition reduced the reserves needed at the strategic and operational level 
of commands to counter future Allied offensives.595 
 
This success of the counter-offensive on the Marne turned out to be the opening round of the 
second step in the four-step strategy that Foch presented in July. Foch presented the strategy 
in the 24 July 1918 meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief in his Headquarters in Bombon.596 
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In a memorandum for the meeting on 24 July 1918, Foch emphasised the manner in which the 
offensives were to be conducted: 
 
[t]hese actions are to be carried out at short intervals to disrupt the enemy in his use of 
reserves and not to give him time to reconstitute his units. 
They need to be powerfully endowed with all necessary means in such way as to secure 
the success of the blows. 
Finally, surprise must be achieved at all costs. Recent operations show that this is an 
essential condition for success.597 
 
The strategic approach Foch presented was, on the one hand, related to specific operations 
aimed at limited objectives. On the other hand, it signalled a general ambition to take and 
maintain the initiative to prevent the enemy from regaining it: 
 
It is impossible to foretell at present where the different operations outlined above will 
lead us, either in the matter of time or space. Nevertheless, if the objects they have in 
view are attained before the season is too far advanced, there is reason for assuming 
now that an important offensive movement, such as will increase our advantages and 
leave no respite to the enemy, will be launched toward the end of the summer or during 
the autumn. 
It is still too early to be more precise in regard to this offensive.598 
 
This memorandum made it clear that Foch had understood how operations were to be 
conducted in the modern industrialised people’s war. There would be no breakthrough or 
dashing pursuit, no mobile warfare (Bewegungskrieg) or decisive operations. The contrast to 
Ludendorff’s 1914-style operational concept of an all or nothing mobile warfare is revealing. 
Whereas Foch and the Allies had discarded the illusion of breakthrough in the new kind of 
warfare, Ludendorff maintained his bottom-up tactical approach: “I disapprove of the word 
operation. We’ll cut a hole. The rest will follow. That’s how we did it in Russia.”599 
 
Foch stressed the war was to be fought by combining the tactical method of limited attacks, 
attaque brusque and “bite and hold” into successive operations with limited aims. The 
initiative was to be maintained by engaging the enemy continuously with operations 
according to Foch’s strategic direction. The Allied learning curve had reached the operational 
level of war and modern operational art was emerging, although it yet had neither a theory nor 
a name. In 1918, the Allies were “speaking prose without knowing anything about it”.600 
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Foch envisaged that the operations by the army groups would take place sequentially in time 
and space to deprive the German defenders of their means to counter the offensive either 
strategically or operationally. This sequencing would force the Germans to consume their 
reserves, which were their main means of combat at the strategic and operational levels. 
These reserves had to be transferred from one Allied offensive to another over distances up to 
150 km or more. The reserves themselves would be worn down in the fighting against the 
superior Allied combined arms system and also exhausted by the constant transfers from 
sector to sector. In addition, these movements of reserves would strain the German transport 
and supply system that was already suffering from a lack of fuel and critical raw materials. 
When the Allied offensive were underway, these effects on German reserves took less than a 
month to materialise and severely limited the German ability to support the tactical defence 
the final months of the war.601  
 
Foch also issued a detailed questionnaire at the 24 July meeting and asked the Allied 
commanders to list the forces that would be ready for the offensive in 1919. He asked for 
information about large units via tanks and aeroplanes, logistical capacities and motorised 
transport. Foch also asserted that Britain and France should maintain their number of 
divisions, while the Americans would increase their forces. It was imperative to be ready to 
renew the offensive early in 1919 and stock ammunition for a long fight.602 This questionnaire 
is a clear indicator that Foch did not expect to end the war in 1918, despite ordering 
preparations for a major offensive after the railroad junctions had been cleared. The 1919 
offensive would be the fourth and final step in Foch’s strategy. 
 
The Allied campaign will be analysed in the framework of Foch’s second and third steps. The 
analysis is structured in phases based on the actual progress, to present how the third step 
unfolded. The purpose is to investigate whether modern operational elements were present 
and the extent to which they indicate planning and conduct of operations constituted 
operational art as it was defined by Svechin a decade later. The first phase of the third step 
(the general offensive) was the advance to the Germans’ main defences, the Siegfried 
Stellung. The second, phase was the operations to break through the defences. The third phase 
was the advance to the intermediate Herrmann Stellung and the fourth its breakthrough. The 
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final phase was the war of manoeuvre that ended with the armistice on 11 November 1918. 
The general offensive got underway before the second step (the reduction of the threats to the 
vital railroad junctions) was completed, which was a pragmatic adaptation of the campaign 
design to the realities on the ground. 
 
Step Two: Counterattack 
 
The Western Front in July 1918 consisted of a protruding double salient between Reims and 
Arras, two smaller bulges aimed at Hazebrouck in Flanders, and one at Saint-Mihiel by the 
Meuse. The three first salients were the territorial results of the German spring offensives; 
thus, all were obvious objectives for attacks. Firstly, they threatened strategic railroad 
junctions and secondly, the Germans were deployed in weak defences that were manned with 
exhausted troops at the end of undeveloped supply lines. The Germans had also taken heavy 
casualties, which they could ill afford, while the Allies could count on 250,000 American 
soldiers arriving monthly. The German offensives had culminated. Furthermore, the strategic 
initiative shifted decisively with the Allied offensive on the Marne.603 
 
The Reduction of the Salients 
 
Plans for a British offensive east of Amiens had already been developed by the commander of 
the British Fourth Army, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson. Foch informed Haig in a 
General Directive of 20 May 1918 to coordinate closely with French forces to clear the Paris-
Amiens railway and the Amiens region when planning the Fourth Army’s offensive. As a 
consequence of the success on the Marne, Haig told Rawlinson on 13 July to revise his plan. 
The Fourth Army was reinforced with the Canadian Corps, which was one of two elite corps 
in the BEF. The other was the Australian Corps already assigned to Fourth Army, alongside 
the British III Corps.604 The two Dominion corps would spearhead some of the most difficult 
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Rawlinson had already used the Australian Corps and tested an improved attack form on a 
smaller scale at Hamel. The attack used a combined arms approach where artillery, armour 
and aeroplanes paved the way for and supported the infantry. The Fourth Army had allocated 
more than 2000 pieces of artillery, one-third of these were heavy guns, over 500 tanks and 
armoured cars, and 800 aeroplanes. A strict security and deception regime was imposed to 
ensure surprise.606 The preparations for the Amiens-Montdidier operation is an illustration of 
how the bottom-up approach by the Fourth Army met Foch’s strategic initiative. It also an 
example of how the tactical optimisation of means and methods would allow for operations to 
achieve the strategic goal. 
 
Foch placed the French First Army under Haig’s command for the operation, which ensured 
unity of command of all forces involved. In his letter of 28 July, Foch also urged Haig to 
speed up the preparations: 
 
Under these conditions, it would seem advisable to hasten the combined action of your 
Fourth Army together with our First Army. They would certainly find an enemy less 
prepared to confront them. I therefore ask you to advance, as far as possible, the date of 
this operation. I will similarly prepare for the return of your II corps. 
Finally, as this operation of two allied armies requires a single direction, I ask you to be 
willing to take the command yourself.607 
 
This command arrangement was contrary to Ludendorff’s division of command in the 
Michael operation, where the three armies that took part were divided between two army 
groups to allow Ludendorff a direct control of events. General Marie-Eugène Debeney, 
commanding the First Army, expected his mission to be to secure the right flank for 
Rawlinson’s Fourth Army. Debeney’s army group commander, General Fayolle had attached 
an extra corps to the First army and widened its front to the south. Debeney was also assigned 
the two tank battalions France had available after the Second Marne. In contrast to the British, 
Debeney had to rely more on artillery and infantry and would open the attack with an artillery 
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When German vulnerabilities became apparent, Foch intervened and extended the depth and 
scope of the operation. Fayolle also directed Debeney to conduct a converging attack, one 
push south-east along the British Fourth Army and one north-east further south. The French 
Third Army under Fayolle bordering Debeney to the south was to support the First Army with 
artillery and an attack along Debeney’s right flank. Debeney received instructions and 
resources from his formal operational superior, Haig; from the strategic commander, Foch; 
and from his parent unit, General Fayolle’s G.A.R. The net result was an extended mission, an 
extra corps to do the job, and a supporting attack on his southern flank.609 All of these extra 
measures reinforced the operation without frustrating the command arrangements or the 
objective, as was the case in Ludendorff’s direct interference in tactical issues during the 
German spring offensives. 
 
The German forward positions lay just over 15 km east of Amiens where the Michael 
offensive had ground to a halt in early April. The salient was an inviting objective for an 
offensive; it was the obvious place to attack. The terrain was well suited for men, horses and 
tanks, and the German defences were weak. The positions were manned by exhausted troops 
at the end of their supply lines and with faltering morale. They were short on artillery, had no 
tanks, no designated anti-tank weapons, and the Allies had command of the air. Any German 
gun that was observed from the air could be targeted by precise counter-battery fire, thus 
depriving the exposed infantry of their artillery support.610 A fragmented and exhausted 
German defence was to be attacked by a comprehensive combined arms force. The Allied 
strategic directed operational art would allow them to fully utilise their larger resource base 
and provide them with a combination of combat means that the Germans could not counter. 
 
The offensive began just after 04:00 on 8 August when the British Fourth Army attacked 
without a preparatory artillery barrage. The infantry and a strong tank force advanced 
immediately behind a creeping barrage. Tanks provided direct fire support for the infantry. 
The French First Army followed alongside the Canadians on the British right but lagged 
behind by the end of the day. Foch intervened the next day and urged Debeney to press on. 
Debeney had deliberately attacked to the north to draw in German reserves. When the 
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Germans were committed to halting that initial attack, the First Army attacked against the 
weakened German line in the south. This second attack met with instant success that was 
followed up by the rest of the army the next day. By the third day, the German reserves from 
several armies along the Western Front were arriving as complete divisions. They were 
deployed in planned and well-prepared defensive positions and managed to stabilise the 
shattered defences.  
 
Sketch 5.2. The Western Front on 8 August 1918. The Battle of Amiens fought by the British 
Fourth and the French First Army, both under the command of Field Marshal Haig. Shown 
are also the planned operations of Foch’s second step (counter-attack) against German 
salients at Hazebrouck and Saint-Mihiel.611 
 
When the offensive met with increased resistance on 11 August and progress slowed down, 
Haig was urged by his subordinates to call off the offensive. He did so, despite Foch urging 
him to continue. The territorial gains were between 12 and 20 km deep across a 45 km wide 
front over four days, half the width and a little less depth than the first four days of the 
Michael offensive in March. Debeney’s First Army returned to the G.A.R. on 16 August. 
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Haig and Fayolle would immediately initiate two parallel operations north and south for the 
Amiens-Montdidier operation to maintain the strategic initiative.612 
 
The tactical conduct of the British Fourth and French First Armies differed because of the 
resources available. Since the British had larger numbers of tanks, they could substitute the 
initial artillery bombardment for the firepower of the tanks. The tanks' armour was thin and 
vulnerable to enemy artillery. Thus losses on the first day were more than 25 per cent. 
Mechanical breakdowns left less than half of the tanks ready the next day. There were another 
30 per cent losses on 9 August, while 50 per cent of the remaining vehicles were lost the third 
day. These losses left only 38 tanks out of an initial strength of 534 operational the fourth day. 
As a consequence, the Fourth Army had to rely on the more traditional infantry-artillery 
combined arms tactics as the attack progressed. Tanks were mechanically unreliable. Crews 
were exhausted after one full day inside the steel hull. The early tanks had an unsilenced 
engine that caused the entire vehicle to vibrate and emitted poisonous fumes, while the hull 
took hits by field artillery and machine guns. Tanks made good progress the first day of an 
attack, but the vehicles and their crews were worn out by the end of that day’s action and 
required rest and repair.613 These physical and human factors were important in shaping 
tactics. They necessitated that tanks were fully exploited on the first day before exhaustion of 
crews and mechanical breakdowns, in addition to losses inflicted by the enemy, brought them 
to a standstill. 
 
By the end of 8 August, the German AGR assembled three divisions, mostly without artillery, 
as a reserve, and one corps and four divisions were to arrive from the OHL the next day. The 
army group ruled out counter-attacks before 10 August due to lack of artillery. The OHL 
ordered an artillery regiment in place by the same date. The next day the OHL ordered the 
assigned corps and one division to be attached to the Eighteenth Army, while the AGR was 
free to deploy the other reserves as it saw fit. The armies under attack reported that they could 
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not hold the line and requested to be pulled back. At the end of 9 August, the OHL allowed 
the AGR to pull the Eighteenth Army back to an assigned line. Reports were more optimistic 
the next day. Both the Second and Eighteenth Armies assessed that they were able to hold 
since it appeared the enemy did not possess the same combat power as on the two previous 
days. All available reserves were spent, thus exhausted divisions were to be returned to the 
rear. The army group assessed on 11 August that the attack had stalled and would be 
contained.614 This after-action report reflects the operational role of the army group in defence 
as managing and husbanding the reserves, which included reinforcements sent by the OHL. 
The AGR, on the other hand, could not conduct operational counter-attacks, because too 
much artillery was lost during the Allies’ rapid advance on 8 August.  
 
The Allied gains shook the German high command on the first day of the operation. The 
collapse of German morale made Ludendorff name the 8 August 1918 the “the black day of 
the German army in the history of this war.”615 The number of prisoners taken was a clear 
indicator of faltering morale. However, it was also related to the Allied superiority in men, 
materiel, and supplies and the speed and shock of the initial assault. The German troops were 
exposed in their advanced defensive positions just as at the Marne three weeks earlier. 
Therefore, the OHL would still be hard-pressed to balance the need to hold terrain that was 
difficult to defend with the need to retire to strong defensible positions to preserve combat 
power. Reserves that were brought forward in daylight ran the risk of strafing and bombing 
from the air, so reserves often arrived piecemeal and were sent into battle as they became 
available.616 
 
The OHL decided on 12 August to establish a new army group, commanded by General Max 
von Boehn (AGB). The purpose was to better manage the most vulnerable part of the Western 
Front by placing the armies between Albert and Soissons under one commander. The AGB’s 
task was to prepare a winter position approximately where the German defensive positions 
were situated during the 1916 Battle of the Somme. The German strategic assessment was that 
 
614
 Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Oberkommando, "Die Abwehrschlacht zwischen Ancre und Oise von 8. 
mit 12. August 1918" [The defensive battle between the Ancre and the Oise from 8 to 12 August 1918] BAMA 
PH 5I/124. 
615
 Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914-1918, 2, 679. 
616
 Weltkrieg 14,1, 555-567; Harris and Niall Barr, Amiens to the Armistice, 103-107; Lloyd, Hundred Days, 57-
58, 67-73; Alistair McCluskey, "The Battle of Amiens and the Development of British Air-Land Battle, 1918-
45," in Changing War The British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and the Birth of the Royal Air Force, 
1918, ed. Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 231-235. 
  183  
the armies in Flanders should expect a major enemy attack. But German intelligence was 
unable to detect the Allied focus of effort (Kräfteverteilung). The front of Army Group Crown 
Prince Wilhelm was calm, while no attacks were expected to the east and south.617 
 
Contrary to the German spring offensives, the Amiens-Montdidier operation was called off 
when progress was checked. It became apparent that further attacks would yield little more 
than increased casualties. The process of calling off the offensive is an illustrative example of 
the constructive tension between the strategic ambitions, tactics, and administration: in other 
words, the “material of operational art”.618 Foch wanted the operation to continue to keep up 
the pressure on the defenders and maintain the initiative. Haig, who was influenced by the 
views of his Generals, Fourth Army commander Rawlinson and Arthur Currie, commanding 
the Canadian Corps, argued to end the attacks. The increased resistance had almost halted the 
advance and increased casualties significantly. The Allied operation had culminated; the 
German defence had become stronger than the Allied attacks and progress was halted. Foch 
acceded to Haig. As the senior British officer in France, Haig was followed closely by 
London. He therefore also had to consider the domestic political dimensions of British 
casualties.619 
 
After the Amiens-Montdidier operation was halted, Foch would continue the campaign by 
mounting operations at other parts of the front. Since the Allies had the initiative and 
therefore could choose where and when to attack, the Germans were left guessing. The 
German reserves that had been spent to halt the Amiens-Montdidier operation could not easily 
be released, reconstituted, and moved to the next area of operations in time. To keep the 
Germans busy and in the dark, the British Second Army south of Ypres was ordered by Haig 
on 21 August to:  
 
continue minor enterprises, in order to gain ground towards Mont Kemmel and keep the 
enemy in expectation of an attack against that place, which if he were compelled by the 
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That option materialised in late August when the British Second and Fifth Armies reduced the 
German salient east of Hazebrouck. The largest gains came in early September when the 
Germans retreated to their Drocourt-Queánt fall-back position near Bapaume.621 
 
With Hazebrouck secure, the final element in the second step of Foch’s strategy was the 
reduction of the St. Mihiel salient by the First US Army (Sketch 5.3). The American 
Expeditionary Force (AEF) amassed three corps with a total of 18 divisions, including four 
French divisions, supported by 3000 pieces of artillery, 150 tanks and 1400 aeroplanes. The 
Americans faced the weak Armee-Abteilung C (Composite Army C) of 50,000 troops in 11 
understrength divisions, many of them low-quality troops with faltering morale. The Germans 
could field only 560 guns and 200 aeroplanes. The artillery opened early on 12 September, 
while the attack was launched at 05:00. The Germans were pulling out when the Americans 
attacked, but lost more than 17,000 troops killed and over 13,000 taken prisoner over the next 
three days. The Germans also lost 150 guns. The OHL experienced another black day.622 St. 
Mihiel was another tactical disaster for the German army and the final element in the second 
step of Foch’s strategy. The German inability to counter these offensives demonstrated that 
they had exhausted their resources and were losing their freedom of action. 
 
Step three had already begun when the French Tenth Army attacked west of Soissons on 20 
August and the British Third Army the following day. This overlap in steps is an example of 
the pragmatic opportunism in Foch’s strategy and of strategy as a practical undertaking. The 
question was how to utilise the resources available to end the war, “the art of combining 
preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal set by the war for 
the armed forces.”623 The tension between Foch, as strategic director of operations, the 
operational commanders, and Pétain, commander of the French army, illustrates how strategy 
meets “the practical realities of military life” at the higher command echelons.624 These 
practical realities centred on the need to find a sustainable balance between Foch’s offensive 
drive, the methods used by the army groups to direct the tactical combat by the armies, and 
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finally, the ability to sustain the offensive logistically. Edmonds’ postbellum critique of the 
offensive’s frontal character highlights the tension between the ideal and the practical: 
 
But, attrition apart, the success gained was only what the Germans would call an 
"ordinary victory" ; nothing decisive had been accomplished, except that the Germans 
from O.H.L. to the soldier in the ranks had lost faith in final victory.  
Strategically the main offensive was made at the wrong place, because the Army that 
was most fighting-fit happened to be holding that front. [...] an offensive east of Reims 
offered the best results.625 
 
At this stage of the war and so early in the overall Allied offensive, an “ordinary victory” 
without horrendous losses was probably the best that could have been achieved. After all, the 
Allies won the struggle for the initiative in the transition from defence to offence, which was a 
strategic gain the German army was not able to reverse. 
 
Step Three: General Offensive 
 
The third step of Foch’s four-step strategy began when the German forward defences had 
been broken. Germany started to pull their armies back to the Wotan and Siegfried Stellung 
(the Hindenburg Line to the Allies). There were overlaps between the steps as some German 
units were withdrawn before the Saint-Mihiel and Hazebrouck salients were reduced. Foch’s 
stages must be understood as a general and pragmatic campaign outline where developments 
on the ground would determine the pace and sequencing of the operations. But the strategic 
objective remained central to the direction of the campaign. This section will describe and 
analyse the BEF, the G.A.R., and the Fifth Army on the left flank of the G.A.C. in their role 
as operational formations in the breakthroughs and mobile operations during the final months 





 OHGW 1918 IV, 509-510. 
  186  
Phase I: The advance to the Siegfried Stellung 
 
As the Amiens-Montdidier operation was facing increased resistance, French General Charles 
Mangin was ordered to hasten his preparations for an attack with his Tenth Army between the 
River Oise and Soissons. The Tenth Army was part of Fayolle’s G.A.R. and had attacked the 
western shoulder of the Marne salient in mid-July. Planning and preparation followed the 
pattern of the previous operations, where secrecy, thorough artillery planning, and massing of 
ammunition were the basic elements. In the morning of 20 August, the Tenth Army attacked 
along its entire front and broke in and through the German tactical defence zone on the first 
day. By the second day, Mangin’s forces had advanced well into the German defences and 
had reached between 5 and 12 km by the third day. The French First and Third Armies to the 
north launched supporting attacks between Tenth Army’s left flank and the southern boundary 
of the BEF and extended the French offensive to a 70 km wide front.626 
 
There was a tension between ambition and restraint at different levels of command. In this 
instance, Mangin’s desire to continue the advance was in conflict with Pétain’s priority to 
limit casualties and preserve the French army. There was also the difference in Mangin’s 
tactical ambition of deep penetration and the step-by-step approach to reach the strategic 
ambition of the campaign. The deep penetration that Mangin was urging would cost too much 
in casualties and undermined the purpose of mounting a continuous line of successive 
operations to wear down and keep the enemy off balance while forcing him to retreat. The 
challenge was still to balance the progress of the campaign and to keep casualties relatively 
low. Therefore, the operations had to be conducted with these dual aims of keeping the enemy 
off balance and shielding the attacking forces from excessive casualties. Fayolle’s G.A.R. had 
advanced 8 to 15 km deep between Soissons and Chaulens and reached the Canal du Nord 
and the Somme when the three-army operation was halted on 29 August.627  
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Sketch 5.3. The Western Front August-September 1918. The operations against German 
salients at Hazebrouck and Saint-Mihiel and British and French operations following the 
Amiens-Montdidier operations. Note the lateral extension and sequencing of the operations. 
 
The British Third Army, commanded by Sir Julian Byng had on 13 August been ordered by 
Haig to plan an attack between Albert and Arras. It was reinforced with five infantry and two 
cavalry divisions in addition to two tank brigades. When the Germans showed signs of pulling 
out of their defences during the Amiens-Montdidier operation, Haig urged Byng by to attack 
vigorously and “without delay”.628 Byng attacked on 21 August and advanced more gradually 
than the Fourth Army at Amiens, while keeping up a steady pressure on the defending 
German Seventeenth Army. The advance took on the character of a moving battle of attrition, 
but by the sixth day, the front had reached the outskirts of Bapaume. Byng’s cautious advance 
came up against Haig’s urge to press through the German defences. The successful execution 
of his attack is another example of a fruitful compromise between opposing views. The 
British First Army to the north was reinforced with the Canadian corps on the boundary to the 
Third Army. It had been ordered to “take advantage of any withdrawal” to follow up any 
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success of the Third Army. The Canadians attacked the same day as the Third Army reached 
Bapaume and was alongside the Third Army on 27 August, facing the Drocourt-Quéant line, a 
northern extension of the Siegfried Stellung.629 
 
The Drocourt-Quéant line was a deep defensive zone of trenches, concrete bunkers and 
barbed wire obstacles. After an artillery bombardment over five days, the Canadian attack 
began at 05:00 on 2 September. Since little armour was available to support the infantry, the 
attack took the form of an aggressive infantry assault. The attack opened with the support of a 
rolling barrage. But when the Canadians entered the German trench-system, the attack 
developed into a chaotic close battle. By the evening of the same day, the Drocourt-Quéant 
line was broken through. Two days later the Canadians reached the Canal du Nord. The OHL 
had ordered the Seventeenth Army to break contact and retire immediately to the Siegfried 
Stellung on 2 September. The German armies to the south followed suit under pressure from 
the British Fourth Army. In less than a month all the German territorial gains in the spring 
offensives had been lost. Worse still, the only strategic option, the elaborate defensive system 
of the Wotan and Siegfried Stellung, had been unhinged by the Canadian Corps at Canal du 
Nord and by the Australian Corps at Peronne.630 
 
The entire British Third Army reached the Siegfried Stellung on 7 September. Casualties had 
reached 23 per cent of the army during the two weeks’ advance. Byng needed time to replace 
of troops and equipment. Additional supplies for a deliberate attack against the German 
defences also had to be brought forward. The British Second and Fifth Armies reduced the 
Hazebrouck salient during the last week of August and the first week of September. On 2 
September the OHL decided to conduct a sequenced withdrawal of its armies to the Siegfried 
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Sketch 5.4. The Western Front, German fortifications. The Wotan and the Siegfried-Stellung 
(The Hindenburg line) north of the Oise had obstacles, shelters and artillery positions, but 
few trenches. The defences between the Oise and Verdun were better and had some depth, 
but had been neglected during the previous winter and there was a lack of depth further 
east. Positions east of the main Siegfried-Wotan line were only prepared or planned. None 
of the positions had any tank obstacles. Too many were sited on forwarding slopes or in the 
lowland by the canals.632 
 
With the St. Mihiel salient reduced and the forward corps of the BEF through the northern 
hinge of the Siegfried Stellung, Foch had completed his second step. The third step of his 
campaign, the general offensive, was also well underway. Nevertheless, the Siegfried Stellung 
had to be broken completely for the offensive to gain momentum. The German armies 
withdrew or were pushed towards their defensive system during the second week of 
September. On 18 September, the BEF ordered its First, Third, and Fourth armies to 
“establish themselves within striking distance of the enemy’s main defences on the general 
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line St. Quentin-Cambrai.”633 Haig approached Foch to secure the cooperation of the French 
First Army on the flank of the Fourth Army. Foch responded by altering the boundaries 
between the British Fourth and the French First Armies. The purpose was to give the Fourth 
Army crucial terrain for the offensive and make sure Debeney would attack to secure the 
Fourth Army’s flank. Fayolle followed suit with an order to ensure that the French First Army 
was reinforced with artillery and ordered to support the British Fourth Army.634 The offensive 
began on 18 September with some initial but uneven progress, but sufficient to be followed by 
a general offensive to close up to the German defensive line. The BEF established itself close 
to the German defences to rest and to restore combat power before the defences were to be 
breached in a deliberate attack. Haig then reported to Foch that the BEF was ready to launch 
the breakthrough assault on the central part of the German defences.635 
 
The German responses to the Allied offensive in late August and September were mainly 
tactical. There was very little the strategic (OHL) and operational (army group) commands 
could do but order a general withdrawal since their reserves were depleted. The attrition of 
German first-line units during the spring offensives and the remaining reserves in the initial 
Allied offensives, left them with few resources to counter the Allied operations. Their 
defensive system lacked the necessary depth and uncommitted reserves to counter-attack and 
plug tactical or operational gaps.636 The Germans were therefore left to counter the Allied 
strategic and operational combat system with nothing but the depleted armies in their 
trenches. Major von Stülpnagel, chief of the Operations Department in the OHL wrote that the 
 
assessments of the situation of the army groups and armies indicate that strong attacks 
are expected almost all over the Western Front. Agents and reconnaissance results are 
not able to clarify the picture. We are dependent on the enemy, whose goal must be to 
deceive us on the whole front over the expected direction of the main thrust.637 
 
These German limitations in reserves reinforced the Allied advantages to exploit the initiative 
and mass strategic and operational resources, such as heavy artillery and logistics, to increase 
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Compared to the operations in the previous months, the major difference was that the Allies 
now faced German defences that were constructed in deep fighting zones, with elaborate 
barbed-wire obstacles and shell-proof fortifications. The German defence in depth was 
designed to be more resistant to artillery and to break up attack formations and defeat them by 
machinegun and artillery fire within the defensive system. The initial Allied successes caused 
the OHL to improve their defences and defensive tactics, especially against armour. German 
defensive doctrine was adapted continuously and improved as the Germans gained experience 
from the Allied offensive. However, the constant attrition of the German army did not leave 
them with enough troops of sufficient quality to make the most of the improved defences. The 
static German defences were thus unable to counter Allied combined arms attacks that were 
strategically and operationally coordinated to destroy the German high command’s ability to 
respond. It left them the choice of either withdrawing or being destroyed in their trenches.638 
 
The Wotan and Siegfried-Stellung had already been unhinged by the Canadian Corps’ assault 
on the Drocourt-Quéant line on 2 September. It suffered from defects in trenches, obstacles, 
and shelters. These inadequate defences were manned by exhausted, tired and hungry troops 
that suffered under a crumbling logistical system. The German defensive tactics were 
basically the same as in 1917, but the trenches were manned by units that had been badly 
depleted by heavy overall losses. The number of machineguns was increased, which improved 
the infantry’s firepower, but the counter-attack divisions faced a much more comprehensive 
Allied attack system than the previous years. There was little the Germans could do to counter 
the Allied superiority in artillery, armour, and airpower, as long as the Allies maintained the 
initiative and could choose the time and place for the next operation.639 
 
The first phase of Foch’s third step was the transition from individual operational 
counterattacks to an offensive campaign. The strategic direction consisted of timing the 
operations so that the attacks struck separate parts of the German front at different times, to 
wear down the defenders and stretch their reserves thin. Foch pushed to advance the date for 
the attacks to keep the offensive going without pauses. The aim was to deny the Germans time 
to recover. But the strategic ambitions had to be balanced against the need for planning and 
preparations and the need to ensure that attacking forces were resupplied and ready to resume 
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the offensive. This tension between the ambitions of the campaign and the realities on the 
ground illustrates well how the dynamics and interactions between the levels of command 
developed. 
 
Phase II: Breaking through the Wotan and Siegfried Stellung and the 
advance to the Herrmann Stellung 
 
The German intelligence assessment of the Allied intentions in late September 1918 was that 
there would be strong attacks. German counter-actions were dependent on the Allies, who had 
the initiative and who sought to hide their intentions. The most likely offensive was expected 
to be towards Champagne, while direct offensives towards Alsace and Lorraine were less 
likely. The OHL strived to balance its forces between those in defensive positions in fighting 
zones and reserves that were to be pushed forward to counter Allied breakthroughs. Further 
discussions ended with Ludendorff accepting that the greatest threat was a direct Allied thrust 
towards Lorraine and Germany, while Champagne was less likely. Measures were taken to 
transfer forces to strengthen the defence in the east. British landings on the Dutch coast were 
ruled out.640 
 
Foch’s plan for a converging strategic manoeuvre was presented in a note to US General 
Pershing on August 30 and in the directive to Haig, Pétain, and Pershing on 3 September. 
Supported by the left of the French armies, the BEF was to continue to attack in the general 
direction of Cambrai and Saint-Quentin. The centre of the French army would “continue its 
energetic actions to throw the enemy beyond the Aisne”, while the AEF along with the French 
Fourth Army, was to operate along the Meuse and advance to Mezières. The purpose was to 
advance the flanks to manoeuvre the German army out of its strong defences in front of the 
BEF and the G.A.R. in the centre. The Army Group Flanders, G.A.F. and the French Fourth 
Army, together with the AEF, would constitute the flank attacks. Sustained pressure on both 
flanks would threaten the centre with encirclement, threaten the railway junctions at Mézières, 
and force the Germans to retire or draw troops from the centre to strengthen the flanks. The 
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last option would expose the centre for a renewed Allied thrust by the BEF and the G.A.R. A 
final objective was to wear down the German reserves.641 
 
In the north, King Albert of Belgium was in command of the Army Group Flanders (Le 
groupe d'armées des Flandres (G.A.F.)). The G.A.F. was established on12 September 1918 as 
Le groupement des Flandres and renamed on 15 October. It consisted of the Belgian army on 
the coast, the French Sixth Army (from 15 October renamed d'armee francaise de Belgique 
(the French Army of Belgium)) and the British Second Army.642 Even before the G.A.F. was 
formally established, it was on 9 September directed by Foch to advance along the coast 
through Ghent and clear the northern flank to the Dutch border. 643 
 
 Sketch 5.5 Foch’s strategy of converging operations.644 
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The British and French armies in the centre were to break through the Siegfried-Stellung 
before the general advance could commence. The beginning of the offensive operations was 
sequenced so that the AEF and the French Fourth Army would begin on 26 September, the 
British Third and First armies on the 27, the G.A.F. on the 28, and the British Fourth and 
French First armies on 29 September. This section will analyse the BEF’s operation and its 
role as an operational command within Foch’s strategy, emphasising the Fourth Army as the 
BEF’s focus of effort. The other operations will be briefly outlined to present the context and 
progress of the campaign. 
 
In the early hours of 26 September before the troops moved out, the AEF and the French 
Fourth Army began a three-hour artillery bombardment. The German defences in the wooded 
hills of the Argonne were elaborate and slowed the attack until it became bogged down. A 
breakthrough west of the Meuse would unhinge the entire Siegfried Stellung and had, 
therefore, to be prevented at all costs. Despite Foch’s high hopes for the offensive, it became 
an exhaustive and slow advance that wore down the attacker as well as the defender. 
Synchronisation both within and between the two armies was lacking, so the operation 
progressed slowly until the German defenders finally succumbed under the massive pressure 
by the end of October. The importance of the operation became apparent in late October when 
American artillery bombarded the German strategic railroad lines in the vicinity of Sedan 
across the Meuse. The First US Army was finally able to advance to cut one of two German 
strategic supply lines to the Western Front.645 
 
The G.A.F. attacked on 28 September across Flanders, which were still devastated after the 
Battles of Ypres. The operation began at 02:30 with a three-hour artillery barrage. A creeping 
barrage then paved the way for the assault troops. Counter-battery fire severely limited 
German artillery support. The initial German defences were overcome by the end of the day. 
The first line of the Flanders defences was broken the next day and the second Flanders line 
was pierced on the first day of October. Logistics just as much as enemy action slowed the 
operation when the Belgian and British Second Armies fought their way through the German 
defences and transitioned into mobile warfare. While the OHL ordered the coast to be held, 
the AGR ordered its armies to free up as big a labour force as possible to improve the 
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Herrman Stellung further east. The emphasis of construction work on the next defensive line 
was another indicator that Flanders would have to be abandoned. The Flanders offensive was 
halted against mounting resistance and growing supply problems on 2 October. It was 
renewed with the opening of the Battle of Courtrai on 14 October. Although progress within 
the G.A.F. was uneven, the British Second Army exploited an initial success, and on 20 
October the entire army had crossed the River Lys. When the British attack developed a 
mobile character, the Belgian coast was subsequently cleared of German troops.646 
 
Sketch 5.6. The Western Front on 26 September to mid-October. The French-American 
offensive in the Argonne (below right), the G.A.F. offensive along the coast, and the British-
French assault on the main German defences in the centre. The Germans retreated to their 
next position, except in the Argonne, where they conducted a stubborn defence to avoid 
strategic outflanking.647 
 
The strategic breakthrough operation was to be conducted by the southern three armies of the 
BEF. The main effort was to be the Fourth Army to the south, while the First Army to the 
north was to attack with its right wing south of the Sensée Canal and protect the Third Army's 
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flank. The Third Army in the middle was to cooperate with the First Army and advance to 
cross the Schelde Canal and act together with the Fourth Army to the south. With its left 
protected by the Third Army and its right by the French First Army, the Fourth Army was to 
“deliver the main attack against the enemy’s defences” after a three-day artillery 
preparation.648 The majority of the tanks were allocated to the Fourth Army, together with 
most of the armoured cars. The British Official History of the Great War (OHGW) stated that 
tank officers wanted to use the tanks en masse, but the tanks were distributed to the armies 
and directed to support the infantry. The aeroplanes were more evenly distributed, but the 
Fourth Army received about one third more than the two other armies. The Royal Air Force 
(RAF) was given several tasks, ranging from reporting progress of own forces to interdiction 
of enemy railway stations and reserves. The Fourth Army had the advantage of a detailed map 
of the German defences that had been captured by armoured cars on 8 August. The map 
allowed Fourth Army to direct their artillery preparations precisely on selected targets.649 
 
The British plan for the breakthrough of the southern part of the Wotan Stellung and the main 
part of the Siegfried Stellung, mirrored the Fourth Army’s plan for the Battle of Amiens. The 
main difference was that while the Amiens-Montdidier operation was a surprise attack against 
an exposed and weakly fortified part of the German front, this operation would be a long-
expected assault against the most robust German defences on the Western Front. If successful, 
a breakthrough would be a powerful strategic psychological blow by destroying the German 
army’s final hope to stem the Allied offensive. The operational elements of the plan were the 
deliberate concentration of forces for the breakthrough, the reinforcement of the Fourth Army 
with additional resources, and the harmonisation of the missions given to the BEF’s First, 
Third and Fourth armies. The French First Army would again attack along the Fourth Army’s 
southern flank. The entire operation of the BEF was limited to breaking through the German 
defences, which indicates that ambitions were adjusted to the realities experienced on the 
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The operation began on 27 September by the attacks of the First and Third armies. The First 
Army was attached the Canadian Corps, which spearheaded the assault. The Canadians 
launched a high-risk attack across a narrow dry part of the Canal du Nord behind a creeping 
barrage and secured the first day’s objectives. Bridges were laid across the canal at first light 
and by the end of the day, some units had even surpassed the final objectives for the attack. 
The Canadians made little progress the next day against strong German resistance and 
counter-attacks but advanced in the south alongside the neighbouring Third Army.651 The 
Third Army was faced with an elaborate German defence in depth and would need persistent 
and deliberate fighting to penetrate the defences. The Army made some initial gains the first 
day, but the complicated and deep defences demanded closer coordination of its units and 
resources. The next day yielded greater gains with the greatest progress on the left alongside 
the Canadian Corps, where the lead units reached the Schelde Canal and crossed it on 30 
September.652 The main force of the Third Army followed suit, captured the canal on 29 
September, and expanded the bridgehead the following day. The northern part of the British 
operation had broken into and partly through the German defences by the first two days. The 
Third Army was stretched thin and had to pause for a week, but had to some extent consumed 
the German reserves, thus preparing the field for the Fourth Army's main thrust.653 
 
The Fourth Army began deliberate artillery preparations on 26 September, when the other 
armies attacked. The bombardment lasted three days. Then the artillery shifted to a creeping 
barrage to blast the way for the assault troops and tanks. The German defences were known as 
the Hindenburg main, support, and reserve lines, with the latter two less developed than the 
first. The Fourth Army’s concentrated its army corps in its northern sector and planned for a 
sequenced assault, where units would leap-frog and assist one another to keep up the 
momentum. The Army had its III Corps in the north and the IX in the south, with the 
Australian and II US Corps deployed for a breakthrough in the centre.654 The assault was 
initially hampered by the inability of all units to reach the starting line in time, which 
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disrupted some of the artillery preparations. It was also frustrated by the elaborate defences 
and strong German resistance, including novel anti-tank measures. The initial set-backs also 
highlight the crucial role of artillery in assaults on fortified positions. Yet, by the end of 29 
September, the St. Quentin Canal was captured together with its bridges. The Hindenburg 
main and support lines were broken to a depth of 5 km.655 
 
The offensive continued over the next days as the Fourth Army cleared the main Hindenburg 
line and support line while being held up in the south due to the French First Army's lack of 
progress. Foch intervened directly, reminding Fayolle, CO G.A.R., that the “main mission of 
the First Army is constantly to support at all costs the right of the British Fourth Army” and 
ordered him to direct Debeney to attack immediately in support of the British Fourth Army. 
Pétain simultaneously urged Fayolle to support the British and Fayolle transmitted these 
orders to Debeney directly the same day.656 This exchange of orders and directives 
underscores the decisive role given to the British Fourth Army. It was to be given every 
possible support. Debeney’s order of operations, issued 21:00 the same day, reflects both the 
superior importance attached to close coordination along the Western Front.657 
 
The French attack made some progress, St. Quentin was taken on 2 October, which took some 
pressure of the British left flank. The German defenders were unable to block the continued 
advance of the Allied armies and had to give up the main Siegfried Stellung when the 
defences gave in. As early as 30 September, the OHL assigned the army groups the 
responsibility to lead the operations since the OHL no longer possessed any means to 
influence the situation. It had no strategic reserves left. The same day the OHL decided to 
establish a new retreat position, the Antwerpen/Maas-Stellung (Sketch 5.4), an implicit 
acknowledgement that their main defences on the Western Front were shattered.658 
 
The Fourth Army attacked the final part of the Siegfried-Stellung, the Hindenburg reserve 
position, on 3 October. The Army’s objective lay just beyond the line. The defences consisted 
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of two lines of trenches and concrete pillboxes, where the backbone of the defence was a large 
number of machine guns deployed in depth. While the line was crossed on the Army’s entire 
front, the lack of progress of the Third Army to the north and the French First to the south, in 
addition to strong German counterattacks, hampered the attack. On 5 October, the British 
Fourth Army seised its objective and secured the past few days' gains.659 The Fourth Army’s 
order on 4 October for the follow-up attack and especially the distribution of Whippets light 
tanks for pursuit, demonstrated its ability to adapt to the new situation of mobile warfare: 
 
4. [...] 
(b) Whippets will follow up the barrage with, or close behind, the infantry and as soon 
as the protective barrage lifts of the Red Line they will push on at once independently, 
and exploit to the Green Line, beyond which the general line they should not go. They 
will assist the infantry and Cavalry Corps to reach, and the Cavalry Corps to pass, the 
Green Line. 
(c) R.A.F. will arrange direct with Corps for covering the advance of the Tanks to their 
starting line.660 
 
The German field commanders admitted that their armies no longer were able to defend 
against the Allied onslaught. The Kaiser announced publicly the same day that Germany was 
seeking peace terms from the Allies. The new Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, had wired 
the first telegram to President Wilson two days earlier.661 
 
Foch’s strategy to outflank the German defences in the west was a textbook manoeuvre. But 
did not take into account the strong defences on the flanks in Argonne and to a lesser degree 
along the Belgian coast. The outflanking stalled. The decisive operational results were by 
contrast in the centre. It were more a matter of where the most capable units were positioned 
and where the ground allowed for offensive operations. This situation mirrored, to some 
extent, Edmonds’ critique of the place and purpose of the Amiens-Montdidier operation.662 
The lack of progress on the flanks made frontal breaching operations in the centre necessary 
to maintain both the initiative and the momentum. Foch’s strategy, the operational capabilities 
of the BEF and French army groups, and the fighting qualities of their armies were 
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The deliberate breaching character of the assault on the Siegfried-Stellung demanded an even 
more thorough attack approach than the initial offensives, due to the deep character of the 
defences. This character had some operational qualities in the sense that the tactical assault 
units could be absorbed in the depth of the defences and defeated by deliberate use of 
operationally controlled resources, such as reserves and artillery. The German Major Frank 
Reiser observed in his Staff College study: 
 
On the other hand, it appears that the concept of operational art, as stated in the 
introduction, is predominately build around offensive actions. Even though Clausewitz 
named the defensive as the stronger form of warfare, military commanders always 
compete over the initiative. Offensive operations are decisive. This is depicted in the 
language Clausewitz used, as in the language of today`s military doctrines.95 By 
analyzing a solely defensive type of warfighting, the German “Abwehrschlacht,” the 
language of operational art appeared not to match the conditions of the defensive, as 
well as it applies to the offensive. 663 
 
The continued attrition of the German front line forces, as well as their reserves, had broken 
the ability of the Germans to act strategically or operationally. The Allied strategic and 
operational coordination of their attacks in time and space further negated any effective 
German responses. The problem faced by Major Reiser in his study was that the German 
defences in 1918 lacked any operational qualities outside the depth of their defensive zones. 
Since there were no reserves to manoeuvre in response to Allied operations, there were no 
means to force the enemy offensive to culminate. Terms and doctrine of operational art may 
well match defensive operations if the defences were constructed and manned so that 
operational reserves or fires can be put into action. The German defences in 1918 was on the 
other hand deprived of all their operational qualities by the Allied offensive, which had worn 
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Phase III: Mobile warfare – to the Herrmann Stellung 
 
Armentières, a critical junction in the German defences, fell on 4 October when the British 
First and Third Armies continued their attacks in parallel with the Fourth. The character of the 
offensive changed from breakthrough to pursuit. On 8 October the OHL ordered their armies 
in the Siegfried-Stellung to disengage and withdraw to an intermediate position. Orders were 
prepared for a general withdrawal to the Hermann and Brünhild (Gudrun)-Stellung. The 
defence in the Argonne against the Americans and the French Fourth Army was to continue, 
especially during this period when there was diplomatic contact between Germany and 
President Wilson. Such diplomacy required that the German army maintained its strength and 
occupied as much foreign ground as possible to as a bargaining tool. The OHL ordered the 
continued development of the Antwerpen-Maas retreat position in case the Hermann and 
Brünhild (Gudrun)-Stellung fell.664 
 
When the British armies recognized that the Germans had begun a general retreat, the planned 
assaults were halted. The armies issued new orders and made good progress against weak 
opposition. Even in retreat, the Germans were able to mount strong local counter-attacks. But 
these were not able to influence the Allied advance. The Fourth Army sent cavalry forward. 
By this time the combat zone was so fluid that even cavalry was able to mount several 
successful attacks. Some units attacked supported by the usual artillery barrage, while others 
adapted to the fluidity of mobile warfare and let field artillery follow close behind the 
infantry.665 The German concentration against the BEF allowed for French army commanders 
to press forward and pursue the retreating enemy. The pursuit was to be covered by artillery 
and take the form of deliberate advances by successive leaps.666 General Fayolle, 
commanding the G.A.R., issued instructions to the First and Tenth Armies to organize and 
coordinate pursuit of the retreating enemy. Because the Germans used darkness to disengage, 
it was imperative to maintain contact even at night “so as not to allow the enemy to retreat 
freely and at leisure.” The First Army was to maintain contact with the British Fourth on its 
left and the French Tenth Army to its right. The aim was to keep up a steady pressure on the 
 
664
 Weltkrieg 14,1, 647-650; Harris and Niall Barr, Amiens to the Armistice, 237-240; Lloyd, Hundred Days, 
207-208. 
665
 OHGW 1918 V, 212-227; Harris and Niall Barr, Amiens to the Armistice, 240-242. 
666
 AFGG VII-2, Annexe No. 161, 247-248, Annexe No. 162, 248, Annexe No. 172, 269-272, Annexe No. 177, 
278-279. 
  202  
retreating Germans and deny them any chance to reform or regroup. The means to do so were 
to maintain close contact with neighbouring units, to advance in concert, and to keep the 
enemy engaged along the entire front constantly.667 This approach resembles the offensives 
and breakthrough operations in July and August. 
 
As the Allies began to manoeuvre in pursuit of the retreating German armies, Foch issued a 
directive on 10 October that confirmed a strategy of convergence. The advance in Belgium 
was to continue; furthermore, the front of the combined American-French advance along the 
Meuse was to be widened. Foch directed Pétain to reinforce the centre and prioritize tanks to 
the First Army to outflank the line of the River Serre, a tributary of the Oise to the east south 
of St. Quentin.668 Although the Germans had no forces to block the offensive effectively, they 
were able to frustrate and delay it. In the Allied pursuit, artillery was distributed to battalion 
level to keep up the momentum when they faced German rear guards. The rear guards were 
normally machinegun detachments that could be defeated by a battalion that used artillery in 
direct support. River line defences were reinforced and had to be breached by the same 
methods as when breaking through the Siegfried-Stellung. The first river to be encountered by 
the BEF was the Selle, while the French First and Tenth Armies were facing the Germans on 
the Serre.669 
 
Foch issued a revised strategic directive on 19 October that adapted former directives to the 
latest developments. The G.A.F. was to drive on Brussels; the BEF was to push the Germans 
towards the hilly terrain of the Ardennes and in doing so, cut their main railroad. The French 
First Army was tasked to support the BEF, while the Fifth and Fourth Armies, together with 
the First US Army, were to move on Messiers, Sedan and the Upper Meuse.670 These 
adjustments meant that the British Fourth Army’s front was reduced and its right flank 
protected by the Sambre Canal. It was imperative to maintain the coordinated pressure on the 
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The French Fifth Army breached the German defences of the Serre on 15 October. Despite an 
unsuccessful French attack two days later, the Germans withdrew into their Hunding-Stellung. 
A second attack on 26 October broke through the Hunding-Stellung and forced the Germans 
to abandon it and pull further back.672 Fifth Army’s operations order clearly stated that it 
would exploit the German retreat. To keep up the tempo of the exploitation the Army 
delegated the authority to conduct the pursuit to its corps: 
 
[I]V. – The Third, Fifth, and First Corps will be ready to exploit without delay the 
results obtained by the corps in the centre. A manoeuver will be prepared in each 
division in these army corps to expel the light rear-guards that the enemy might leave to 
cover his retreat from the Hunding position. 
The corps commanders will carry this out by deploying one or more battalions, 
supported by the maximum amount of artillery, at favourable points. 
All arrangements will be made to initiate these actions immediately. 
[...] 
VI. – It remains understood that in case of the withdrawal of the enemy, the only 
concern of the units will be to push forward to gain the most ground possible. They will 
have to ensure the security of their flanks without trying to align with neighbouring 
units.673 
 
As this order from the French Fifth Army illustrates, the Allied operational response to the 
German retreat was to delegate the task of organising the pursuit to tactical units. The corps 
would be aware of the tactical alterations in the field more quickly and could respond directly 
to these changes without having to wait for further orders. The relative fluidity of the pursuit 
demanded greater flexibility than the thoroughly orchestrated breaching of the defensive lines. 
This was the best practical compromise between speed, flexibility, and control, given the slow 
and static means of communications. The character assumed by operational art in the pursuit 
of a retreating enemy was relatively hands-off. Initiative and responsibility were delegated to 
a lower tactical level, while operational control was limited to provide boundaries and 
direction. 
 
 Ludendorff wrote a directive for future operations on 19 October that was only partly 
conditioned by the developments of the recent peace moves. Continued work on defensive 
positions was imperative to continue the war. However, there were doubts as to whether the 
Herrmann/Gudrun-Stellung could serve as a long-term position, given the strength of enemy 
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attacks. The Herrmann/Gudrun-Stellung defences were in the main improvised field 
fortifications of rifle pits and foxholes. There were no bomb-proof shelters or any of the 
elaborate defensive systems compared to previous defensive lines. The mass of the available 
work-force was to be used on the Antwerpen/Maas-Stellung to make it defensible. 
Preparations for a withdrawal were to be made but the actual withdrawal was to be delayed 
and adapted to circumstances. The continued attrition of the German armies had further 
reduced their combat power and their ability to hold defensive positions over time.674  
 
Phase IV: Breaking the Herrmann and Hunding Stellung 
 
The Herrmann-Stellung forced the BEF to launch a full-scale assault across the Selle west of 
Cambrai. BEF orders on 11 October directed the Fourth Army as the “principal effort” in 
cooperation with the French First Army to push “strong advance guards to the Sambre and the 
Oise Canal” 10 km further on. The Third Army would secure a passage over the Selle, while 
the First Army was to would protect the Third Army’s left flank. Besides, the cavalry corps 
should “be ready to pursue in the general direction of Mons” if the enemy retired. All these 
preparations necessitated a build-up of supplies over several days. Artillery shells were in 
great demand since artillery were used to gain better starting positions for the next operation 
and to respond to enemy counterattacks. The civilian population in the liberated areas also had 
to be fed, which further strained the supply system. Delays in supply build-up also gave the 
Germans more time to improve their positions, improvements the Fourth Army had failed to 
detect. The terrain and built-up areas east of the river reinforced the German defences. There 
were also several rested and reasonably strong divisions in the German armies manning the 
Herrmann-Stellung.675 
 
The BEF HQ issued a formal operations order on 17 October directing the First, Third, and 
Fourth Armies “with the French First Army co-operating,” on 21 October to reach “the line 
Sambre Canal–the western edge of the Forest of Mormal and northwards to the Schelde.”676 
The CO French First Army issued his operations order No. 1012 the same day, copied to the 
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British Fourth Army, directing his left wing to proceed in parallel with the British advance.677 
The Fourth Army crossed the Selle on 17 October and made “steady progress” over the next 
days against strong German defences and division-sized counter-attacks. Fourth Army could 
not take advantage of these gains because of “the lack of an arm of pursuit–for cavalry was no 
longer able to fulfil this function, and the tank, its successor, was too weak both in speed and 
structure”.678 The First French Army advanced alongside the Fourth Army to the south and 
had by 19 October advanced to a point 4 to 5 km from the Sambre Canal. The British First 
and Third Armies crossed the canal on 20 October, but the BEF was not able to continue due 
to supply problems. Logistics became an increasingly limiting factor for the Allies as they 
moved further away from their railheads.679  
 
The BEF attacked again on 23 October after a two days’ delay due to late arrival of 
munitions. Its progress was good despite difficult ground and enemy artillery, but it took 
another day to reach and secure the objectives. The BEF now stood along the Schelde Canal 
to the Sambre Canal, with the Fourth Army through parts of the Herrmann-Stellung. At this 
stage, the Army required an an operational pause for a week and a half to rest and reconstitute 
the fighting power of the formations involved in these attacks.680 Further south, the French 
First Army was held up by bad weather, but finally attacked two days later and breached the 
Hunding-Stellung. The French Fifth Army to the south captured the rest of it.681  
 
The three southern British armies attacked again on 4 November alongside the French First 
Army. The French faced strong resistance over the Sambre and the Oise Canal and also 
struggled to cross the Oise, but managed to establish themselves on the east side by the 
evening.682 The British Fourth Army crossed the Sambre and Oise Canal and established itself 
solidly on the enemy side, while the Third Army had similarly reached all its objectives.683 
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The First Army kept one corps in the north on the defensive, while the southern corps were 




Sketch 5.7. The Western Front on 4 to 11 November. The break-throughs of the Herrmann 
and Hunding Stellung and pursuit to the armistice. 685 
 
Events were now moving fast on the German side. Ludendorff was replaced by General 
Wilhelm Groener on 26 October, who reviewed the situation and on 1 November understood 
that the front would not hold. The Allied attacks on 4 November that broke deep into three 
German armies caused the OHL to order a general retreat along the front from Condé to 
Sedan. After Groener met with the government the next day, the OHL finally ordered a 
general retreat to the Antwerpen/Maas-Stellung to begin on 6 November.686 
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The Allied tactical and operational approaches to breaching the Herrmann- and Hunding-
Stellung were similar to previous breachings. The German defences were no longer as 
formidable as the Siegfried-Stellung. Logistics became the main limiting factor due to reduced 
transport capacity. The British Fourth Army undertook the main effort and the other armies 
followed suit. However, the transition to pursuit became more sudden when the Germans 
decided to expand the retreat along the entire front. 
 
Phase V: Mobile warfare 
 
The extent of the German retreat was initially not known to the BEF. Its orders for 5 
November were to continue the advance that began the day before. The objective was the 
main road Avesnes-Maubeuge-Mons, but progress was slow due to wet weather that caused 
the heavy traffic to turn roads into almost impassable mud tracks. French patrols reported 
gaps in enemy lines and weakened resistance. The French First Army moved out at first light. 
The advance was slow but steady. The lead elements were in contact with German rear-
guards, and the resistance was primarily from machine-gun detachments. To the south, the 
Third Army was to advance by divisions without any concern for alignment, letting the troops 
keep up a steady advance against the retreating Germans.687 
 
The German armies used the unusually dark nights to disengage and left machine guns and 
snipers behind to delay and disrupt the pursuit. Artillery shells were rigged as improvised 
explosive devices with delayed fuses and were left behind to explode after the Allies had 
occupied the area. Demolitions of roads and bridges were more deliberate than in previous 
retreats. Nevertheless, much of the artillery had to be left behind due to the lack of horses. 
Battalions were down to barely 150 men (out of 800), a clear indication of the toll the recent 
fighting had taken on the German armies. The aim was to reach an intermediate position, 
stretching from Maubeuge over Hirson to south of Charleroi on 6 November. The plan was 
then to hold this line for a few days before falling back to the Antwerpen/Maas-Stellung.688 
 
The Allies identified the general German retreat in the evening of 5 November and orders 
were issued by the army groups for 6 November to continue the pursuit. The advance on 5 
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November had varied from a steady advance in some places led by the cavalry to forced 
crossings of streams and the occasional deliberate attacks supported by massed artillery. As 
the offensive moved more steadily forward, units at corps level and below operated more 
independently within their designated areas. Detailed orders from army group and armies 
were no longer needed to keep up the advance. General Maistre, commanding the G.A.C., 
ordered Fourth and Fifth Armies to exploit the situation without delay and manoeuvre rapidly 
towards known enemy points of resistance. The Fifth Army ran into strong defences on 7 and 
8 November that had to be overcome by division size attacks. Progress until the armistice was 
steady and met only sporadic machinegun fire since the Germans were retreating all along the 
front.689 
 
The French First and Third Armies690 in the G.A.R. were in a similar position and received 
updated orders late on 5 November. There was heavy resistance along the main Paris-
Maubeuge Road on 8 November. When the advance resumed in the morning the resistance 
was weak to non-existent until 10 November, when artillery had to be brought forward to 
regain the momentum.691 The Third Army continued the advance in pursuit of the retreating 
Germans through 6 November and was informed that it was to detach units to the strategic 
reserve since their front had narrowed. It was forced to a halt by strong resistance along the 
Aube and Thon rivers on 7 November. Instructions arrived the same day to detach more 
divisions to the reserve. When the German retreat resumed the day after, the entire army was 
in pursuit until armistice went into force at 11:00 on 11 November.692 
 
The BEF continued the pursuit with cavalry and infantry. Tanks or armoured cars that tried to 
advance were not able to continue among the numerous ditches and craters. The manoeuvre 
was fluid, but the situation changed so quickly that orders for relief and replacements at the 
front were overtaken by events and often not carried out. The tempo of the pursuit was limited 
by bad roads, obstacles, and rain, while resistance came mainly from machineguns covering 
demolition parties. The majority of Germans forces showed only token resistance. But the 
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British First Army encountered resistance by German units that had to be dislodged by 
deliberate division attacks supported by artillery. On 8 November the ground was covered in 
fog, while the Germans had pulled back during the night. The British Fourth Army advanced 
with cavalry and bicycles in front to gain contact with the enemy, but flooded streams and low 
visibility slowed the advance. The bad roads made it impossible to bring forward artillery and 
heavy bridging equipment was also delayed. The First and Third Armies also experienced 
enemy resistance in the form of machineguns and artillery fire, before demolitions were 
executed and the defenders pulled out.693 
 
The progress was steady over the next days. Orders carrying news of the armistice and 
instructions of how to proceed reached the armies on 11 November 06:30. The armies were to 
continue their advance until the armistice took effect at 11:00 and then establish defensive 
positions. Third and Fourth Armies sent forward advance guards and mobile forces, while 
First Army advanced in line to catch up with their forward elements east of Mons. Detailed 
instructions of how to handle the transition from combat to armistice had arrived from the 
BEF HQ a few hours earlier.694 
 
There were numerous black days for the German army before and after 8 August 1918. The 
first was actually on 18 July, the first day of the Second Marne. The conclusion of the German 
official history of the Western Front acknowledged that 9 November was the blackest day. 
Not only for the army but also the Reich: “Der 9. November 1918 wurde zum schwärzesten 




Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, the editor in chief of the British Official History, 
commented on the form of the Allied offensive in the final book of the volume on 1918. First, 
he described the strategy of “a frontal pressure against every active sector of the front” as very 
different from the planning and execution of “old style strategy” and different from the 
“prolonged effort at penetration at one or more vital places”. The frontal pressure kept the 
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Germans on the defensive after Amiens. It also allowed them to escape encirclement by large-
scale withdrawals along the entire front.696 Edmonds acknowledged that there was limited 
opportunity for an individual attacking army to obtain a strategic advantage. They instead 
took advantage of a neighbouring army's progress to force a withdrawal to avoid being 
outflanked. Divisions and brigades, conversely, were able to profit from flank attacks to turn 
defenders out of their positions.697 Edmonds stated that the practical room for operational 
manoeuvre was limited for the army group commander. The only manoeuvring was to zigzag 
forward by sequencing the advance of the armies. His analysis of the prospects for mobile 
warfare ruled out any deep exploitation by either armour or cavalry, due to enemy 
countermeasures and immature tank technology.698 
 
Edmonds further discussed the issue of breakthrough and the option of a deep advance from 
Verdun through the Argonne to cut off the German Armies’ principal railroad. He then 
referred to Foch’s Chief of Staff, General Maxime Weygand, who confirmed that Foch never 
“believed in the possibility of a ‘breakthrough’, with decisive results, between two armies of 
equal fighting value.” Weygand referred to the failed German offensives between March and 
July. He argued that Foch did not aim for breakthrough, but planned instead to widen the front 
successively.699 Edmonds referred to Foch’s aim to exploit the success of the British Fourth 
Army at Amiens in August and develop the initial attack into a deep penetration. As noted 
above, Haig halted the attacks after meeting Fourth Army commander Rawlinson and had to 
convince Foch himself that breaking off the operation against mounting resistance was the 
correct decision.700  
 
The strategic-operational relations between Foch, as supreme Allied commander, the senior 
national representatives, and the army group commanders during the Allied offensive, were 
not without friction. However, disagreements were sufficiently well-managed to keep the 
operations within the agreed strategic ambition. Edmonds’ observation is illustrative: 
 
It need not be emphasized that the Generalissimo [Foch] was handicapped by the fact 
that his command consisted of four national contingents, each with its own lines of 
communication, and with different natures of armament, ammunition and rations, so 
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that their formations were not homogenous and interchangeable as were the German 
divisions.701 
 
While the heterogeneous Allied command and force structure was not as unified and flexible 
as that of the Germans, it was more than sufficient to manage the Allied forces in the 
offensive. As Elizabeth Greenhalgh concluded, “it is undeniable that the allied solutions to the 
logistics problems were war-winning.”702 Even as there were tensions and mutual scepticism 
at various levels of command and among the troops, the strategic-operational interactions and 
relations allowed the Allies to regain the initiative in July 1918 and maintain a steady 
offensive until the Germans unexpectedly asked for an armistice. The Allied offensive 
balanced the aim with the means available and with methods that were sustainable against the 
German army that was deployed in strongly fortified defensive belts. The operational method 
was to mount operations that were limited in time and space. The purpose was to achieve the 
best balance between manoeuvre, attrition of enemy forces, keeping one’s own casualties low, 
and sustaining the momentum of the campaign. 
 
The operational-tactical interaction was mainly between national commanders and their army 
generals. But there were exceptions. The army groups conducted operations to reach 
objectives defined by the Allied supreme commander, Ferdinand Foch. These objectives 
were, at times, modified or limited by the army group commanders according to the situation. 
The army groups had their assigned armies, which occasionally were rotated or allocated to 
another army group for a specific operation, such as when the French First Army was attached 
to BEF for the Amiens-Montdidier operation. For the duration of the offensive, the army 
groups would mainly use their organic resources. An army group would reinforce the army 
that was to mount the main effort. It might also receive some strategic assets for an attack, 
such as tanks, heavy artillery, and combat aeroplanes. This system operated across the entire 
with of the Western Front. 
 
The role of operational art was to plan, conduct, lead, and sustain operations. The planning 
was based on the assigned objective, the part of the army group in the overall strategy, which 
again determined the resources available. The mission of adjacent army groups also had to be 
taken into account. These missions spanned from deliberate breakthrough operations against 
 
701
 OHGW 1918 V, 572. 
702
 Greenhalgh, Victory through coalition, 263. 
  212  
the enemy’s fortified lines on the one hand, to the pursuit of a retreating enemy on the other. 
The former mission demanded a high degree of centralized planning and preparations, while 
the latter called for smaller mobile forces that operated independently within the framework 
of the operation. Logistics became the prime factor that determined the pace of the offensives 
as weather and infrastructure deteriorated. Supplies had to be built up over weeks for a major 
breakthrough operation, while pursuit forces had to limit their speed of advance to allow 
logistics to catch up. Food and other supplies to the civilian population in the liberated areas 
added to the demands on the logistics system. 
 
The “war of manoeuvre” on the Western Front in the late autumn of 1918 differed 
considerably from the manoeuvres in the first months of the war. The conditions were 
fundamentally different from previous wars. There was a continuous front to consider and no 
gaps in the front or open flanks to exploit. Although the front moved as the Germans retired, 
they had sufficient firepower available in the form of machine guns and artillery to preclude 
any large movements of masses of unprotected soldiers. An army’s mobility was also defined 
by the speed at which its combat forces could move. In 1918 that was marching speed, even 
tanks moved at the pace of the infantry. This meant that a defender could slow the attacker by 
fire and retreat faster than the attacker could advance, thereby avoiding outflanking, 
encirclement, and annihilation. Logistics made the difference at the operational level by 
sustaining movement over a prolonged period. An attacker that had an advantage in supplies 
could move faster than a defender if he could exhaust the defender’s logistical system. This 
was difficult since a retreating defender could fall back on his supplies and the attacker had 
few combat means with the speed, range, and combat power to destroy supplies behind the 
front. When the Allied offensive progressed, the armies moved further away from their 
railheads. The supply situation deteriorated further when dirt-roads turned into mud in the 
autumn rain. 
 
The mobile war in the autumn of 1918 approached the character of a continuous breakthrough 
operation and was not like any of the pre-war ideas of Bewegungskrieg or mobile warfare. 
Firepower determined the battlefield, but the technology that early in the war contributed to 
the stalemate of the trenches had been developed into systems that could return mobility to the 
modern battlefield. It was a very different kind of mobility, though, one that was defined just 
as much by the ability to integrate fire and movement as by the ability to move troops. 
Jonathan Boff has a revealing description of the character of offensive warfare in 1918 in his 
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book on the British Third Army: “The positional attrition of 1915–17 gave way, not to 
manoeuvre warfare, but to a form of mobile attrition.”703 Mobile attrition differed from 
positional attrition since it also gained ground and allowed the attacker to maintain the 
initiative and force his strategy on the defender that was forced to either retreat or die in his 
trenches.704  
 
But attrition is just one side of the coin. The other is mobility. While the Germans tried to 
return to 1914 style mobility in their stormtroop offensives, the Allies developed “1918 style” 
mobility. The premises for the new mobility were related to all levels of command, but 
without strategic direction, operational and tactical attempts to restore mobility would have 
proved futile and resulted in severe losses. This had been the case in the previous years; the 
Russians in 1916 and Germany in the spring of 1918. The Allied success was dependent on 
more than just that “Foch had developed an appropriate attritional method that was to make 
the difference between the two sides in their most intensive campaign to date.”705 
 
Nick Lloyd argues that the allied 1918 offensive was “[a] victory of superior operational art; 
the ability to combine divergent operations together, across a huge width of front, into 
something greater than the sum of their parts. This is what Foch managed to do during the 
Hundred Days.”706 This statement is more of an argument for superior strategy. It was the 
strategic direction by Foch that combined the operations to achieve the strategic objective. 
The rationale for the statement appears to be that he bases his analysis on British doctrine, 
where operational art is to “attain strategic goals through the design, organization, integration 
and conduct of campaigns or major operations.” The doctrine also defines the operational 
level as “the level of war at which campaigns are planned”.707 Lloyd’s article is a very good 
account of Allied strategy and operational art on the Western Front. However, the way he 
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The offensive “attritional methods” had been used in the past two years, but they were tactical 
and only capable of limited tactical results. Foch’s most significant victory was to be 
entrusted with “the strategic direction of operations”. It was the new role of operations to 
direct the limited attritional offensive thrusts; the bite and holds and attaque brusque, towards 
intermediate objectives that Foch laid out in his strategic offensive. The tactical attrition 
would have gained nothing but attrition by itself. It was the operational bridging of the attacks 
to the campaign’s purpose that made it a war-winning effort. Compared to Nick Lloyd’s view 
discussed above, the role of operational art was to combine tactics together within the 
operation. Lloyd’s use of modern doctrine as an analytical tool made him include Foch’s 
strategic direction of operations in his understanding of operational art. 
 
The Soviet theorist Georgii S. Isserson dismissed the Allied operations in the 1918 offensive 
as examples of operational art: 
 
Our operational thought cannot fixate on the experience of the World War. This 
exhausting system of attrition battles, which failed to solve the problem of operationally 
breaching a front, and whose very slow offensive tempo, requiring four months during 
1918 for the allies to push the Germans back only 100 kilometers, cannot become the 
sole point of departure for developing our theory on the conduct of operations.708 
 
Alexandr Svechin explained Germany’s defeat by the political and military breakdown of 
morale and the Allies' superior material resources. He downplayed the importance of the 
Allied offensive to the defeat of Germany.709 At the same time, when he explained the 
defining characteristics of modern operations, he described the Allied operations in 1918.710 
Soviet theorists were wrong in their rejection of the operations in the Allied 1918 offensive as 
operational art because they failed to consider the physical realities of the Western Front. Nor 
has the Allied 1918 offensive been studied in the framework of operational art by many other 
scholars.711 It is usually placed well inside the tradition of attrition, although newer books 
acknowledge some unique qualities outside the framework of mass slaughter. The Allied 
 
708
 Isserson, The Evolution of Operational Art 13-14. 
709
 Svechin, "Sokrusheniye i izmor," 312; ibid., 301; Svechin, "U Istokov operativnoy mysli," 378-380; "Otpor i 
oborona," 471-482; "U Istokov operativnoy mysli," 377-379.  
710
 Strategy, 81-82, 295, 300. 
711
 Some good examples are Doughty, "French Operational Art: 1888–1940."; Lloyd, "Allied Operational Art in 
the Hundred Days, 1918." 
  215  
qualities in the offensive have for the most part been described in the tactical domain and as 
unit narratives.712 
 
The Soviet interpretations have to be read partly in their contemporary political and security 
context of the Soviet Union, but they also reflected the writers’ own preferences, whether 
those preferences were a strategy of exhaustion or one of destruction that included large-scale 
operations deep into the enemy rear areas. To a great extent, western writers of operational art 
have equalled operational art with deep operations and described and criticised military 
operations based on their idealised pattern of swiftness and depth. What is usually missing is 
an understanding, or acceptance, of the unique conditions that shaped warfare on the Western 
Front. These conditions caused strategy and operational art, as well as tactics, to take on the 





There was a continuous line in the Allied 1918 offensive war from the nations’ cabinets, 
through the Supreme War Council and the various military organisations, into the tactical 
forces that did the fighting. Foch stood in the “unequal dialogue” between policy and politics, 
on the one hand, and the physical realities of the industrialized battlefield on the other.713 
When Svechin defined operational art as the third military discipline, bridging strategy and 
tactics, he made it clear that operational art must be seen as just one element of warfare. He 
also argued that any division of war into separate disciplines has an arbitrary element that 
might cause one to lose sight of the entirety.714 The Allied offensive of 1918 had this element 
of totality. But it took a long and costly road to get there. It required combining successful 
tactical actions into an operation. Then to direct operations within the campaign to reach the 
strategic objective, which then had to align itself with the war’s political aims and purpose. 
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The conduct of the Allied offensive preceded Svechin’s lay-out of strategy and operations in 
modern war by a decade: 
 
The duty of strategy is to keep offensive operations from getting drawn out to the last 
gasp; great leadership ability is required to stop an offensive in time without getting 
distracted by minor partial successes which could still be achieved. 
[…] 
When strategic intensity begins to diminish when the enemy’s front is deprived of major 
reserves, rendered punchless, when it becomes quite incapable of launching major 
counterattacks and is only able to offer passive–in these conditions strategic work on 
exterior lines is even advantageous and a decisive offensive will be dictated by the 
situation. 
Small separate attacks may be even more economical than a single major operation. 
They make it possible to avoid the loss of time and effort, which are always the excess 
cost of a major concentration, [...]. If the enemy’s reserves have been exhausted and 
small operations are undertaken simultaneously, the latter have the opportunity to 
maintain the initiative that have been seized almost as long as major operations. Foch’s 
offensive in the second half of 1918 had this kind of divided nature.716  
 
This continuum shows clearly that the nature of operational art was prevalent in the entire 
Allied campaign of 1918. This was evident in the functional interactions between strategy and 
operational art, between Foch and the army group commanders. Similarly, the functional 
interaction between operational art and tactics, between the army groups and their tactical 
units, was effective to the point that it managed to solve the tension between the need to 
maintain the offensive and the mounting casualties as resistance hardened. The various forms 
the offensive took, which varied from deliberate breaching of heavily fortified defences to 
mobile pursuit of a retreating foe, are all examples of the different characters operational art 
can assume within a campaign. Despite the above-mentioned Soviet critique, the operations’ 
character of mobile attrition was conditioned by the combination of factors that shaped 
warfare on the Western Front. These factors ranged from the policies of the Allied nations to 
the unique character of the individual Allied armies, to tactical elements and physical 
conditions, such as terrain, weather, and, not least, the qualities of the enemy.  
 
The Allied operations during the offensive did not resemble the deep offensive operations 
Isserson perceived in a future war. They did not correspond to the operational art that was 
promoted by the western “maneuvrists”, such as Luttwak and Lind, or the US Army in 
AirLand Battle concepts and doctrines.717 The character of the operations in the Allied 
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offensive was more of a mobile trench war than some of the dashing armoured thrusts in the 
Second World War. The operations in 1918 were determined by the physical realities of the 
combat conditions in Belgium and northern France. It was operational art, although it did not 
resemble the image of operational art that has been constructed as a defining element of the 
twentieth century's idealised deep operations. 
 
The operational art conducted by the Allied army groups in 1918 worked because it was part 
of the strategic-operational-tactical totality placed at the service of political aims. Previous 
attempts, from the German offensives in 1914 to the attrition from 1915 through 1917, to 
Ludendorff’s spring offensives in 1918, all failed because one or more elements of this 
totality either were missing or misapplied. The form of the Allied operations in 1918 varied 
from tightly controlled and deliberate breakthrough offensives to more loosely directed 
operations. Both the strategic-operational and the operational-tactical interactions were 
maintained to the extent that was necessary and practical, given the character the operations 
developed.  
 
The strategic-tactical gap in modern war was bridged by operational art in the autumn of 1918 
by the same forces that had caused the tectonic rift between strategy and tactics during the 
previous half-century. The bridging was assisted by an enemy that still clung to his archaic 
and militaristic pursuit of the idealised decisive battle of Cannae and exhausted himself in the 
process to the point where the German army was “well placed to be chopped.”718 What was 
missing at war’s end was a developed definition and theoretical understanding of this new 
discipline of war. But that work was to be carried out over the next decades by the Worker’s 
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Chapter 6: Perceptions and definition  
 
The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as 
it were, confused and entangled. Not until terms and concepts have been defined can 
one hope to make any progress in examining the question clearly and simply and expect 
the reader to share one’s views. 
Carl von Clausewitz720 
 
This chapter will examine and analyse how military operations were understood 
institutionally after the First World War and how these understandings influenced military 
theory and doctrine. It will describe how differently some of the major participants 
understood the First World War and how these understandings were developed into concepts 
and doctrine. The emphasis is firstly on the Soviet Union’s Red Army. The understanding of 
modern war will also be examined in some other armed forces that did not develop explicit 
operational theory or terminology. These developments demonstrate that operational art as a 
military discipline was not a preordained result of shared experiences of modern war. On the 
one hand, these experiences led to the development of operational art in the Soviet Union. The 
French army, on the other, never went beyond their refinement of the methodical battle 
(bataille conduite) of 1918. 
 
In the inter-war years, the Red Army and the United States Army and Navy developed their 
understandings of modern war in two very different manners. The Red Army developed 
sophisticated new operational theory and terminology that was written into explicit 
operational doctrine. Massive force structures tailored to execute the operations that the 
doctrine prescribed were established in peace-time. On the other hand, the Americans 
developed specific plans for campaigns and operations against likely future enemies within a 
pre-existing strategic-tactical paradigm. They planned without existing force structures and 
developed concepts and doctrines for armed forces that had to be built and mobilised when 
the war began. Nevertheless, the campaigns and operations conducted by US and Soviet 
forces in the last half of the Second World War shared so many similarities that they seem to 
have been cast from the same mould. The outward appearance of the large Soviet land 
operations and the American joint operations in the Pacific and Western Europe were very 
different due to vastly different operating environments. The similarities lay in the political-
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strategic interactions that defined strategy and its priorities, how campaigns directed 
operations, and how battles and engagements were harnessed within the operation. 
 
The French army will be used as a comparison. In the inter-war years, it did not develop the 
successful strategic-operational interaction during the 1918 offensive but concentrated on 
tactics.721 Both the German and French cases are in different ways contrasts to the Soviet and 
American development of the operational dimension of war. The German approach was a 
continuation of their operational concept of rapid, decisive tactical offensives. The French 
Army discarded its successful operational practice in 1918 and concentrated on developing 
the orchestrated battle. Foch’s offensive strategic drive was replaced with Pétain’s emphasis 
on careful management of tactics. 
 
Were early twentieth-century military theory and terminology able to describe the new 
realities of war? Could nineteenth-century terms explain the changed character of warfare that 
twentieth-century operations represented? Operational understanding is an awareness of what 
constituted operational art, but not necessarily the unique theory and terminology the Soviets 
developed. While the Red Army, especially Alexandr A. Svechin and other Soviet military 
thinkers, are the main subjects for this chapter, the emergence of operational understanding in 
other great powers’ armed forces will be compared to that of the Red Army. The US Army 
and Navy developed a pragmatic approach to modern joint and combined operations 
acclaimed as American operational art.722 The American case will be studied with an 
emphasis on the institutional processes that led the US Army and Navy to fight the Second 
World War in ways in which they had no previous experience. The purpose of this chapter to 
explore and compare two fundamentally different approaches to modern warfare that appears 
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The Soviet Union 
 
The newly established Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army began to analyse recent years' war 
experiences while it was still fighting in the Russian Civil War. From the very beginning, the 
military debates became an element in the internal power struggles within the Communist 
Party. When Lenin was incapacitated by illness in 1922, Leo Trotsky and Josef Stalin's 
internal contest was no longer curbed by Lenin’s authority. Debates over the development of 
the Red Army’s doctrine, structure, and force composition were significantly influenced by 
the power struggle between Stalin and Trotsky. The questions of military doctrine and 
planning became politicised and highly polemic and often led to outright disloyalty charges 
against the persons involved. Such accusations could wreck careers and cause arrest, 
deportation, and execution. The political-military relations in the Soviet Union reached their 
nadir in the great purge of 1937-1938 when the officer corps of the Red Army was literally 
decapitated.723 This section will focus on the first ten years of the Soviet state when “when 
open debate in professional military periodicals was tolerated and even encouraged (1917-
28)”.724 
 
The primary sources of the Red Army’s military theoretical and doctrinal debates must 
therefore be read in the context of this unique political environment. Many of the positions 
that actors took in the discussions, their opinions, their rhetorical form, and their choice of 
sources and arguments, must also be considered in the same context. The fact that only very 
few of the central theorists survived the purges is a stark reminder of the atmosphere at the 
time. This unique political climate underlines the need for the kind of caution that Skinner 
puts forward in his approach to the study of the history of ideas.725 An entire array of 
arguments might, for example, mainly have been designed to protect the proponents’ necks 
from the secret police. This section will not enter the internal debates on strategy, force 
structure, operational concepts, and military doctrine, which other authors have described 
eloquently in previous studies.726 It will rather emphasise the early theoretical texts where the 
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fundamental definitions and character of operational art as a new military discipline were 
developed in regard to the interpretations of the First World War. 
 
Central to this story are the works of Alexandr A. Svechin, who first defined and developed 
the theoretical foundations for operational art. Svechin was acknowledged as the originator of 
operational art by his peers and is accredited the same way today. The emphasis will be on 
Svechin’s theoretical understanding of operational art and less on how it later was developed 
into specific doctrines and force structures. Svechin (1878-1938) was a general staff officer in 
the Imperial Russian Army. He commanded a regiment and a division and served in higher 
headquarters in the First World War. Svechin entered service as a military specialist in the 
Red Army in 1918. He served in held higher staff and command positions in the first year of 
the Civil War and at the General Staff Academy and Red Army Headquarters until arrest and 
execution in 1938.727 
 
Svechin had the unique background of a classically educated general staff officer who served 
in both combat and higher staff assignments. He was widely read in both Russian and 
international military history and other literature and published his own experiences and 
analysis of modern war as a captain. Among the last things Svechin did before his final arrest 
was to finalise editing the Russian translation of Clausewitz’ On War and write a popularised 
biography of the Prussian thinker.728 When operational art was defined as a new military 
discipline, it was an innovation based on classical general staff education and first-hand 
experience of modern war. 
 
The defining war for Svechin was the First World War. He chaired the Military Historical 
Commission for the First World War, which made him aware of all of the lessons to be drawn 
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from it.729 He was sceptical of imitating other armies and argued that the next war would not 
be a continuation of the First World War. It would be fought by another generation and have 
its own unique properties. After warning that for the Soviet Union imitation of bourgeois 
states was unacceptable both for strategic and political reasons. Svechin then emphasised that 
 
one's military thought must be based directly on historical reality, not on the refraction 
of this reality in the views of an alien army. The study of the [First] World War seems 
to us especially important for the Red Army, since only it can be a prerequisite for 
independent creativity in the art of war. Works of the [Russian] Civil War cannot 
compensate for gaps in the study of World War;  
[…] 
Any direction in the art of war, which will be chosen by the Red Army, will be one way 
or another an interpretation of the experience of the World War. The World War 
provides the majority of that particular material, which will contribute to our military 
thought for a long time.730 
 
Even if Svechin based his understanding of modern strategy and operational art on the Allied 
1918 offensive, his assessments of it were critical to the point of accepting that the German 
army was not defeated, only forced to retreat.731 His analysis of the Allied attacks in 1918 was 
almost mocking: “Despite the obvious collapse of the German front and an emerging victory, 
the French were only capable of sluggish attacks and could not break through the German 
front anywhere.”732 Even if this critique was published as early as in 1926, it reflected the 
peculiarities of the debate climate in the Soviet Union, and particularly in the Red Army. 
 
Terminology and translation 
 
Svechin’s book Strategy contained the first printed expression of operational art. It was the 
result of Svechin’s own experience in the field, in the headquarters of army and front, and 
service in the Imperial Russian General Staff, in addition to his studies and lectures.733 
Svechin wrote the book to explain strategy in the modern world. Operational art was the new 
military discipline that would bridge strategy and tactics. Svechin drew on classic texts, such 
as Clausewitz and Delbrück, Russian analysis and debate before the First World War, 
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international military literature, contemporary debates and discussion and recent war 
experience, including the Russian Civil War. The book was a part of the strategic debate in 
the 1920s, which explains the polemics and rhetorical style in some of the chapters.734 
 
The first chapter acknowledged that modern war involved much more than combat. Political, 
geographical, technological, administrative, and organisational issues had become equally 
important.735 Svechin then limited his book to warfighting, since it ”has become so broad and 
so significant that currently we consider the conduct of military operations to be the art of war 
in the narrow sense of the word.”736 
 
These paragraphs themselves and the context in which they were written, gave the impression 
that warfare had become military operations and operational art. This perception is a 
translation issue in the first subsection “A classification of Military Disciplines” in the 
English 2004 edition. Military activities that span from warfare in general to tactical actions 
and engagements were all translated as “military operations”. This choice in translation gives 
the reader the impression that Svechin regarded all military issues in modern war to be about 
operations and operational art. But for Svechin, operations and operational art were only 
discrete elements in the conduct of war. 
 
The term in question is the phrase iskusstvo vedeniya voyennykh deystviy, which literally 
means “(the) art of conducting actions of war” or “the art of military actions”. This translation 
of the term also corresponds to the subsection’s aim of setting the framework for the 
contemporary study of war and not just for military operations. A more precise translation of 
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The English 2004 translation Translated from the Russian 1927 edition 
This aspect of the art of war has become so 
broad and so significant that currently we 
consider the conduct of military operations 
to be the art of war in the narrow sense of 
the word. 
 
The art of conducting military operations 
cannot be divided by any clear boundaries 
into completely independent and delineated 
sections. It is a single whole which includes 
the assignments of missions to fronts and 
armies and leading a small reconnaissance 
patrol. […] Hence it would be quite 
reasonable to divide the art of conducting 
military operations into several individual 
parts on the condition that we do not ignore 
the close relationship between them and do 
not forget the arbitrary nature of such a 
division. 737 
This part of the art of war has now expanded 
to such an extent and gained such self-
sufficient significance that under military 
art, in a narrow sense, we mean at the 
present time precisely the art of military 
actions. 
The art of military actions cannot be divided 
by any clear boundaries into completely 
independent and delineated sections. It is a 
single whole which includes the assignments 
of missions to fronts and armies and leading 
a small mounted patrol, sent out to recon the 
enemy. [...] Therefore, it is quite reasonable 
to divide the art of military actions into 
several individual parts, provided that we do 
not miss the close relationship between them 
and do not forget a certain arbitrariness of 
such a division.738 
 
The 2004 English translator’s use of the specific term operations for the general term 
“military actions” may lead the reader to believe that Svechin meant that operational art and 
operations covered the entire conduct of war. As the paragraph demonstrates, this was not 
what Svechin meant and may explain why some western doctrine writers had perceived 
operational art to include strategy and tactics as well as operations.739 The translation 
resembles the English translation of Clausewitz’ On War as discussed in chapter 2, where also 
western operational terminology was superimposed into a classic text.740 
 
Svechin was consistent in his use of terms, especially those related to operational art and the 
new role of operations, where “the efforts of the troops are directed towards the achievement 
of a certain intermediate goal in a certain theatre of operations, without any interruptions”. 
Similarly, he used precise terminology in the description of the modern content of operations: 
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logistical preparations, [...] etc.”741 Both Svechin and Clausewitz were precise in their use of 
terminology to explain and argue for their views. Therefore, translations must be equally 
exact to allow the nuances in their critical arguments to come to the forefront. In several 
instances where the term voyennykh deystviy denotes “military actions” or “actions of war”, it 
is translated as operations, combat operations, or military operations.742 This translation may 
well give the reader a different understanding of the terms' content and meaning than the 
historical authors intended.743 
 
Svechin stressed that operational art was an integral part of warfare as a totality.744 
Furthermore, the division of warfare into three disciplines demanded caution and an eye for 
the entirety. 
 
We notice that the art of military actions most naturally falls into the art of warfare, of 
conducting an operation and of conducting combat actions. The requirements of a 
modern battle, a modern operation and the war as a whole, represent three relatively 
definite stages, according to which it is most natural to justify the classification of 
military disciplines.745 
 
There is also a tendency in the English edition to translate voyennykh deystviy as operations in 
sections discussing tactics, operational art, and strategy. This practice also gives the 
impression that operational art and operations covered all aspects of warfare.746 The English 
2004 edition is, on the other hand, consistent with the original in the translation of specific 
military terms, such as operational art and operations. Thus, the challenge for a thorough 
study of the relations between operational art, strategy, and tactics in the English translation, 
is to understand whether the term operation translates from the general term voyennykh 
deystviy or the specific operatsii. 
 
The Imperial Russian Army’s thinking about operational elements before 1914 was among 
the aspects of the Russian intellectual efforts that matured into Svechin’s definition of 
operational. A clear example is Alexander V. Gerua’s term operatika and the emerging 
understanding of modern operations after the Russian-Japanese War. Several writers have 
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explained and discussed the broad and deep military experience and intellectual effort on 
which Svechin’s remodelling of military theory was based.747 The width of the Russian 
military intellectual tradition is also evident in publications by the Russian diaspora after the 
Revolution and Civil War. Émigré and philosopher Anton Kersnovsky’s Philosophy of War 
from 1939 included the chapter “Strategy, Operatika and Tactics”.748 His understanding of 
operatika was along the same lines as Svechin’s definition of operational art. Kersnovsky 
described operatika as a new military discipline intersected between strategy and tactics to 
plan and conduct operations: “Strategy orients operatika politically, just as operatika orients 
Tactics strategically. As Strategy should be subordinated to Policy, operatika should be 
subordinated to Strategy, Tactics – operatika.”749 Kersnovsky used the missing interrelations 
between strategy, operatika and tactics to criticise recent warfare; the Russian conduct of the 
First World War, Ludendorff’s 1918 spring offensives, and the white general Wrangel in the 
Russian Civil War. Kersnovsky’s critique was in line with Soviet theorists, such as Svechin 
and Georgii S. Isserson.750 
 
Kersnovsky’s book was also the source for western scholars’ knowledge of Gerua’s pre-war 
term operatika.751 Gerua did not use operational art in his post-war book published in 1923. 
This was a book he wrote in exile and dedicated to the disarmament of the “peoples in arms” 
societies that caused the previous decade of carnage.752 Another Imperial army general staff 
officer, Alexander A. Neznamov, who sided with the Red Army in the Civil War and served 
in military academic positions in the Red Army, used neither operatika nor operational art in 
his two volumes work entitled Modern Warfare.753 The second volume was published in 
1921, while the first volume was published in two editions before the the First World War and 
again in 1922. His understanding of the modern operation, on the other hand, was in line with 
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Svechin and so was his use of the terms operation and operational.754 Neznamov’s books are 
another example of how the terminology and understanding of modern war from the Imperial 
General Staff were continued by the military specialists in the Red Army. The fact that both 
volumes were published before Svechin coined operational art as a term, may well explain 
why Neznamov did not use that expression. 
 
Colonel Eugene E. Messner was a World War One and Russian Civil War veteran and a 
central actor among the Russian military émigrés. He knew and worked with Gerua as part of 
the military diaspora in Bucharest.755 Messner wrote that in the 1930s, he began to introduce 
the third element operatika in addition to strategy and tactics based on his studies of the First 
World War. Still, he did not relate the term to Gerua, who had coined it after the Japanese-
Russian War.756 In an article in 1938, Messner wrote that operatika was the same as 
operational art, which “is more than conducting battles, it is the art of conducting large-scale 
operations, each of which consists of a multitude of battles and a multitude of measures to the 
supply of troops for battle.”757  
 
The understanding of operational art and associated terminology by the Russian military 
diaspora confirms that the continuity of the Imperial Russian Army’s nascent operational 
thought into the inter-war period was through individuals. Individuals who either sided with 
the Red Army and became military specialists or opposed the Soviet State and chose to leave 
Mother Russia after the Civil War.758 Both the military diaspora and the military specialists in 
the Red Army based their operational thinking on the nascent pre-war attempts of the Imperial 
General Staff. Experiences and lessons from the First World War and the Russian Civil War 
were incorporated in later studies. Except for different terms, the results for both groups were 
identical. This indicates that the pre-war operational thinking was so thorough that it led to 
similar outcomes. Both operational art and operatics were two names on the same subject; the 
newly defined third military discipline. 
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Strategies of destruction and exhaustion 
 
A central premise for Svechin was that the modern industrialised people’s war had become a 
war of exhaustion.759 The idealised battle of destruction (battle of annihilation, 
Vernichtungsschlacht) had subsequently been reduced to a very rare occurrence. Svechin 
continued Hans Delbrück’s Strategiestreit by other means on Russian soil and developed 
Delbrück’s line of arguments.760 Delbrück was involved in a controversy regarding the use of 
history by the German Great General Staff. He challenged the applicatory method of teaching 
history and the use of selected interpretations of history to legitimise doctrine. One crucial 
question in the debate was whether Frederick the Great pursued a strategy of destruction 
(Vernichtung) or exhaustion (Ermattung). Delbrück debated strategy and used the German 
term Ermattung, of which exhaustion is a more precise translation than the more commonly 
attrition.761 The Russian term used by Svechin, izmor, starvation in English, which is closer to 
the German term Ermattung than to attrition. Attrition is an operational and tactical term 
regarding the physical destruction of enemy forces in combat through accumulated losses, 
also referred to as wearing down.762 
 
Svechin stated that “the task of strategy is greatly simplified if we or the enemy, following 
Napoleon and Moltke’s examples try to end a war with a destructive strike.”763 He described a 
strategy of destruction as characterised by “a unity of purpose, time, place and action. 
Examples of a strategy of destruction are truly classical in terms of their style, simplicity and 
consistency.” Further, “a strategy of destruction requires yet another premise, namely the 
extraordinary victory.”764 In modern industrialised wars, logistics and the “short range of 
modern operations” had “placed major limitations on a strategy of destructions.” Another 
limitation was that in modern wars, the beginning of the war was no longer “the culmination 
of strategic intensity.” Modern industrialised societies could mobilise their economy and 
military forces. They would therefore be able to equip and replace troops lost in the initial 
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battles. Svechin used France’s ability to raise new armies after the Emperor capitulated in 
1870, which forced the Germans to fight new armies mobilised by the Republic.765 In 
discussing the advisability of an operation, Svechin inverted the common critique of choosing 
Amiens as the direction for Ludendorff’s Michael Offensive: “In a strategy of destruction the 
direction of an assault is less important than its scale.” On the other hand, he criticised the 
lack of massing of combat power in one decisive strike, as opposed to the series of offensives 
Ludendorff orchestrated: “On the contrary, Ludendorff’s subsequent attempts on new sectors, 
which were in part demonstrative, clearly contradicted a strategy of destruction.”766 Svechin 
had for all practical purposes discarded the strategically decisive victory by destruction in 
modern war. 
 
Strategies of exhaustion were more complex and diverse than a strategy of destruction: “The 
term attrition [original: izmor, exhaustion] is a very poor expression of all the different shades 
of different strategic methods outside the realm of destruction.”767 Svechin emphasised that 
destruction and exhaustion were not opposites, like black and white, but rather white and non-
white. Still, he highlighted the contrast between them:  
 
A strategy of destruction is unified and allows for only one correct decision (white). In a 
strategy of attrition [izmor, exhaustion] the intensity of armed conflict may vary and 
thus each level of intensity may have its own correct decision. One can determine the 
level of intensity required by a given situation only through very careful study of 
economic and political conditions. A very broad range is opened up for politics, and 
strategy should be very flexible.” 768 
 
A strategy of exhaustion did not exclude operations aimed to destroy enemy forces, but that 
would only be one task, not the entire mission. One key argument for Svechin was that 
operations were only stages; they had limited goals, and were just elements in “a struggle for 
positions on the armed, political and economic fronts”.769 
 
Svechin’s discussion of strategies of destruction and exhaustion was more than just listing the 
pros and cons of different methods. He argued that modern wars, such as the First World War, 
had begun to pursue a strategy of destruction, but changed into a war of exhaustion after the 
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initial clashes. The main reason was that modern industrialised states could absorb initial 
defeats and then mobilise their resources and raise new armies. These armies had to be 
defeated over time by gradual attrition and their industrial base strangled by blockade or the 
physical destruction of industry, raw materials, infrastructure, and food supplies. Modern 
operations would, therefore, no longer chase the decisive battle. The character of modern war 
had changed into a war of exhaustion. Modern operational art would pursue limited objectives 
within the framework of a campaign to wear down enemy forces by fires and manoeuvre, 
forcing him to exhaust his resources in the process. This was an accurate description of the 
operations in the Allied 1918 offensive. 
 
Strategy and operational art in modern war 
 
The interdependency between strategy and operational art was a Leitmotiv in Svechin’s book. 
The pre-modern operation “was clearly divided into two parts: the maneuver designed to put 
our forces in the most advantageous position at the time of the decisive clash, and the battle 
itself.” The modern operation, on the other hand, “means a combination of different actions 
aimed at achieving a goal set forth by strategy.”770 A strategy that Svechin expected more 
often than not would be one of exhaustion. “The battle itself” was discarded as a concept, 
 
because today battles, which are a phenomenon of the historical past, do not exist, and if 
these terms are still used, they are used only as expressions that reveal a preference for 
the vividness of a concept rather than the accuracy of its formulation. Now the general 
battle has become dispersed over a large part of an operation.771 
 
Svechin rubbed further it in and stated that “‘the battle of the Marne’ and ‘the battle at 
Tannenberg’ were literary figures of speech that the victor uses to publicise his successes 
among the masses”. He mocked “several young historians of the Civil War, who have looked 
for similar specific phenomena in the Civil War and have been unable to find them because 
such phenomena belong to the historical past along with the 19th century.” On the other hand, 
he did acknowledge the propaganda effect of the creative naming of military successes.772 For 
Svechin, these statements were elements in his argument that twentieth-century war was 
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In the decades between Moltke the Elder and the First World War, the strategic headquarters 
planned and conducted operations and directly commanded subordinate armies. But the size 
of the armies and the scale of the operations had made it impossible to lead the entire force 
from one headquarters. When Germany launched its invasion of Belgium in 1914, the German 
Army’s High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL), directed an operation of seven armies 
spanning a front from the Swiss border to Brussels. An essential task for OHL was to 
coordinate the three armies on the strong right wing that were wheeling through Belgium and 
the two armies advancing through Luxembourg. It became an impossible task. The sources of 
friction were many; independent-minded and headstrong army commanders who adapted their 
manoeuvre to the local situation, a command infrastructure that was unable to keep the OHL 
updated, and corps commanders marching to the sound of the guns instead of as directed by 
orders.  
 
Finally, German doctrine allowed subordinate commanders freedom of action within the 
commander’s intent, which often caused tactical necessity to trump strategic direction. The 
inability to control the forces caused the armies in front to be out of sync and opened a gap on 
the Marne River that gave the French and British the opportunity for to counterattack. 
Besides, came physical realities; insufficient logistics, ambitious and exhaustive marching 
over weeks, and an incomplete situational awareness. The command issues alone made it 
almost impossible for the OHL to manage the complexity of the operation. The loss of control 
was partly solved by the establishment of Heeresgruppen (army groups) as de facto 
operational commands in late November 1914.773 The French army established the first 
provisory army group, the groupe provisoire du Nord on 4 October 1914 and organised three 
regular army groups by June 1915. An army group would typically command from two to 
four armies, including air units.774 
 
Svechin observed that the front (the army group), had become “an even newer echelon of 
operational leadership in the Russian forces”, but was not convinced it was a wise way of 
organising the forces: “Every extra echelon is an unconditional evil.”775 He drew on recent 
experience: “The reality of the front over six years (1914–1920) raises some doubts; its [the 
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front] short history is not fraught with organisational achievements.”776 He cited German and 
Russian failures in their attempts of strategic coordination of Heeresgruppen and fronts and 
the Soviet failure to coordinate the Western and South-Western Fronts in August 1920 during 
the war against Poland. Svechin’s main concern was that the front commanders would 
challenge the authority of the high command, especially if it only had two fronts to 
coordinate, such as Russia in 1914 and the Red Army in Poland in 1920. He also referred to 
the German experience with their Heeresgruppen and how strong personalities undermined 
command authority. He continued his line of arguments in the next section on friction, 
emphasising command and command relations.777 
 
Svechin did not mention or analyse the Allied ability to strategically coordinate and direct 
four army groups after Foch became supreme commander in the spring of 1918. Foch’s 
strategic direction of operations was the counter-case to the dysfunctions in the German, 
Russian, and Soviet leadership that Svechin criticised. The successful Allied strategic-
operational interactions on the Western Front in 1918 were, on the other hand, not present in 
Svechin’s book, nor his other published studies.778 Svechin had some very valid and critical 
observations on both the German and Allied offensives in 1918, but only a few comments on 
the Allied campaign, and none on the Allied command arrangements. The Allied command 
arrangements should have been of interest since the Allies were a heterogeneous coalition 
force, where up to four nations held operational commands.779 Foch’s ability to direct four 
army groups in the offensive; one led by the Belgian king, one British and two French 
generals, would have been an interesting argument in the discussion mentioned above. 
Besides, were two of the army groups multinational, the BEF had strong dominion 
contingents, and there were national interests from London, Paris, and Washington to 
consider. 
 
Svechin briefly discussed the method of sequenced limited offensives during the 1918 Allied 
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operations in modern war. He began by dismissing the case of the one-operation war as 
“exceptional conditions”, where strategy became irrelevant since the war was expected to be 
won by just one operation. The rest of the chapter dealt with the new normality: wars of 
exhaustion. In these, the high command will have to direct and manage several operations 
with limited goals. Svechin’s description of strategy in modern wars was a reflection of 
Foch’s direction of military operations in 1918: 
 
The duty of strategy is to keep offensive operations from getting drawn out to the last 
gasp; great leadership ability is required to stop an offensive in time without getting 
distracted by minor partial successes which could still be achieved.780 
 
Foch was initially not inclined to halt an operation, but accepted both arguments and decisions 
by operational and tactical commanders as long there were other ways to continue the 
offensive and maintain the initiative.781 The Allied 1918 offensive was conducted according 
to Svechin’s description of a modern war of exhaustion, where “small separate attacks may be 
even more economical than a single major operation.”782 
 
Svechin set forth to discuss the consequences for warfare when the operation had replaced the 
battle as the means to achieve the aim of the war. At the beginning of the chapter “Combining 
Operations for Achieving the Ultimate Goal of the War”, he initially stated that pre-war 
strategic thought of a geographic operational line could not bring clarity to the conduct of the 
First World War.783 In the next paragraph, which for some unknown reason has been omitted 
in the English edition, Svechin replaced the geographic operational line with 
 
a strategic line of conduct, the logic that ties the goals of individual operations together 
towards the ultimate success, and which, would represent too large kinks and breaks to 
be called a geographic line.”784  
 
He summed up the paragraph: “We reduce the whole essence of the strategic art of warfare to 
an understanding of the logic of grouping operations to achieve the goals of the war.”785 This 
summary statement represents the same logic that defined Foch’s authority as supreme 
commander responsible for “the strategic direction of military operations”. It also reflects the 
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changing character of strategy. Clausewitz’ definition of strategy as the “use of engagements 
for the object of the war” was extended to combining and directing military operations in the 
campaign, where the campaign objectives served the purpose of the war.786 Finally, 
destruction was superseded by exhaustion, where operational and tactical attrition replaced 
the decisive battle. The decisive war-winning battle Ludendorff aimed for in the Michael 
operations was replaced by Foch’s series of strategically directed operations with limited 
aims. 
 
The fact that Svechin did not refer explicitly to the Allied offensives of summer and autumn 
1918 is very strange. Svechin’s definition of strategy and operational art reflected closely the 
way Foch directed the Allied campaign and the way the Allied army groups conducted 
operations. Therefore, one must consider the possibility that the Allied campaign provided 
inspiration for Svechin’s conceptualisations, but that the politicised environment of the Red 
Army in the mid-1920s prevented him from crediting Foch explicitly in his writings.787 Such a 
possibility at least cannot be discounted, despite his critical tone: “[…] only Frech chauvinism 
would ascribe the victory of the Entente to the successes of Marshal Foch in the French 
theatre of operations because the Germans had vast resources for resistance.”788 A further 
explanation may also be Svechin’s almost Tolstoyan perception of the role of the individual 
actor in war, where “[n]either Ludendorf, Foch nor the military men of the civil war 
dominated events, but were rather carried away by the maelstrom.”789 
 
The character of Soviet operational art: Breakthrough and depth 
 
The narrative and analysis of the development of the character of the inter-war years’ Soviet 
operational art have been thoroughly studied in the west, where personalities, theory and 
doctrine development, and technology and the industrialisation of technology, have been 
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objects of comprehensive and thorough analysis.790 Harrison’s observation about the neglect 
of the defensive indicates that the politicisation of military thought caused doctrine to become 
dogma. Doctrine, understood as “institutionalised beliefs about what works in war and 
military operations”, became a politically defined offensive dogmatism.791 Some of the blame 
was to be shared by those military theorists who used policy and political statements to defeat 
their professional opponents.792 Despite these peculiarities of the Soviet system, the Red 
Army were able to field large mechanised combined arms formations by the mid-1930s 
directed by an up-to-date operational-tactical doctrine, the 1936 Provisional Field Service 
Regulations (PU-36).793  
 
Harrison describes the four main themes in the Soviet military debate in the 1920s and how its 
outcome defined the conditions for the character of Soviet operational art. Firstly, these 
themes were the question of whether a future war will be a protracted war or if it could be 
decided quickly. Secondly, if the Red Army was to pursue an offensive or a defensive 
strategy. The third theme was if a future war would be a positional war or a war of 
manoeuvre. Finally, there was the question of whether mechanised forces or infantry would 
dominate. A related contested area was the debate between strategies of destruction and 
exhaustion. When a decision was reached by the end of the 1920s, the Red Army would 
pursue an offensive annihilation strategy. That decision would direct the character of Soviet 
operational art. 794  
 
The drawback of this politically sanctioned and dogmatic pursuit of offensive destruction was 
a “serious neglect of defensive preparations that would cost the army dearly in 1941.”795 The 
chapter on defence in the PU 36 regarded defence as a temporary halt before offensive 
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operations were resumed. The defence would be against modern forces, including mechanised 
and air forces, and chemical weapons. Each branch was given its specific roles in the defence, 
where modern means were emphasised, such as armour, chemical weapons, engineers, and 
combined arms combat. Despite Harrison’s critique of the lack of the overall emphasis of the 
offensive, the operational doctrine thoroughly covered the conduct of defence.796  
 
The Soviet theorists that explored operational art from the late 1920s onwards were primarily 
developing theories and concepts for the officially approved offensive strategy of destruction. 
The initial strategic debate was settled and so was also the issue of doctrine. The Red Army 
faced the challenge of developing its initial conceptual understanding of operational art into 
applicable operational methods that would work in a future war. Two issues are illustrative of 
how the character of Soviet operational art was developed: the questions of breakthrough and 
depth. Both issues were departures from how the Allied 1918 offensive was conducted and 
illustrate how the Red Army developed operational concepts and doctrines for a different kind 
of war. The character of the future operations was thus very different from those from which 
Svechin derived operational art and modern strategy.  Nevertheless, the interrelations between 
strategy and operational art were maintained, while both operational art and tactics were 
developed in the framework of Soviet military science. Some military theorists from the late 
1920s will illustrate the new character of soviet operational art. Their choice of historical 
examples further demonstrates how Svechin’s perception of Allied 1918 style of sequenced 
operations with limited objectives in a strategy of exhaustion was superseded by deep, 
decisive operations in a strategy of annihilation. 
 
Vladimir K. Triandafillov rose through the ranks to captain in the Imperial army during the 
First World War and joined the Red Army in the Civil War. He graduated from the Red Army 
General Staff Academy in 1923 and was imperative in the initial development of modern deep 
operations theory. His book The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies, was published 
in 1929.797 Triandafillov was killed in an air accident in 1931 but had already established 
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Two central themes in Triandafillov’s book were the problem of break-through of a fortified 
front (trench system) and the subsequent exploitation of the breakthrough. The method for the 
breakthrough was to create a strong all-arms shock army for a wide breakthrough. It was to 
some extent modelled on Brusilov’s Galicia operation in 1916 and the Allied 1918 offensive. 
The German March 1918 offensive was criticised for its narrow frontage and the inability to 
engage the width of the Allied front, which left the Allies free to concentrate their reserves 
against Ludendorff’s storm-troopers. Triandafillov argued that the penetration of the enemy 
defences was to be echeloned, supported by large numbers of artillery and tanks, and finally 
by tying up enemy defences outside the breakthrough sector.799 His method of tactical 
breakthrough was a mirror image of the British and French offensive operations on the 
Western Front in 1918. The next step aimed further than what was physically possible on the 
Western Front; deep thrusts into the rear of the enemy’s defences. 
 
The theory of consecutive operations emerged from the search for solutions to overcome the 
problems of destroying modern armies by a single operation. The German and Allied 
operations in 1918 and the Red Army’s series of operations during the Civil War, gave rise to 
the notion that campaigns with multiple consecutive operations would make it possible to 
destroy an enemy army in one campaign.800 Before Triandafillov discussed the operational 
elements of successive operations, he elaborated on the preconditions. He concluded that the 
present level of transport technology did not allow for the scale of operations needed for the 
“powerful crushing blow”. However, new means of mobility would be available shortly.801 
Triandafillov and his contemporaries moved away from Svechin’s limited operations and 
towards large decisive operations deep into the enemy’s rear areas. The means were future 
developments of mechanised forces and motorised logistics.  
 
Nikolai N. Movchin discussed the role of the front (army group) in managing complex 
consecutive operations in his book Posledovatel'nye Operatsii Po Opytu Marny I Visly  
(Consecutive Operations According to the Experience of the Marne and the Vistula). He 
based his studies on the German invasion of France in 1914 and the Soviet offensive against 
Poland in 1920.802 Movchin was a lieutenant in the Imperial army, joined the Red Army, and 
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fought in the Civil War. After the Military Academy, he served in the Red Army 
Headquarters until his arrest in 1937. He was killed the year after.803  
 
Movchin argued that the operations’ complexity determined how they had to be led and 
managed. An army could command and manage one simple operation pursuing one objective. 
On the other hand, the front would command and manage several complex sequential 
operations to defeat a main part of the enemy force. A single army not able of such a task, 
although it conducted several successive operations. Front operations were not equal to the 
campaign, since the campaign was the totality of actions over an extended period. Movchin 
maintained that the correlation of army and front operations along a logical sequence had 
significant advantages over operations with limited objectives. Within the concept of 
consecutive operations, the individual operations would develop in the logical framework of a 
common objective. Such harnessing of operations along a logical line of conduct would 
prevent the disintegration of control and strategic direction the Germans experienced on the 
Marne and the Red Army on the Vistula.804 
 
Movchin also discussed operational command issues and the inability to control individual 
armies that were not within a strategic or operational framework. Given the size and 
complexity of modern operations, an army as a tactical unit would solve individual tasks 
within the operational framework. The front, as an operational formation, would conduct 
several operations within the strategic direction. The central issue for Movchin was 
complexity management. In the specific context of large-scale industrialised war, the 
complexity was related to the magnitude of the forces, personnel, equipment, and 
sustainment. The task of armies was to be simple. The front must not be too large and 
cumbersome but limited to three to four armies, perhaps even five in exceptional cases. The 
armies would be given limited tasks to avoid that they were forced to make tactical decisions 
with dire strategic consequences, such as the German First and Second Armies on the Marne 
in 1914. “The difference between the operational and tactical orders will be that the latter sets 




 V. V. Gradosel'skiy, "Osnovatel' Sluzhby Goryuchego," [Founder of the Fuel Service.] Voenno-istoricheskii 
zhurnal, no. 11 (2009), 41. 
804
 Movchin followed Svechin’s reasoning, see Svechin, Strategiia. 172; Movchin, Posledovatel'nye operatsii, 
116-121.  
805
 Posledovatel'nye operatsii, 119-121. 
  240  
Movchin’s concluded from the Schlieffen Plan and the German advance on Paris that an 
appropriate command system must manage the increased difficulties in manoeuvring millions 
of troops and harness the forces to the plan. There would still be a substantial risk to any 
attempts to destroy the main enemy force in one operation. Yet, given the possibility for 
success, these risks must be acknowledged and managed professionally.806 Movchin discussed 
the role of the front and the command challenges more thoroughly than Triandafillov but kept 
to the established Soviet understanding of operational art. His differencing between complex 
and simple operations was a qualitative distinction between the kinds of tasks an army, or any 
other tactical unit, could manage. However, the complex operations that contained an intricate 
multitude of tasks needed a front organisation. Complexity was a natural consequence of the 
modern character of war where operations had replaced battles. Each complex operation 
needed its front headquarters. However, it would be ill-advised to let one front manage more 
than one complex operation.807 
 
Movchin wrote in his conclusion that the theory of consecutive operations was not a universal 
tool and not the entirety of operational art, 
 
although the most important, it serves as the theoretical foundation for all operational art 
as a whole and represents the most reliable tool for solving the main tasks pursued by 
politics and strategy in modern warfare.808 
 
Complexity was used as a qualitative indicator to discern whether an operation was tactical or 
operational. The complexity of an operation was, to a great extent, determined by the 
character of the war. Operations in the First World War was conducted to manage a 
complexity caused by how the character of warfare evolved during the war. In the Allied 
offensive on the Western Front in 1918, the solution was sequencing operations laterally 
along the entire front. The continued technological and ideological developments in the inter-
war years would create new forms of complexity. As a consequence, the character of 
operational art had to emerge to cope with new complexities. 
 
The issue of complexity was also a determining factor in the conclusion of Nikolay Ye. 
Varfolomeyev’s book on the shock army from 1933. The Red Army used the term shock 
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army for powerful combined arms armies with a central role in an offensive. Varfolomeyev 
was a General Staff Academy graduate and fought in the First World War. He entered the Red 
Army as a volunteer in March 1918 and served in staff assignments in the Civil War. After 
arrest and prison from 1922 to 1923, he was assigned to the Military Academy and served in 
educational institutions until 1936. He was again arrested in 1938 and shot the year after.809  
 
Varfolomeyev noticed that it was the accumulated difficulties of the tasks, the available 
means, and the rear areas that caused the overall complexity in controlling the shock army in 
its mission. The shock army, like other armies, was controlled by the front. Still, referring to 
the Michael offensive in March 1918, the high command might well overrule the operational 
command and also change the army’s task during the operation. The norm was that the front 
directed the shock army when the army shifted from one task to another or used the shock 
army to adjust the overall offensive direction. The shock army was usually free to solve its 
task without interference. In the operational-tactical interrelations, the front would manage the 
operational complexity and leave the shock army and other armies free to solve their tactical 
tasks and seize their objectives.810 
 
Varfolomeyev used the German spring offensives and the Allied offensive in 1918 to argue 
for the new conditions for warfare and the need for shock armies.811 The book is a thorough 
analysis of selected parts of the offensives. Despite some ideologically based explanations of 
the French soldiers’ mutinies, it is a clear-cut example of the strong influence of the final year 
of the First World War on the development of Soviet operational art.812 Varfolomeyev 
focused his study on the German Eighteenth Army in the 1918 March offensive, the Seventh 
Army in May-June, and the French Tenth Army’s counter-attack in the Second Battle of the 
Marne in July 1918. These armies had central roles in the offensives and were categorised as 
shock armies by Varfolomeyev. The analysis was, to a great extent, tactical. Still, the 
functions given to the front as an operational command to direct the shock army brought 
forward some essential elements in operational art's operational-tactical relations. 
 
809
 N. S. Cherushev and Iu N. Cherushev, Rasstreliannaia elita RKKA, 1937-1941 [The executed elite of the Red 
Army, 1937-1941] (Moskva: Kuchkovo pole, 2014), 39-41. Presented at http://1937god.info/node/1282 
(accessed 14 November 2019). 
810
 N. Ye. Varfolomeyev, Udarnaya armiya [The Shock Army] (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1933), 
187-189. 
811
 Ibid., 15-158. 
812
 Cf. Ibid., 152-153. 
  242  
Varfolomeyev discussed the different roles of the front and its assigned armies along the same 
lines as Movchin, although he did not explicitly use the term complexity. He developed the 
operational-tactical interactions into more detail. The difference between the operational and 
the tactical echelons was while the front “simultaneously pursues several goals and operates 
in several operational directions, the army pursues one goal and operates in one operational 
direction.”813 The chapter “The shock army within the front (Army group)” delved in more 
detail into the same kind of operational-tactical concerns that were forwarded in the 
conclusion. Just as Triandafillov and Movchin, Varfolomeyev maintained that practical 
operational art was about offensive operations to break in, break-through, and break out of an 
echeloned defence to advance into the rear areas of the enemy’s formation.814 Their 
discussions of the command and control issues of the armies’ simple operations within the 
front’s complex operations reveal how operational art had evolved from a theoretical concept. 
As the example above illustrates, the terms complex and complexity were linked to specific 
tasks, functions, and roles at the operational and tactical levels. 
 
On the one hand, these Soviet works on operational art were about developing the character of 
operational art in an offensive strategy of destruction. On the other hand, the discussions of 
complexity, command, and management questions explored some of the central issues of the 
nature of operational art. These were chiefly operational art’s part in warfare's totality, 
complexity management, and its interrelations with strategy and tactics. These Soviet authors 
set the operations in 1918 Allied offensive as their starting point for developing the character 
of the future operational art for the Red Army. When Soviet strategy developed into an 
offensive strategy of destruction, historical cases changed accordingly. Nevertheless, 
operational art as a new military discipline was defined and described based on the Allied 




After the defeat in the First World War, the Imperial German Army was replaced by the 
Reichswehr, which was severely limited in numbers and equipment by the Versailles Treaty. 
The Allies abolished the General Staff, but its core of general staff officers and functions was 
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preserved within the inner structures of the Reichswehr. This clandestine continuation of key 
personnel from the Imperial army secured a vital continuity of German military thinking, 
especially its operational thought.815 
 
Gerhard P. Groß describes the German military’s reaction to the defeat in 1918 by an army 
who proclaimed itself to be “undefeated in the field”, as a military crisis of reason and 
purpose (eine militärische Sinnkrise). The crisis's core issue was not the loss of the war, but 
whether a rapid mobile form of warfare was still possible alongside the positional trench 
war.816 The fundamental question of whether the established operational thought of rapid 
mobile operations was the right one was never raised. Such questions were prevented by the 
personification of the debate in a search for scapegoats for the defeat. The basic German 
understanding was that the commander himself should quickly make the right operational 
decision, not an abstract staff apparatus. The person deemed responsible for the defeat was 
Chief of the General Staff in 1914, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, nephew of the elder 
Moltke. He was accused of diverting from the original Schlieffen Plan and of indecision 
during the offensive in Belgium and France. Moltke died in 1916 and was unable to have his 
voice heard in the post-war debate. 817 
 
In blaming Moltke for being indecisive (entscheidungsschwach), the disciples of Schlieffen 
could hold one specific person responsible for the defeat, instead of questioning an abstract 
set of intermingled causes or criticising living persons that would be able to defend 
themselves. By directing any critique away from the army’s leadership, it was possible to save 
the “secret of victory”. The “Schlieffen School” controlled the archives, writing the official 
history of the war, and could shape the public perception. This narrative emphasised Moltke’s 
role in the defeat; therefore, operational thought did not have to be questioned or criticised. 
Moltke’s successor, Erich von Falkenhayn, responsible for the failed Verdun offensive, was 
also a personified explanation of defeat. Groß asserts that psychopathological personality 
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Groß further maintains there was no realistic German analysis of the military-economic 
potential or the strategic power relations between the great powers. The lack of such an 
understanding among the German military elite allowed them to continue to cling to an 
operational thinking independent of policy. Consequently, there was never any understanding 
or acceptance that strategy must be defined by policy. The belief was still that offensive 
operational warfare would allow Germany to outmatch the superiority in resources of an 
enemy coalition. The Versailles peace agreement left Germany with its 100,000 strong and 
lightly armed border defence force, the Reichswehr. On the other hand, this new reality never 
became any precondition for German operational thought during the Weimar Republic. 
German operational thinking continued unaffected by circumstances in its pre-war pattern.819 
 
After the defeat in the World War, German understandings of future war can be categorised in 
three main groups. The first proclaimed that future war would turn into a war of exhaustion 
and of mass and material. Such a war could only be won by an “an unwavering fighting spirit 
and tenacity of the people.” The second group was oriented towards technology, where the 
exploitation of all technological possibilities, such as aeroplanes and tanks, was the only way 
to revive mobile warfare. The third group would overcome the trench war by modifying 
operational thought. A stronger focus of effort (Schwerpunktsbildung), wider flanking 
movements, and more consistent exploitation of surprise and successful breakthroughs would 
bring the armies out of the deadlock of trench warfare. A common precondition for all groups 
was to win back the control over the overall leadership of the war effort from the civilian 
authorities.820  
 
The operational thinking of the Reichswehr was, to a great extent, conditioned by its 
commanders. During Major General Reinhardt's term as head of the Reichswehr, the 
understanding of future war mirrored the Allied 1918 offensive; massive firepower and a wide 
breakthrough that developed slowly as artillery fire moved forward followed by tanks. This 
understanding was also much in line with contemporary French thinking.821 In 1920, 
Reinhardt was succeeded by Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, who had completely different 
interpretations of the World War and thoughts about the future. Seeckt remodelled the 
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100,000 strong Reichswehr into a training institution for a modern army. It had a high density 
of officers in the various staff levels. Furthermore, all regular soldiers were trained to the next 
higher level. Seeckt’s interpretation of the World War was that the defeat was caused by the 
difficulties of leading an immovable mass army incapable of rapid, decisive operations. The 
combination of increased firepower and reduced quality of the troops due to the expansion of 
the mass army would inevitably lead to positional warfare. Seeckt discarded the idea of the 
mass army and thought of the Reichswehr as the cadre for a future professional army. The 
Reichswehr should be strong enough to counter a sluggish mass army, but small enough to 
excel in the mobile warfare that had been and remained the hallmark of the German army.822 
 
There was a continuity of Schlieffen’s strategic thought from the 1890s into the inter-war 
years. The core of the German operational thought was to prevail over an enemy coalition of 
superior resources by defeating each coalition member in turn by rapid mobile operations. 
This continuity of thought survived the defeat in the First World War. The means to succeed 
was Seeckt’s professional all-arms army that could launch an offensive without prior 
mobilisation. The continuity of pre-war thinking was also seen in applying break-through and 
envelopment as the primary operational methods. Similarly, a tactical defensive engagement 
would always be decided by counter-attacks. The battle to secure tactical success was to 
follow at the end of each operation and tactics should be dovetailed with the operation. The 
operational breakthrough was closely tied into the offensive envelopment that. The 
destruction of the enemy forces would decide the outcome. Seeckt was challenged by Lt Col 
Joachim von Stülpnagel, a general staff officer serving as chief of the operations department 
of the Truppenamt (the Army High Command). The question was in principle if it was only 
the army that should wage war, as in Seeckt’s view, or if, according to Stülpnagel, the entire 
population should be involved. Society as the whole would mobilise to exhaust and wear 
down the enemy in a popular war. On the other hand, Seeckt and Stülpnagel agreed that the 
regular army was to decide the war by encirclement and destruction. Another pre-war 
continuity was that neither the operational concepts nor the individual officers regarded policy 




 Groß, Mythos und Wirklichkeit, 150-153; Matthias Strohn, "Hans Von Seeckt and His Vision of a 'Modern 
Army'." War in history 12, no. 3 (2005): 318-37. 
823
 Ibid., 155-165; William Mulligan, "Weimar and the Wars of Liberation: German and French Officers and the 
Politics of History." European history quarterly 38, no. 2 (2008), 268-270; Gil-li Vardi, "Joachim von 
Stülpnagel's Military Thought and Planning," War in History 17, no. 2 (2010);  
  246  
German war games and war planning in case of a war with Poland changed somewhat when  
General Groener became Minister of Defence in January 1928. The inclusion of the 
Kriegsmarine (Navy) in strategic planning indicated a joint perspective at the strategic level. 
The series of studies for an attack to reduce the fortified Polish port of Gdynia, was, on the 
other hand, illustrative of the lack of actual joint planning between the Army and Navy. The 
planning was in parallel, but the Navy’s ambitions were out of sync with the army’s 
abilities.824 The army’s planning sought to integrate emerging technologies, such as tanks, 
forbidden by the Versailles Treaty. In the period, the war games and manoeuvres emphasised 
the offensive to envelop and encircle enemy forces and train lower echelon leaders in rapid 
decision-making and offensive action.825 These were the fundamental qualities of the 
traditional German symbiotic relationship between Auftragstaktik and the offensive.826 Citino 
makes a point of the emergence of Blitzkrieg in this period as something new.827 However, 
there were more continuities than novelties in the process, an issue that Shimon Naveh 
emphasised in his study on operational art, especially in his chapter 4, “The Blitzkrieg 
Concept: A Mechanized Manipulation of Tactical Patterns”.828 
 
The Wehrmacht began the Second World War with the same doctrinal approach as the 
Imperial army in 1914. A practice that also was continued in the spring offensives in 1918. 
The new technologies of tanks and attack aeroplanes allowed for an extended operational 
reach, while the command culture and professionalism allowed for a maximal tactical effect 
to pursue extensive strategic ambitions. The German bottom-up approach that was inherited 
from the elder Moltke would contribute to the disconnection between policy and strategy, 
while the validity of the traditional operational concepts was never seriously questioned. 
German operational art was still nothing but an extension of the tactical space, where audacity 
and tactical professionalism could secure strategic gains against formidable opposition. The 
“strange victory” against France and Britain in 1940 is the most celebrated case. The joint 
Operation Weserübung against Denmark and Norway is a remarkable example of strategic 
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risk-taking. Airpower ruled the waves and severely limited Allied operations at sea and on 
land.829 
 
Gerhard P. Groß concludes that the initial victorious and unplanned “Blitzkriegen” disguised 
that the problems of mobile warfare had not yet been solved. Only 10 per cent of the 
Wehrmacht was motorised in 1940 and logistics were still neglected. On the other hand, the 
war in Russia revealed “the structural strategic deficit” in German operational thought, where 
the enhanced focus on the operational level had caused a neglect of the strategic.830 Although 
German operational thought was advanced and their tactical proficiency great, it was one-
sided. Furthermore, its neglect of strategy disclosed an institutional understanding of the 
nature of operational art. The emphasis on decisive battles and the narrow focus on rapid 
mobile warfare ignored modern war's other dimensions. Svechin’s warning about the 
arbitrariness of dividing war into discrete disciplines and losing sight of war’s totality was lost 




The defeat of France in 1940 generated numerous studies of what went wrong, how and when 
the French failed, and what the Germans did right. Almost every field of military studies, 
from strategic culture to technology, and from command incompetence to commander’s 
recklessness, have been examined.831 The Russian émigré, Major General Boris V. Gerua, 
brother of Alexander Gerua who coined the term operatika, gave words to the impact of the 
French defeat among former Imperial Russian General Staff officers. In his memoirs, he 
wrote that Ferdinand Foch must have turned in his grave after the fall of France.832 Foch was 
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sidelined during the first years after the war when Philippe Pétain, commander of the French 
army, and Pétain’s conception of war was institutionalised in the army and shared by 
parliament members on both sides.833 
 
A few months after the armistice the General Headquarters published a note on the future use 
of tanks and artillery. The future French army was to be fully motorized. A variety of tanks 
would constitute its core, supported by mechanised infantry, armoured field artillery, and 
ground attack aviation. The new mechanised army would be a combined arms army with 
tanks at its core and supported by the other arms. In 1920, tanks were transferred from the 
artillery to the infantry. Despite the initial ideas of a motorised army, the primary mission of 
tanks would continue to be infantry support.834 
 
The last French doctrine of operations before the Second World War was published on 12 
August 1936.835 It covered the strategic role of army groups and armies and the tactical role of 
army corps and divisions. The doctrine was structured similarly as previous field service 
regulations that followed the 1895 edition.836 The strategic-tactical paradigm was constant 
through the editions, but the emphasis on the different levels of command and parts of the 
army varied between them. 
 
The role of the doctrine was to guide the planning and conduct of operations by army groups, 
armies, corps, and divisions. It did not provide any “strategic direction of operations”; 
whether operations were to be defensive or offensive, or if France was to adopt a defensive or 
offensive strategy in case of war. These decisions were for the politicians and the high 
command to decide, as it was in other countries. The use of the term doctrine to describe and 
explain France’s political and strategic approaches to defence and security issues is, at times, 
confusing since doctrine was about many things. Eugenia C. Kiesling sums up her 
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However modern the hardware, the doctrine with which the army intended to fight was 
fundamentally that of 1918, and material incompatible with that doctrine was adopted 
reluctantly or not at all.837 
 
Kiesling also clarifies that a doctrine is not an independent entity, but developed in a 
framework of constraints and possibilities. Security and defence policy and strategic direction 
all provide a set of constraints, direction, and a degree of freedom of choice regarding how to 
plan and conduct operations.838 Elizabeth Kier has a wider understanding of doctrine in her 
discussion of culture's role in shaping French doctrine between the wars. For Kier, doctrine is 
more a matter of strategic orientation than just a field manual for operations. Still, her 
argument about how culture influenced the framework for the development of doctrine 
expands Kiesling’s perspective.839 Phillippe Garraud defines and discusses doctrine as 
operational doctrine (doctrine opérationnelle) and argues for the “role of ideas”, in the form 
of “the conceptions that structured defence politics far beyond the conduct of contemporary 
military operations” to explain the fall of France.840 Such a conception, “a thinking framework 
that allows order and significance for pieces of information relevant for a proper 
understanding of a concrete problem”, can serve as a structuring tool, but also severely limit 
critical information or new interpretations that challenge established doctrinal pattern.841 
 
After the First World War, the French army developed its tactical conduct during the war's 
final years into doctrine. This doctrine emphasised the tightly and centrally controlled 
cooperation between artillery and limited manoeuvre by infantry and armour. Robert Doughty 
concludes in his introduction to the chapter on France in Krause and Phillips’ Historical 
perspectives of the operational art: 
 
Despite their interest in large formations, the French failed to develop a sophisticated 
understanding of the operational art of war. Even worse, they deformed its very nature 
by having operational concepts distort their tactical methods before World War I and by 
having tactical concepts distort their operational methods before World War II. These 
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The French army only developed the tactical experience from 1918 and not Foch’s strategic 
direction or the operations of the army groups. They excluded other theatres outside the 
Western Front and the experiences of other armies. Michel Goya describes the first post-war 
doctrine as very self-centred and linked to the past, which might have precluded critical 
analysis of the experiences before the 1918 offensives or the validity of new developments.843 
The strategic role Foch had in directing the operations of the army groups was not elaborated 
in French doctrine after 1918. Similarly, the function of army groups was understood within 
the realm of tactics. Doughty initially recounts the development of the term grand tactics,  
which was elaborated by Jean Colin in 1911. Colin wrote that “[t]his new part of the art of 
war takes its place between strategy and tactics. It melts into the one and the other.”844 He 
defined neither the nature nor the content of grand tactics any further.  
 
Furthermore, the concept of grand tactics was not used in any French high-level doctrines 
before either world war. In this sense, the doctrinal terminology was in line with Derrécagaix’ 
La guerre moderne.845 The French army’s doctrine understood warfare in the framework of 
strategy and tactics. At the same time, the term operation was used to refer to military actions 
at all levels, both offensive and defensive.846 Sabine Marie Decoup presents another problem 
in studying French operational art: the term operational had not been precisely defined, while 
French historians did not agree on its meaning.847  
 
The French army emphasised the tactical conduct of the methodical battle in the 1918 
offensive in their post-war doctrine. It developed rigid and mechanical procedures to control 
and coordinate the complicated systems of fire and movement. The idealised model was the 
Battle of Montdidier that was fought by Debeney’s First Army parallel with the battle of 
Amiens on August 8 to 11 1918 and taught at the École supérieure de guerre, the French Staff 
College. Doughty draws attention to the risk of a “dangerous degree of rigidity within their 
system for command and control”. The majority of decisions had to be made and coordinated 
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at the highest level of command. This system of “rigid centralization and strict obedience” 
severely reduced the ability to adapt to changes of enemy action outside the defined paradigm 
that the doctrine, force structure, and equipment were designed to handle.848 Doughty’s 
statement that the French army “failed to develop a sophisticated understanding of the 
operational art of war” appears as an understatement, since the French focused to such an 
extent on tactical management of combat.849 Goya argues along the same lines that the 
dominant so-called “material” school “replaces operational and tactical thinking with the 
application of ever more precise fire-management schemes.”850 
 
The first doctrine after the First World War, Instruction provisoirie du 6 octobre 1921 sur 
l'emploi tactique des grandes unités (the Provisional instructions on the tactical employment 
of large units of 6 October 1921), only mentioned the army group once. It was just an option 
for the high command of leading armies, which were “the fundamental unit of the strategic 
manoeuvre.”851 The doctrine presented the lessons learned from the war and the implications 
for future conflicts. The doctrine’s outlook was to avoid a repetition of 1914 by emphasising 
the primacy of fire in manoeuvre caused by the strength of the defence, and centralised 
control.852 The omission of an explicit role for the army group is remarkable, especially 
regarding the part the army groups had in managing both the defensive and the offensive 
operations in 1918. The 1913 doctrine had an entire chapter about the army group, stating its 
role and its primary purpose to “impose on the enemy the general battle in conditions likely to 
produce decisive results to end the war.”853 In light of the emerging role of the army groups as 
an operational command during the war, the omission of its role underlines the tactical focus 
of the 1921 doctrine. 
 
Doughty asserts that the tactical battle of Montdidier became the archetype battle in French 
military education. Any other lessons were subordinated to this preferred model.854 General 
Debeney, who commanded the First Army at Montdidier, was president of the editorial 
 
848
 Doughty, The seeds of disaster : the development of French army doctrine 1919-1939, 72-89; "French 
Operational Art: 1888–1940," 87-92. 
849
 "French Operational Art: 1888–1940," 69. 
850
 Goya, Les vainqueurs, 302; Doughty, The seeds of disaster : the development of French army doctrine 1919-
1939, 91-111. 
851
 Instruction provisoirie du 6 octobre 1921 sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités, 64. 
852
 Doise and Vaïsse, Diplomatie Et Outil Militaire, 339-344. 
853
 Conduite des grandes unités (1913), 18-20. 
854
 Doughty, The seeds of disaster : the development of French army doctrine 1919-1939, 9-11, 72-90. 
  252  
committee for the 1921 doctrine, which was led by Marshal Philippe Petain.855 None of the 
army group commanders in 1918 was part of the commission, neither was Marshal Ferdinand 
Foch. Pétain was the only member who had commanded an army group, the Groupe des 
armées du centre, from May 1916 to May 1917. However, that was before the army groups 
were directed strategically by an Allied supreme commander. Pétain and members of la 
maison Pétain were to define the defence concept for the next decades.856 
 
Goya explains further how the French generals that won the war influenced doctrine and the 
attitude of defensiveness, by staying in high office over the next decades and maintaining the 
concept of the methodological battle. The debate between Petain and Foch on the issue of an 
offensive element, a sword in addition to the defensive shield, did not lead to any changes in 
the dominating defensive conception. The lack of funding reinforced the defensiveness since 
there was little room to develop new offensive capabilities. Foreign and domestic political 
developments also reinforced the emphasis on defence. The Maginot line consumed a 
significant part of the funds that would otherwise have allowed for a modernization of the 
army, leaving it static and unable to respond to Germany’s re-militarisation of Rhineland in 
1936. Foch argued again that a defensive belt like the Maginot Line would allow for offensive 
operations elsewhere.857  
 
The 1936 Tactical instructions for large units was up-to-date in its understanding of modern 
warfare.858 It acknowledged the development of motorised and mechanised units, anti-tank 
capabilities, airpower and air defence, and communications technologies. Its introduction 
underlined these developments as the most critical issues that had changed since the 1921 
edition it replaced. The instructions specified that one of its aims was to set general rules for 
the new motorised and mechanised large units (divisions).859 There was no explicit French 
operational terminology comparable to the Soviet or German terms, such as operational art or 
 
855
 Goya, Les vainqueurs, 289-290. 
856
 AFGG X-I, 19; Doise and Vaïsse, Diplomatie Et Outil Militaire, 346-347; Doughty, The seeds of disaster : 
the development of French army doctrine 1919-1939, 9-10, 81-83; Conduite des grandes unités (1913), 15. 
857
 Martin S. Alexander, "In Defence of the Maginot Line: Security Policy, Domestic Politics and the Economic 
Depression in France" in French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 : The Decline and Fall of a Great 
Power, edited by Robert Boyce (London: Routledge, 1998), 165-170; ; Doise and Vaïsse, Diplomatie Et Outil 
Militaire, 340-341; Goya, Les vainqueurs, 289-296. 
858
 Instruction sur l' emploi tactique des grandes unités (1940). 
859
 Ibid., 15-21. 
  253  
operativ. The term operation was used in the tradition of Jomini as a general term for military 
activities and not related to any level of command or a specific form of military action. 
 
In light of the role of a culture of “defensiveness”, the content of the 1936 doctrine was, on 
the other hand, evenly balanced between offence and defence.860 It stated clearly that the 
offensive was the only form that could yield positive results and defence was only temporary 
until offensive action could be resumed.861 In this respect, it mirrored similar doctrines, such 
as the 1939 US Army FM 100-5, Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations.862 The 
chapter on the offensive said that the form of the attack would depend on the context. It would 
be a hasty attack if it followed a successful manoeuvre or methodical if launched against a 
stabilised front. Although the doctrine prescribed the methodical approach of a phased attack, 
the commander should adapt according to the situation and mission. No time should be 
wasted if the opportunity to exploit success presented itself. 863 If both forces were 
manoeuvring, it was imperative to exploit the meeting engagement to gain an immediate 
advantage to defeat the enemy.864 The methodical approach was only valid when the enemy 
had established fortified defences. However, even then, the attack should “press on 
immediately to prevent [the enemy] from reconstituting itself” when his front was broken.865 
The chapter on the employment of tanks described their different ways of use, which varied 
from infantry support, on the one hand, to penetration by large tank forces into the depth of 
the enemy on the other. Tanks should primarily operate in combined arms formations and be 
given central roles by the commanders of large units.866  
 
The army group was still an optional large unit that might be formed when several armies 
operate in the same theatre of operations. Although the army group's mission was primarily 
strategic, the army “is the fundamental unit of strategic manoeuvre.”867 The army group was 
just briefly described in two paragraphs and its role to “direct and coordinate the operations of 
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[its] armies”.868 The army group was the highest field command, subordinated to the high 
command. It would by default serve an operational role, although operational terminology 
was not explicitly used.  
 
French army groups served operational roles under the strategic direction of Ferdinand Foch 
in 1918, even then without operational terms. The commander’s position was reflected in the 
doctrine’s very first paragraph: “The personality of the chief has a major influence on the 
design and conduct of military operations.”869 The 1918 experience illustrates that the 
personalities of all the chiefs involved strongly influenced the planning conduct of operations. 
The different personalities of Foch and Pétain, the various army group commanders, and even 
army commanders, such as the aggressive Mangin, competed to exert influence on operations. 
The point is that doctrine is usually open to interpretations. As a norm, it is “authoritative but 
requires judgment in application.”870 Commanders’ judgement is influenced by more than 
personalities, not least the political and strategic context within which they operate. Henry 
Dutailly asserts that for General Gamelin, the French army commander after 1935, “the 
regulations are more than a simple guide; they express a doctrine of employment. The rule 
and its interpretations thus become masters of the action.” Dutailly further suggests that the 
experience of the fighting in 1940 proved that most senior officers applied the “receipt” and 
not the intentions (l'esprit) of the doctrine. 871  
 
Although the 1936 French doctrine for operations was a doctrine that emphasized the 
methodical battle, the text did not necessarily prescribe it for anything but breaking a fortified 
front. The doctrine did not favour or prohibit any particular form of operation, but it could not 
compensate for the conception of defensiveness or ill-suited strategic choices. But the 
doctrine also maintained the defensive outlook of its predecessor by stating that the new 
material conditions did not alter the conceptual direction of the 1921 instructions. Dutailly  
highlights a revealing contradiction between the principles introducing the 1936 doctrine and 
the detailed prescriptions for a 1918-style methodical battle. He concludes that the doctrine 
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initially had imagined future war, but then the writing commission set out to codify the 
past.872 
 
Doughty emphasized the context of the 1936 doctrine and that despite its new, modern and 
offensive-oriented terms and expressions; it was not implemented as anything but a default 
continuation of the de facto methodical battle doctrine of the past. Garraud’s explanations of 
“the conceptions” as the framework within which the doctrine would function reinforces 
Doughty’s argument. When doctrine is understood as “institutionalised beliefs about what 
works in war and military operations”, a doctrinal text is barely worth the paper it is written 
on, if there is no consensus about its practical use.873 According to Harald Høiback, one pitfall 
of doctrine is that “[d]octrine-like patterns of thought and cultural idiosyncrasies pop up and 
flourish whether we like it or not. By developing doctrine formally, we get a kind of 
control.”874 
 
Despite its formal and authoritative status, French doctrine could not escape the prevailing 
conception of “defensiveness”. Petain defined the inter-war development of the army’s 
approach to modern war, while the influence of Foch was marginalised. The 1930s marked 
the decisive victory of the maison Pétain over Foch and any competing military thought. The 
French institutionalised tactical continuity did not leave any place for operational thinking or 
operational art, nor the tactical adaptations to the future war the doctrine envisioned. Whether 
a French understanding of operational art would have mattered within the contextual 
framework of defensiveness that influenced French operations in 1940, lies outside this study. 
 
The United States 
 
In his book Carrying the war to the enemy : American operational art to 1945, Michael R. 
Matheny describes how the US Army and Navy developed “American operational art” in the 
services’ higher educational institutions.875 The planning, plans, war-gaming, and doctrines 
laid the foundations for the conduct of campaigns and operations in the Second World War by 
the Americans and their allies. The main difference between the US and the Soviet is the lack 
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of operational terminology and theory in the American case. That did not stop the Americans 
from conducting major operations that were even more complex than those of the Soviets, 
especially the large joint operations that included amphibious assaults. Therefore, the US case 
is interesting compared to the Soviet approach to operational art because it illustrates how 
experiences from the 1918 Allied offensive shaped the American understanding of modern 
war. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) took an independent part in two operations in 
the1918 offensive at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne. Individual American divisions and corps 
were also detached to British and French armies during the offensive. 
 
While the Red Army developed sophisticated theory and new terminology that allowed 
operational art to “be publicly articulated and discussed”, the Americans appears to “have 
been speaking prose without knowing anything about it”.876 Matheny’s thesis is that the US 
Army and Navy developed operational art as a de facto new military discipline that was at 
least as sophisticated as the Red Army’s but without the “terms and concepts”877 considered 
necessary to make it work. 
 
The US Army entered the First World War with “no plan for how America might contribute 
to the Allies, how an expeditionary force might be organized, or even how the War 
Department itself might be expanded.”878 After the war, the US Army and Navy analysed 
their experiences and began a learning process that culminated in the extensive US joint 
operations in the Second World War. The army decided to use its Command and General 
Staff School (later College) and War College to develop high-level doctrine, write the Field 
Service Regulations, and write and war-game the war plans. The Staff School educated its 
students through academic and military theoretical courses and trained them in the planning 
and conduct of operations using war plans and associated scenarios.879 
 
Matheny describes William K. Naylor’s book, Principles of Strategy, as the first indigenous 
American book on military theoretical subjects. Naylor wrote in the Jominian tradition and 
referred to Victor-Bernard Derrécagaix and von der Goltz, whom he often paraphrased.880 
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Derrécagaix also directly quoted and paraphrased von der Goltz’ The Nation in Arms and 
maintained Jomini’s understanding of strategy and tactics.881 Naylor’s understood military 
operations as 
 
certain groups of actions, in the same theater of war, consisting of concentrations, 
marches, occupations of positions, and combats that follow each other in logical order, 
each successive one inseparably growing out of the preceding one. This group then 
would be called an operation and the plan would be called the plan of operations.882 
 
This description of operations contained many of the same elements that Svechin had in his 
definitions, which formed the basis for the Soviet development of operational concepts and 
doctrine. Although Svechin elaborated more on theoretical issues and definitions, the basic 
understanding of operations by the Soviets and Americans was all the same.883 The difference 
was that the Soviets refined the theoretical elements and explicitly developed operational art 
as the third military discipline. 
 
Naylor was more ambiguous in his definition of “campaign” and took some precautions based 
on recent historical experience: 
 
We cannot draw a very definite distinction between an operation and a campaign other 
than to say that when the events within a theater or theaters of war form a certain 
combination unbroken as it progresses, it is usually properly called a campaign. And, 
when, as a result of some more or less great change or catastrophe, new combinations 
begin to develop, or are developed, we have a break in that campaign and another 
begins.884 
 
These observations must not be taken literally to indicate that there was little consensus on 
these terms. But, they must instead be understood as an academic discussion to clarify the 
meaning and content of terminology in the emerging modern character of war. 
 
Naylor also stated that battles were related to tactics, while operations were parts of 
strategy.885 Campaigns were also within the domain of strategy. Compared to the Red Army, 
there was no distinct operational terminology. Naylor continued Jomini’s strategy-tactics 
paradigm in his book: 
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For the purposes of this study, the definition of Jomini seems to be sufficient. He says 
"strategy is the art of maneuvering armies in the theater of operations ; tactics, the art of 
disposing them upon the battlefield." It will be understood that this is an incomplete 
definition but serves the purpose until a more detailed discussion of the subject is taken 
in its proper place.886 
 
Naylor did not conduct a more detailed discussion in his book but maintained his modern 
perception of the three elements campaign, operations and battles within the military 
disciplines of strategy and tactics. 
 
In The fundamentals of military strategy, published in 1928, Oliver Prescott Robinson 
maintained Naylor’s interpretation of operation and campaign. The book was based on his 
lectures at the US Army Command and Staff College and used in the inter-war years at both 
the Army and Naval War and Staff Colleges.887 Robinson began his book by discussing the 
role of the battle and modernised Clausewitz’s definition of strategy by simply replacing 
battle with “operations of war”, 
 
which includes all those things which precede and lead up to the battle and the threat of 
battle, as well as the battle itself, there results the all-inclusive definition: "Strategy is 
the use of the operations of war to gain the end of the war."888 
 
Robinson stated its purpose to “attain the national or political object through the complete, 
partial or threatened achievement of the military aim, under the existing political, economic 
and military conditions.”889 Strategy solved its purpose by conducting operations that “by 
directing the armies and their concentration on the battlefield, provides tactics with the tools 
for fighting and assures the probability of victory;”890 The strategic-tactical duality was 
consistent. Operations were defined as parts of strategy, although both Naylor and Robinson 
mentioned tactical operations in the context of the strategic defensive.891 Neither Naylor nor 
Robinson used any moderating terms, such as grand, major, or minor tactics, although Naylor 
briefly stated that tactics was sometimes called grand tactics.892 None of these elements 
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Matheny highlights the US Army Command and Staff School’s Principles of strategy for an 
independent corps or army in a theater of operations as the most remarkable document of that 
institution, a document that was also quoted at the War Colleges.893 The text initially cut 
through various terms and decided to use “the conduct of war” to employ the armed forces 
and national policies and economic measures to win the war.894 Strategy concerned itself with 
concentrating superior combat power in a theatre of operations and had four “objects” that 
would disrupt or unhinge the enemy’s strategic dispositions. Tactics was “the art of executing 
the strategic movements before the battle and of employing combat power on the field of 
battle.” The text was normative in emphasising the principles of war and statements such as 
“The art of strategy lies in applying principles to the solution of problems”.895 The book 
provided staff college students with a structured template of applying these principles and 
guidelines to adapt them to a given situation.  
 
Operational elements were found in both the realms of strategy and tactics and expressed in 
the terms manoeuvre, movements, wide envelopments, frontal advance, and penetration. The 
lack of a clear expression of operational art or other explicit operational terms was, to some 
extent, compensated by the descriptions of roles and responsibilities at the levels of command 
where plans were developed. The section “The Plan of the Commander” distinguished 
between the campaign plan and the plan of an operation. The campaign plan was “the general 
conduct of forces in a single theater of operations”. The plan of an operation was “a strategic 
and tactical phase of a campaign–a phase which generally involves several strategic and 
tactical operations”.896 In Chapter IV on the defensive manoeuvre, operational elements were 
discussed in the sections on the various forms of defence, especially in exploring the 
interactions between the strategic and tactical elements.897 
 
The US Naval War College text-book Sound Military Decision had its origins back to 1910, it 
was updated in 1936 and reprinted in 1942. Matheny states the book was “the primary 
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statement of the Naval War College’s views on planning throughout World War II.”898 
Military operations were defined as “[a]ppropriate action to create or maintain a situation” 
and consisted of 
 
an act, or a series of included acts (i.e., work), of a military character. A military 
operation may consist of an entire campaign, or even of several such, constituting a 
clearly defined major stage in a war; or such an operation may consist of portions 
thereof.899  
 
The definition is unusually comprehensive since it also included campaigns, which 
contradicted the book’s understanding of the campaign as 
 
a clearly defined major stage of a war. [...] It may consist of a single operation, or of 
successive or concurrent operations. The operations of a campaign have properly a 
definite objective, the attainment or abandonment of which marks the end of the 
campaign.”900  
 
The subsequent text on operations plans was in line with the understanding of operations’ role 
in the campaign.901 Except for the sentence that stated that an operation might include 
campaigns, the book was consistent in its use of operation as a general term for military action 
and included specified operations, such as amphibious, joint, strategic, and tactical 
operations.902 
 
The discussion of the relationships between policy, strategy, and tactics, clearly stated the 
interdependencies between policy and strategy on one hand and strategy and tactics on the 
other: “Strategy and tactics are inseparable.”903 The strategic-tactical paradigm was 
maintained, while their interdependencies were emphasised to the point of ridiculing any 
thought of them working in isolation. Operations were defined within this context. The book 
was consistent with other text-books that were read at the army colleges in its understanding 
of the military disciplines. There were no implicit or explicit statements of an operational 
level or operational art as a military discipline. The definition of strategy did not explicitly 
include operations, such as in Robinson: “Strategy is the use of the operations of war to gain 
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the end of the war.”904 On the other hand, in Chapter V “The Four Steps in the Solution of a 
Military Problem”, operations were the means to accomplish strategic plans. However, if the 
commander’s mission was tactical; tactical operations were the means. In these discussions, 
operations could be both strategical and tactical.905 
 
Following the First World War, the US Army developed its First World War experience into 
the Field Service Regulations United States Army 1923 (FSR 1923). The FSR 1923 had 
tactical scope but provided a strategic context for operations and tactical actions. It was 
“designed especially for the government of the operations of large units and small units 
forming a part of larger units.”906 Similar to the contemporary French 1921 Instruction 
provisoire, an army “plans and executes the broader phases of strategical and tactical 
operations necessary to carry out that part of a given strategical mission directly assigned it by 
higher authority.” In contrast to the Instruction provisoire, the army group was given an 
explicit role under certain circumstances.907 The relations between operations and battles was 
stated in the first paragraph in the chapter on combat: “The ultimate objective of all military 
operations is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces by battle. Decisive defeat in battle 
breaks the enemy’s will to war and forces him to sue for peace.” The term operation was used 
frequently about military activities in general and not limited to any level of command. 
Operations could also be strategical and tactical operations, night operations, and air 
operations.908 
 
The higher level doctrines regulating operations with large units at the beginning of the 
Second World War were the US Army A Manual for Commanders of Large Units 
(provisional) from 1930 and the FM 100-5 Operations from 1939.909 The Manual for 
Commanders of Large Units was issued in a new edition and designated FM 100-15 in 
1942.910 The FM 100-5 was revised and re-issued in 1941 and again in 1944. There was no 
explicit operational terminology in any of these manuals. Strategy and tactics were the two 
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levels of war that were used. The 1942 edition of Large Units was expanded with a chapter on 
air forces and covered large units, such as army group, army, and army corps.  
 
In the 1930 edition of Large Units, strategy was for the commander in chief of a theatre of 
war and “designates the ends to be accomplished, allots the means, and assigns the tasks to 
subordinate commanders. From him must come the plans and impulses that guide and animate 
all below him.”911 The commander in chief was also “the master tactician”, while 
“[s]ubordinate commanders make tactical plans and carry them into execution.”912 The 
highest tactical unit was the army group, but it served mainly to coordinate armies, which 
were “the fundamental unit of strategical maneuver.”913 In the 1942 edition FM 100-15, the 
strategic manoeuvre was developed into a concept similar to the Soviet deep battle and deep 
operations. The strategic manoeuvre was the culmination of planning and staging and had the 
potential to decide the outcome of a campaign. The manoeuvre consisted of breakthrough, 
envelopment or turning movement, withdrawal, and counteroffensive. The manoeuvre's 
ambitions, the forces involved, and the size of the enemy forces (armies) were comparable to 
the aspirations of Soviet operational art in the same period. The chapter also included the 
defensive manoeuvre as an element of the chapter on strategic manoeuvres.914 
 
In the inter-war years, American text-books and the Field Service Regulations explored the 
strategic-tactical interfaces, interdependencies, and interactions and emphasised operations 
instead of battles. The terminology was consistent and maintained the strategic-tactical 
paradigm and war as a totality of was maintained from the political echelon through the 
military chain of command. Nevertheless, as Matheny describes in his book, the US Army 
and Navy were fully capable of planning and conducting campaigns and operations that bear 
all the hallmarks of modern strategy and operational art.915 Just as Monsieur Jourdain 
discovered, the Americans spoke prose. On the other hand, they were more concerned with 
expressing themselves than philosophising over linguistic genres.  
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Summary 
 
The interpretations of the First World War and the institutional understandings of future war 
by the Soviet Union, Germany, France, and the United States, share some similarities and 
fundamental differences. They share various traits of continuity and discontinuity in both how 
military thought developed and how future war and upcoming operations were perceived. 
These understandings were explicit, such as in military literature and doctrines. But they were 
also implicit and expressed by new ways of planning and conducting operations within the 
existing paradigm of strategy and tactics. 
 
The Allied 1918 offensive became the initial blueprint for the Soviet Union’s development of 
operational art as a new military discipline intersected between strategy and tactics. Together 
with indigenous experience, it formed the basis for the theory of operational art and its 
concepts for future doctrinal developments. When the Red Army began to develop operational 
methods for future war, the 1918 model of limited offensives were replaced by large deep 
operations by mechanised forces. The 1918 offensive was also the basis for the US Armed 
Forces’ development of the plans and force structures for a future war, emphasising large 
scale operations in the framework of campaigns. France developed the tactics of the 
methodical battle of 1918 but did not continue the offensive's operational or strategic 
dimensions. On the other hand, Germany discarded the Allied offensive and gave their storm-
troopers an operational reach in the form of armour and air forces. 
 
The Red Army’s institutional introduction of operational art as the third military discipline 
was the main interruption in military thought that set it out from its contemporaries. New 
terminology was developed, partly rooted in the General Staff of the Imperial Russian Army. 
The new terminology allowed for the phenomenon to be debated and developed into an 
explicit operational level doctrine. The implications of threats and technology were discussed 
within the new paradigm of the three interconnected military disciplines of strategy, 
operational art, and tactics. When the purges began in 1937, almost 80 % of the Red Army’s 
generals were caught in the frenzy, while the 1936 Provisory Field Service Regulation was 
banned. The futile and fragmented tactical counterattacks against the advancing German 
armoured thrusts during the first months of the invasion was the nadir of Soviet military art. 
Despite the catastrophic losses the first year of the Great Patriotic War, operational art 
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survived in the remaining General Staff Academy-trained officers and re-emerged in the 
counteroffensive at Stalingrad.916 
 
France and Germany are both examples of continuity, France embracing its most effective 
tactical conduct of battle in 1918 and Germany in its mechanisation of established offensive 
tactical patterns. The French army developed its orchestrated battle into an almost dogmatic 
tactical understanding. A defensive strategic attitude emerged that contributed to preclude any 
further development of tactics into the large operations that characterised the French army in 
the 1918 offensives.  
 
The German Reichswehr and Wehrmacht integrated mechanised formations and air forces into 
its well-proven tactical concept of Bewegungskrieg, which gave an operational reach the first 
years of the Second World War. But the German political and military leadership were still 
strategically inept and defined their strategic options based on their operational capabilities. 
Consequently, they did not develop an institutionalised understanding of operational art as a 
tool of strategy. On the contrary, they kept to their dogma of strategy as a system of 
expedients where superior tactical performance would develop tactical successes into strategic 
victory. 
 
After the First World War, the United States armed forces decided to be better prepared for 
modern war than they were in 1917. Both the US Army and the US Navy used their staff and 
war colleges to develop an understanding of operations in a future world war and to plan and 
war-game the plans as an element of its institutional learning. Lessons from the 1918 
offensives were integrated into the learning processes. The implications of modern technology 
and the potential of the industry were also brought into the process. Text-books and Field 
Service Regulations were written within the established strategy-tactics paradigm. Although 
new operational terminology comparable to the Soviet case was not developed, conceptual 
understanding, practical planning, and war-gaming for a modern industrialised world war 
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American military historians, such as Russel H. S. Stolfi and Russell F.Weigley, have 
criticised the American conduct of the operations it developed and prepared for in the inter-
war years.917 Other critics of operational art have in no small degree criticised the character of 
operational art of the Second World War for not being relevant in twenty-first-century wars 
and conflicts of a very different kind.918 What appears to be missing in the debate is a specific 
critique of the nature of operational art and not just the criticism of its character in the 
twentieth century. It is necessary to both understand the nature of operational art and have 
terminology that allows us to use theory 
 
to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled. Not 
until terms and concepts have been defined can one hope to make any progress in 
examining the question clearly and simply and expect the reader to share one’s views.919 
 
Modern operations emerged in the last part of the First World War. Operational art was the 
means to harness and manage tactics to reach the objectives set by strategy. The interaction 
between strategy, operational art, and tactics made it possible for the Allies to mount the 
successful offensive in 1918 that won the war. The new understandings of modern war that 
was developed by the Soviet Union and the USA were based on the Allied war-winning 
campaign on the Western Front. It is equally interesting how these lessons were lost to the 
traditional military elites in France and Germany. Perhaps just because they were traditional, 
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Conclusions 
 
Even in the age of “new wars” and COIN, Soviet “operational art” continues to exert 
an almost magnetic pull on the educational establishments of the U.S. Army, especially 
the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the School of Advanced Military 
Studies (SAMS), both at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. 
Robert M. Citino920 
 
This thesis is a product of years of frustration with broad, vague, and approximate definitions 
of operational art. Existing definitions are usually closely related to “operational warfare”, 
“operational maneuvre” and other “war-winning concepts”. The thesis argues that close 
examination of the emergence of operational art in the first half of the twentieth century 
provides a clearer conceptual framework for a more precise understanding of operational art, 
both historically and in relation to contemporary warfare.  
 
The thesis is not a rewriting of the history of the First World War. It aims to understand the 
closing years of the war in light of the new military discipline of operational art developed 
after the war and to a large extent influenced by the war’s final year. Nor does the thesis offer 
any new knowledge concerning the mechanisation of the Red Army and its development of 
deep battle and deep operations. Instead, it attempts to understand the nature of operational art 
by studying its initial conceptual development before it evolved into a specific Red Army 
operational doctrine. 
 
The theory and methodology chapter delineate a theoretical approach to pursue the research 
question based on Hans Delbrück’s Sachkritik (topical criticism) and the Cambridge School 
of history of ideas. The emphasis is on Quentin Skinner’s Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas. These allow for a critical study of both past ideas and events and tracing 
their intended meaning and purpose while avoiding imposing upon them twenty-first-century 
military doctrinal definitions. The chapter will also present a literature review and the military 
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The second and third chapters trace the origins of operational art as it began to emerge from 
the mid-nineteenth century as operational elements, pieces of a puzzle yet to be discerned. 
Armies responded to the tactical changes of increased range, precision, and volume of fire. 
The size and sustainability of these armies made it almost impossible to destroy them in 
battle. Operational elements began to influence operations in the American Civil War and the 
German Wars of Unification. These were single elements, such as directing clusters of tactical 
actions within an operation. Separate operational commands subordinated to the high 
command were formed, to direct groups of armies on behalf of the commander in chief. The 
observations and lessons of the wars were debated in the decades before the First World War. 
Some of the bits and pieces came together to form a vague pattern of the character of future 
war. After the Russo-Japanese War, Russian general staff officers were close to connecting 
the dots. They even gave the new sets of concepts a name: operatika (operatics), derived from 
the German operativ (operational). 
 
The fourth chapter considered the way operational elements were emerging as applied 
adaptations to the new character of warfare. Two modern and successful operations are 
studied to identify and understand these elements: the Russian 1916 Brusilov Offensive and 
the German 1918 Michael Offensive. Since both were tactically and operationally successful 
but failed strategically, they illustrate how operational art in itself was not sufficient in 
modern conventional war. It must be an integrated element in the totality of warfare. Several 
pieces of the puzzle had been connected, a pattern was beginning to appear, but some 
essential parts were still missing. 
 
The Allied offensive campaign in 1918 is the focus of the fifth chapter and the pivot of the 
thesis. The campaign consisted of a series of operations conducted both sequentially and in 
parallel along the Western Front. The Allied campaign was given overall strategic direction 
by the Allied supreme commander, Ferdinand Foch. The army groups planned and conducted 
the operations, while the armies did the fighting. During this campaign, modern operational 
art materialised as the bridge between strategy and tactics, to manage the complexity of 
modern war.  
 
The sixth chapter explains how the lessons and interpretation of the Allied 1918 offensive 
influenced different perceptions of future war. The Red Army developed operational art 
theoretically, while the western land powers continued to modernise their established 
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practices. The exception was the United States Army and Navy. After the First World War, 
the US Army acknowledged that they had been utterly unprepared for modern war and began, 
jointly with the US Navy, a pragmatic development of doctrines, procedures, and practices to 
conduct large-scale joint and multinational campaigns and operations. Despite their 
fundamental differences and the different character of their Second World War campaigns 
and operations, the Soviet Union and the USA shared similar conceptual understandings of 
modern war. These were mainly the interrelations between policy and strategy, campaigns, 
and operations and the role of operations in directing and sustaining tactical combat. The 
Americans lacked only the terminology. 
 
 
The literature emphasises two examples of operational art in the First World War, the Russian 
Brusilov Offensive in 1916 and the German Spring Offensives in 1918. The inept Russian 
strategic conduct allowed the Central Powers freedom of action to move reserves to counter 
the offensive. In 1918, the Germans allowed tactical success to divert the direction of the 
Michael Offensive by 90 degrees, directing it away from its intended objective of separating 
the British and French forces. Armies had begun to master innovative tactics and moderne 
operations but could not direct successful operational strategically. 
 
It was, on the other hand, in the 1918 Allied offensive that operational art had matured to 
manage complex operations within the framework of the campaign. The supreme commander 
laid out the direction for the operations and sequenced them in time and space. The operations 
harnessed the tactical combat by allotting them tasks and objectives that secured the 
objectives of the operations. 
 
The Allied commander, General Ferdinand Foch, deliberately directed the operations to 
outmanoeuvre the German strategic and operational reserves. This strategy reduced the 
German defences to purely tactical efforts where the only German options were to retreat or 
let the troops be destroyed in their trenches. The character of operational art was adapted to 
the specific conditions on the Western Front, where elaborate trench systems for four years 
had made any large scale operations aiming for breakthrough and strategic decision 
impossible. 
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The German Michael Offensive was an all-out effort to decide the war through one massive 
breakthrough operation. On the other hand, the Allied operations aimed to secure intermediate 
objectives that were nothing but small steps in the campaign. These sequential and limited 
operations allowed the Allies to maintain the offensive since they allowed the troops to 
recover between the operations. The pauses also provided time to bring up fresh supplies and 
replacements before the next limited blow. When one army group attacked, the others were 
able to recover and resupply for their next attack. Similarly, the army group system permitted 
some armies to rest when others fought. This method of alternating limited offensives also 
allowed the Allies’ to convert their superior industrial capacity to combat power. It further 
prevented overloading the supply lines by spreading the supplies to several lines of 
communications along the entire width of the front. 
 
The Allied operations were halted when the resistance increased to the point that further 
progress would be very costly in casualties. Operations were planned to succeed one another 
along the entire width of the front to maintain the strategic initiative and momentum. The 
army groups were tasked with planning and conducting their operations sequentially, so the 
enemy would suffer a continuous series of blows that would consume his reserves and wear 
down his front-line troops. It was the task of strategy to coordinate the operations in time and 
space to make the offensive a continuous effort and keep up sustained pressure on the enemy. 
These interactions between strategy, operational art, and tactics became the template for 
American and Soviet military writers who defined modern campaigns and operations in the 
next decades. 
 
This thesis emphasises the interwar American and Soviet theorists’ assertions that operational 
art is not an independent part of warfare, but closely interrelated with strategy and tactics. 
Both the interrelations and the delineation between these parts are somewhat arbitrary and 
have to adapt to the current character of warfare. Operational art was defined as a concept and 
military discipline by 1924, but only within the Red Army. It remained in the Soviet sphere 
until the early 1980s when the term entered the US Army reform process after the Vietnam 
War. Since then, operational art has both become a household concept in western militaries 
and criticised to the point of outright rejection.921 
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This thesis argues that operational art emerged to manage the increased military complexity of 
the industrialised people’s war. It was a fragmented and piece-meal emergence, where pieces 
of the puzzle, the operational elements, appeared and were lost again until the pieces 
conclusively came together in the final years of the First World War. Operational art was not 
the result of a deliberate development, but of several limited and unconnected pragmatic 
adaptations of offensive warfare to the character of industrialised war.  
 
Alexandr A. Svechin’s initial definition of operational art is the keystone of the thesis’ 
analytical framework. Svechin defined operational art in the context of modern strategy, 
where operational art was to harness and direct several tactical events to achieve intermediate 
objectives as part of a campaign. Svechin’s descriptions of operational art, modern strategy, 
and operations were a blueprint of the Allied offensive in 1918. His emphasis on strategy’s 
role in directing operations along a logical line of conduct mirrors how Foch operated as 
supreme commander. Svechin also outlined how operations would have to be limited efforts 
in a modern industrialised war. 
 
Svechin acknowledged the possibility of winning even a modern war by a strategy of 
destruction, but that would need an extraordinary victory. Such victories proved elusive on a 
strategic scale in the First World War. Furthermore, if such an initial decisive action failed, 
the war would take on the character of a war of exhaustion. Such a war had to be won by 
massive campaigns consisting of several limited operations until the enemy’s military and 
industrial capacities were broken. During the interwar years, the Americans reached the same 
conclusions in their war studies, war planning, and war games. They just did not come up 
with an explicit third military discipline the way the Soviets did. 
 
The French and German armies did not recognise operational art the same way the Americans 
and Soviets. The French maintained a tactical perspective on modern war and did not continue 
the operational role that the army group had acquired in 1918. Petain’s legacy pushed aside 
that of Foch. Despite a revised 1936 doctrine that balanced offensive and defensive 
approaches and included armoured forces both for independent manoeuvre and infantry 
support, an overarching conception of “defensiveness” overruled the flexibility embedded in 
the doctrine. The Germans, on the other hand, maintained the same offensive perspective of 
rapid, decisive offensives as in the previous decades. However, mechanisation and tactical 
airpower allowed them to expand the tactical offensive into the operational realm.  
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A seminal problem with the western perception of operational art is the lack of a reasonably 
precise definition. Reasonable in this context is a definition that sets operational art apart from 
strategy and tactics and defines it as it “is”. That means a definition that emphasises 
operational art’s enduring nature and not just what it resembles, its context-based character. 
Since current definitions tend to include large segments of both, operational art is too often 
defined within the framework of large-scale operational manoeuvres, or some particularly 
artful or creative application of military force. Military historians have therefore tended to 
apply such broad definitions of operational art to historical cases and reframe selected 
successful preindustrial warfare as operational art. Napoleon’s 1806 campaign against Prussia 
has been of particular interest in this regard.922 
 
Operational art’s nature is to manage the strategic-tactical interrelations in complex military 
operations.923 Complex military operations are those that are too extensive and intricate to be 
directed and managed by either the high command or the tactical units themselves. They 
therefore often need a separate headquarters intersected between the high command and the 
tactical forces. The complexity that caused operational art to emerge reflected the character of 
industrialised warfare. Operational art is nothing but military complexity management in war. 
It is not specifically about large-scale armoured operations or amphibious landings and 
AirLand Battle, to name a few popular perceptions. Any of these may well be how the 
character of operational art would express itself in the context of industrialised war. But, as 
this study illustrates, western understanding and definitions of operational art are to no small 
extent conditioned by what its character resembled in large scale conventional war. 
 
Contemporary critique and debate of operational art are thus criticising the character of 
operational art in an industrialised conventional war. The critique rarely grasps its 
fundamental nature of bridging strategy and tactics. If operational art is still to be a relevant 
concept, and if there is to be a meaningful debate, it must be released from the procrustean 
bed of “operational warfare”, “operational maneuvre”, and other characteristics of 
conventional industrialised war. It must consequently be understood within its nature, which 
is to manage the strategic-tactical interrelations in complex military operations. Therefore, the 
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debate and critique of operational art need to be within the strategic context where operations 
are to be carried out. Similarly, the character of each war must be defined to such an extent 
that it can be the basis for debate and critique of the role of operational art in the specific war. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated how operational art emerged in the first place to bridge the gap 
between strategy and tactics in the era of world wars. The character of contemporary war is 
different from the world wars since its complexity is more than often not military but 
political. Whether operational art as a concept is to have any meaningful role in contemporary 
conflicts, depends on whether strategy and tactics will manage the strategic-tactical 
interactions themselves or if the military complexity is so comprehensive that an “intervening 
concept” is needed.924 The assertion that modern conflicts will be fought in a “post-
operational era” must similarly be assessed in light of the nature of operational art and its role 
in managing military complexity.925 
 
Finally, the thesis has opened up further questions. The first is why only the Americans and 
the Soviets were able to identify operational art and integrate it into their planning and 
preparations for the next war, while the French and Germans did not. My hypothesis is that 
both the US and the Soviet Union emerged from the First World War without any traditions 
or military institutions that would resist such a fundamental change that a new military 
discipline would demand. Both countries also had their own motivations to change. The US 
was unprepared for modern war when it entered the First World War in 1917, while the USSR 
was an international pariah state surrounded by enemies and had, at least its first decade, an 
open mind to modern science and strategic development.926 
 
Other issues that have caught my attention are how operational art was established in the west 
and why several different interpretations and definitions have developed, both in NATO and 
in western countries. The initial introduction by the US Army in the debate leading up to the 
1986 Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations, gives the impression that operational art was not 
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a prominent element in the reform process and initially limited to the higher tactical level 
(corps operations).927 Jacob Kipp’s observation that  
 
the end of the Cold War [...] left operational art as something of an overripe fruit too 
long on the vine. In this new security environment and in the absence of threat, it 
appeared to be a concept without a rationale or intellectual platform928 
 
is a clear invitation to study operational art’s introduction to the west. 
 
A final question pertains to the role of complexity in contemporary operations. Is the 
complexity military, which means that either strategy, operational art, or tactics can manage 
it? Or is the complexity contextual, such as political or societal, which means that most of its 
solutions are outside the military sphere? Any answer must dive into the nature of the military 
disciplines and not just accept what they currently resemble. These questions cry out to be 
answered in light of the recent expeditionary wars in the Middle East that to a great extent 
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Glossary 
Sources: 
AFGG Les armées françaises dans la Grande guerre (The French Official History) 
BAMA  Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv (The German Federal Military Archive) 
GRDP WW-1 Rossiysko-Germanskiy proyekt pomoshch' otsifrovke germanskikh 
dokumentov v arkhivakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The German-Russian 
digitalization project of German documents in Russian archives), the First 
World War documents. 
OHGW Great Britain, The Official History of the Great War. 
Weltkrieg Der Weltkrieg (The German Official History).  
 
Abbreviations 
AEF American Expeditionary Force 
AGB German Army Group Boehn (Heeresgruppe Boehn) 
AGR  German Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht 
AGW  German Army Group Crown Prince Wilhelm 
BEF British Expeditionary Force 
CO Commanding officer 
FM  Field Manual 
FSR Field Service Regulations 
G.A.C. Central Army Group (Groupe d'armées du Centre) 
G.A.E. Eastern Army Group (Groupe d'armées de l’Est) 
G.A.F. Army Group Flanders (Le groupe d'armées des Flandres) 
G.A.N. Northern Army Group (Groupe d’armées du Nord) 
G.A.R. Reserve Army Group (Groupe d’armées de Réserve ou de Rupture) 
GHQ The BEF General Headquarters  
HQ  Headquarters 
OHL  German Army’s High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung) 
PMR  Permanent military representative to the SWC 
RAF  The Royal Air Force 
SWC  The Allied Supreme War Council 
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